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INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2011, I was invited to attend a conference organised by the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The conference was called “Tropical Forests: starting points and new 
challenges - which orientations for French actors?” In the year 2011, talking about forests was 
very much in vogue: the United Nations declared 2011 the international year of the forests 
and in December, world leaders gathered at the Durban Summit to discuss climate change and 
tropical forests’ protection. The conference in Paris was attended by a wide range of actors, 
from environmental campaigners to bank managers, international organisations’ 
spokespersons to scholars, journalists, directors of transnational corporations and 
representatives from foreign Forest Service Departments. Because I had read articles and 
watched TV reports about such conferences, I was aware that in the past two decades, there 
had been a strong incentive from governments and civil society groups to open the floor for 
discussion to as many “stakeholders” as possible. What I didn’t get from such reports, 
however, was the question of language: during those meetings, who was saying what? What 
was the environmental campaigner speaking about? How was the banker or the international 
organisation’s spokesperson reacting to it? How were those actors coming from different 
sectors and with different interests communicating with each other? Being in the conference 
room on that particular day, my conventional assumptions about environmental politics were 
highly challenged. When Mr. Simon Rietbergen was invited to come on stage and give his 
presentation, I looked at the stage in front of me and wondered: “would I have seen this ten 
years ago?”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conference on Tropical Forests, source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Mr Rietbergen works for the World Bank. He is responsible for supporting and implementing 
the institution’s forestry programs. The person who was inviting him to the stage – and acting 
as the moderator for the discussion – was Mr Martin Perrier, the Director of the Office 
National des Forêts International (ONFI). The desk on which Mr. Rietbergen had put his 
documents had a board on which one could read: “Gouvernement Français – Conférence sur 
les Forêts Tropicales” (French government - Conference on Tropical Forests). On the screen 
behind him was displayed a rather large picture featuring a quote from Gandhi and a black 
and white panda logo [see picture below]. The previous speaker must have simply forgotten to 
close his PowerPoint presentation. So maybe it was just a coincidence that, looking at the 
stage, I could see a World Bank representative giving a speech for the French government 
with a WWF logo in his back.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WWF image displayed during the conference, source: WWF 
“Live simply so others can simply live” 
 
Talking about the previous speaker, here was another interesting observation: Jochen 
Krimphoff is WWF-France Assistant Director for International Programs. In the beginning of 
his speech, he presented himself as one of the founders of a consultant group named 
“Conservation Alliance” which aims at providing business and financial advice to 
conservation NGOs. Keywords in his speech included: finance, investment and return on 
investment. For twenty minutes, Jochen Krimphoff lectured about trust funds, endowment 
fund, sinking fund, revolving fund and insisted on telling the audience that the US$ 810,000 
of capital gathered by the Conservation Finance Alliance had “resisted the 2008 financial 
crisis very well”. Of course, no one should ever believe that a NGO does not have to deal with 
a minimum of financial management to run its programs and remunerate its employees on the 
basis that is it non-for-profit. The point, to me, is not so much that Jochen Krimphoff was so 
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persistent on linking finance with biodiversity but, instead, that his mastering of corporate 
language seemed equal, if not higher, to the banker from Société Générale – who was much 
more cautious about using such a language. Each actor was tapping into the register of the 
other, sometimes with discomfort, as in the case of the banker, sometimes with a lot of 
confidence, like Mr Krimphoff, WWF Assistant Director for International Programs. A 
mental photograph of the stage gave the following picture: the juxtaposition of a diversity of 
actors and symbols that was extremely powerful and … new. When did WWF spokespersons 
start talking about finance and bank managers lecturing about forest protection, like the 
spokesperson from Société Générale who presented his company as a “promoter of 
sustainable development in the tropical timber sector”? Undeniably, what I witnessed during 
this conference reflected a broader shift in environmental politics, the most notable and 
visible being the change in NGOs relationship with private companies.  
 
Nevertheless, the question that I shall ask here is not: “are such types of alliances desirable?”, 
which would require judgments rather than analysis, but instead “how do such partnerships 
come to exist, what do they result in, how are they perceived, and what do they rely on?” 
 
Bankers, NGO workers, researchers, government representatives, private companies and 
financial experts drinking coffee together to discuss the future of tropical forests: was this the 
new norm for environmental politics? When and why did it start? Did anyone object to such a 
change? What surprised me the most was not the fact that government actors, bankers, 
conservationists and business experts were talking to each other but, rather, that they all 
seemed to be using the language of the other. This “hybridity” of discourses and performances 
got me lost: who was who? Why was the WWF agent talking about finance and the banker 
from Crédit Agricole promoting tree plantation in the Congo Basin? What could explain that 
one of the key speakers of the conference was the representative of a transnational company 
lecturing about “forests and global private investments”? Is it purely because, as many would 
argue, forest conservation recently became a bankable and profitable activity? Or are there 
other factors driving companies to seat behind a WWF logo?  
 
Incontestably, this shift in NGO-private companies relations is also a shift in expectations. As 
academics, journalists and citizens, we have grown accustomed to a certain way of talking 
about the environment. And so have we grown accustomed to hearing certain actors or 
institutions speak about the environment too. Reading newspaper articles and seeing 
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demonstrations in the streets, I had personally grown accustomed to environmental NGOs and 
civil society groups teaming up together against private companies and corporate greed. In 
such a context, corporate capital and profits did not seem to go well with environmental 
protection and the safeguard of tropical forests. On a professional level, I had also met with 
grassroots organisation leaders, “indigenous” groups, and citizens who very often identified 
transnational corporations’ activities in their country as a threat to their everyday life.  
 
But the field of environmental politics is now at a transitional phase. The “sustainability 
transition” referred to in the title of this thesis describes this very particular moment when, 
one the one hand, certain civil society groups are calling for action against corporate 
“greenwashing” while, on the other hand, a growing number of NGOs perceive it is time to 
open room for communication, discussion and partnership with the business world. The latter 
standpoint is often based on research indicating that greenhouse gas emissions, water 
pollution together with the production of fifteen specific commodities are the greatest threats 
to environmental NGOs’ priority “hotspots” – the places NGOs actively try to safeguard. 
According to Jayawickrama (2011: 2), domain manager for Humanitarian and Development 
NGOs at Harvard University Hauser Center for Non-profit Organizations, “100 corporations 
touch 25 percent of those fifteen commodities, which include palm oil, soy, cotton, sugarcane, 
timber and seafood. Given this concentration, WWF’s theory of change [working in 
partnership with corporation] argues that, if it can positively influence the way these 
commodities are produced, traded and financed, then global markets for these commodities 
can be tipped toward sustainability,” Jayawickrama explains.  
 
 
WWF poster. The panda stencil reveals an image of the sky to convey the idea of clean air, source WWF. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to point out that even though the number of NGOs extending 
their hands to private companies is growing, the practice of creating partnerships with the 
corporate world remains debated and contested. As I witnessed during my fieldwork in Paris 
and Madagascar, considerable tensions exist between NGOs when it comes to answering the 
following question: what is the best approach for an environmental organisation to make 
companies more accountable for their carbon footprint? For some, partnerships with 
transnational corporations are considered “pacts with the devil”. For others it is a “change of 
paradigm necessary to guarantee sustainable development” [interview with WWF-
International Communication Officer, January 16, 2012]. Interestingly, and even within 
NGOs keen on opening their doors to the corporate world, there is still a feeling that “we 
shouldn’t be completely naive about it, we have to be very cautious with companies that have 
a whole army of communication officers to green themselves and sometimes do so through 
unjustified means,” Program Officer for the French Foundation GoodPlanet warns [interview, 
January 17, 2012].  
 
On the corporate side, the idea of partnering with NGOs seems to make much more 
unanimity. In contrast to environmental organisations which often refuse alliances with 
private company for ideological reasons and fear losing credit in the eyes of their general 
public, the only factor likely to stop a private company from teaming up with a NGO is 
limited financial capacity to afford it. For companies that do have the finances to go into 
partnerships with NGOs, there is a strong belief that receiving bad press about their 
involvement in “sustainable” projects is part of the price a corporation should pay in order to 
build the relationships likely to be indispensable during the sustainability transition, Elkington 
argues (1998: 39). The reason companies are willing to pay this price, as the January 2004 
edition of The Economist clearly states, is because “Greed is out. Corporate virtue, or the 
appearance of it, is in”. Sustainability is very much in vogue to the extent that “being 
sustainable” is no longer just a competitive advantage for companies but, additionally, a norm 
in contemporary business strategies. As Crook (2005) explains in a column for The 
Economist, “it would be a challenge to find a recent annual report of any big international 
company that justifies the firm's existence merely in terms of profit, rather than ‘service to the 
community’ [..] Big firms nowadays are called upon to be good corporate citizens, and they 
all want to show that they are”. It therefore no longer comes as a surprise to see that the vast 
majority of “big international companies” have a Sustainable Development division as well as 
a CSR agenda. This change in paradigm has led James Leape, Director General of WWF 
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International, to tell a business audience in Geneva in 2008 that “sustainability is no longer 
just a matter of corporate social responsibility, it is a fundamental business proposition […]. 
We are talking about a new bottom line” (WWF, 2008)1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The downside of CSR”, source: IDRAC 
 
The “sustainability transition” referred to in the title of this thesis defines a period that started 
with the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, a 
turning point in the development of global environmental politics. Since the 1970s, the 
environment has become a burning topic on the agenda of many international institutions and 
governments. There has been a “greening” of global organisations, from the World Bank to 
transnational and local civil society groups – which now frame their struggle in 
“environmental” terms in order to be heard. But if the talk is about sustainability, do people 
and institutions really trust the message, across different sectors, interests and scales? 
 
The purpose of this thesis, in addition to shedding light on recent partnerships between NGOs 
and private companies, is to answer the following questions. How is a project that was built 
on a specific conceptualisation of the environment (how it ought to be managed and by 
whom) received in different settings? How does the project, together with the ideas and 
practices linked to it, travel across people, networks, cultures and distances?  
 
                                                 
1 See http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?146704/Sustainability-no-longer-just-CSR-says-WWF-chief 
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Most of the research published on the topic has sought to answer the latter questions through 
the lens of “discourse analysis”. The discussion initiated by French philosopher Foucault on 
the role of discourses in wider social processes of legitimacy and power in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge (1972) has incontestably significantly contributed to the understanding of 
global environmental politics. The point that such analysis might be missing, however, is that 
ideas result in practices. A project like the one analysed throughout this thesis is not simply 
the product of diverse ideas, discussions and ways of speaking about the environment, it is 
also the result of a set of practices, attitudes and reactions towards the environment. When 
ideas about the environment start travelling, a reality becomes constructed. It is therefore 
useful to go beyond discourse analysis in order to demonstrate that ideas eventually become 
practices which, in some cases, may have considerable effects on social relations and political 
settings. New laws are created, people with different interests start teaming up together – and 
as a result, disconnect themselves from past alliances – conferences are held, private 
companies set up internal department for Sustainable Development, Corporate Partnership 
branches are created within NGOs, forests users become environmental agents with new tasks 
and responsibilities, access to forest resources becomes regulated, communities resist or, 
alternatively, fully engage in conservation projects … All in all, it is important to stress that in 
a context of globalisation, ideas are constantly manufactured, processed, adopted and 
readapted over time and space. 
 
This raises two points. The first one is about translation and legitimacy. If a project is created 
in Paris based on a certain definition of “sustainability”, what does it entail to be “sustainable” 
for someone living in the South-East of Madagascar? Taken as a whole, and bearing this 
question in mind, his thesis seeks to shed light on the continuous voyage of the PHCF, from 
its creation to its implementation. The question that shall therefore be asked is: how is 
“sustainability” translated when the project is implemented in a protected area in 
Madagascar? If two NGOs and a private airplane company teamed up together to create an 
environmental project in the name of “sustainability”, how did the idea and practice of 
sustainability travelled to Madagascar? Even though NGOs and private companies might have 
the capacity to forge alliances through partnerships, they have no guarantee that the ideas and 
practices conveyed by the project will be legitimate and accepted in different settings. So 
what are the strategies put in place to enable legitimacy and access to the project location?  
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The second point is about governance and authority: if a multiplicity of actors becomes 
involved in environmental politics and, similarly, if projects and “sustainable” practices are 
developed across state boundaries, who is the authorising agent? Who allows ideas to become 
practices? The shift in environmental politics and the change in NGO-private companies 
relations, as we will see in the first chapter of this thesis, are two processes undeniably linked 
to a broader re-arranging of tasks, roles, and commitments between the state, companies and 
civil society. In other terms, there is a wider trend of re-organising state-society relations as 
well as local and global governance.  
 
Research question 
Taking an environmental project implemented in Madagascar as a focal point for analysis, 
this thesis seeks to answer the following question: 
 
How is a translocal project for forest conservation created, negotiated and 
legitimised from Paris to Madagascar, and how does this project translate once 
implemented in a specific spatial, social, cultural, environmental and political 
setting? 
 
 
Research methods 
Multi-sited fieldwork  
My interest for this topic grew out of the long-lasting discussion over the “global versus 
local” debate. The question of the “global” is raised in many domains, and particularly in 
those related to the environment. It is often argued that there is a “global environmental 
knowledge” or that there is “globally accepted” definition of environmental sustainability 
agreed upon by a number of institutions and civil groups that have built policies and actions 
based on that very definition. But while such analysis might be useful to deconstruct 
discourses, it nevertheless blinds us to the discrepancies, tensions, frictions and negotiations 
occurring when two powerful yet, interest-wise, strongly opposed forces encounter. Similarly, 
it avoids the question of authority and legitimacy: if a number of actors are now part of what 
we call “global environmental politics”, who is the authorising agent defining the problem 
and its solution? As Tsing suggests in her acclaimed book Friction (2005: 58),   
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“analytic tools with which to think about the global picture are still rudimentary. Many 
ethnographers find themselves with data about how a few people somewhere react, resist, 
translate, consume, and from here it is an easy step to invoke distinctions between local 
reactions and global forces, local consumption and global circulation, local resistance and global 
structures of capitalism, local translations and the global imagination. Yet we know that these 
dichotomies are unhelpful. They draw us into an imagery in which the global is homogeneous 
precisely because we oppose it to the heterogeneity we identify as locality. By letting the global 
appear homogeneous, we open the door to its predictability and evolutionary status as the latest 
stage in macronarratives,” the author explains.  
In other words, the purpose of this thesis is to question the notions of “the global” and “the 
local”: who is local, who is global? Can such characteristics actually be strictly defined?  
 
My intention throughout this thesis is also to bring anthropology closer to the society in which 
I live and closer to the changes taking place in our society. As stated earlier, there is a shift in 
state-society relations and part of that shift is informed by a re-arranging of roles and 
commitments. New actors have gained authority over issues where we did not expect them to 
have power, including issues related to the environment. Thirty years ago, it would have 
probably come as a surprise to see private companies playing a key role in decision-making 
processes related to the environment – on how it ought to be managed and protected for 
instance. But, as it will be argued in this thesis, it seems that we are now moving towards a 
new policy cycle, a new transition phase guided by the word “sustainability”. Even though 
such a shift has sparked debate in the press, discussions among scholars, and discontentment 
from sceptical NGOs, it is important to move away from judgments and analyse this change 
with caution and objectivity. It is equally important that anthropology, as a social science field 
of study, brings its contribution to the debate – the number of anthropologists who conducted 
research on the topic remains relatively low. Such observations have left Gupta and Ferguson 
(1997: 15) wondering “why there has been so little anthropological work on the translocal 
aspects of transnational corporations”. For Rajak (2005), one of the most renowned and recent 
anthropologists to have written about Corporate Social Responsibility, there is a need for 
anthropology to move away from the rural picture and from its methodological commitment 
to the local.  
“While anthropologists of development have long been concerned with the way in which power 
is mediated through the dominance of ‘Western’, technocratic forms of knowledge, and the 
discursive practices of powerful institutions, the relationship between the construction of 
   18 
 
knowledge and power within corporations has, to a large extent, remained veiled behind the 
elevation of the ‘local’ in anthropological writing. The corridors of power within transnational 
companies (TNC) and international agencies have, for the most part, remained hidden,” the 
author argues (Rajak, 2005).  
The author also calls for a return of anthropology to questions, issues and changes that affect 
our society. “The disciplinary preoccupation with the subaltern,” she argues, has resulted in  
“the marginalisation of anthropology in the public mind as a source of knowledge about the 
society in which we live. In turning the anthropological lens towards transnational processes of 
corporate capitalism, we are faced with new challenges of conducting ethnography on such a 
scale; and new problems in attempting to explore the corridors of corporate power-diffuse 
embedded and pervasive as they are.  At the same time, the scope of anthropology cannot be 
confined to only those arenas in which traditional anthropological methods of localised 
participant observation are possible” (Rajak, 2011: 1). 
 
A significant part of my thesis is devoted to the “rural”, that is, how the project I have studied 
was translated and accepted in a “small-scale locality” situated ten thousand kilometres away 
from the offices where the ideas of that very project were developed. But while it is useful to 
bring attention to this specific aspect, it is equally important to link the “rural” analysis with 
the study of the transnational networks and strategies put in place to enable such a project to 
exist. To do so, I have opted for a multi-sited fieldwork. Such a methodology enabled me to 
receive access to various sources of information and, most importantly, provided me with an 
opportunity to “look behind the curtain”. Conducting fieldwork in Paris, for instance, enabled 
me to look at the people I interviewed in Paris, the elite of environmental politics, as “locals” 
situated in a specific context and confined to a sometimes restrictive, yet poorly 
acknowledged, structure. From Madagascar to Paris and Switzerland, multi-sited fieldwork 
allowed me to “find in-roads and entries into this giant of a corporation from a variety of 
angles and points across the geographical and social space” in which transnational companies 
and NGOs operate (Rajak, 2005). As Rajak suggests, the “rigid vertical hierarchy makes a 
multi-sited approach not merely a choice but a necessity” (ibid).  
 
This study is therefore about tracking the concept of sustainability, from a village in South-
East Madagascar to the offices of Air France headquarters in Paris. As such, conducting 
multi-sited fieldwork was a way to access the ‘partners’ themselves, from the corporation to 
the NGOs, the international institutions to government agencies and forest users. This 
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methodology strongly echoes Rajak’s line of thinking in In Good Company (2011), in which 
she argues that the global dynamics of environmental politics “demand a multi-sited approach 
that engages with the multiple locations in which socio-economic development policies” and 
sustainability are “articulated and enacted”.  
 
Data collection 
Aldin, my research assistant, and I worked together in Antanmamo during my two fieldwork 
periods. In Antanmamo, a specific Malagasy dialect was spoken. I therefore entirely relied on 
Aldin’s translations from Malagasy to French for more than 70 interviews conducted inside 
the protected area. The remaining 40 interviews and informal conversations, which took place 
in Fort-Dauphin, Antananarivo and Paris, were conducted by myself and in my mother 
tongue, French. Aldin is originally from a village close to Fort-Dauphin and is Antanosy, an 
ethnic group considered to have very good relationships with the Antandroy, the ethnic group 
living in Antanmamo. This affiliation greatly facilitated communication, trust and good 
relations between us and our respondents.  
 
In addition to the methodological difficulty of translating interviews from one language to 
another, I shall also acknowledge that considerable challenges appeared when trying to use 
specific research methods. The principal methods for data collection were unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews. To engage in discussions with my respondents, I decided to 
organise focus groups in the village where I was conducting my first case study, in the second 
week of my fieldwork. Soon enough, however, I realised that influential power structures 
existed at the village-level. This hierarchy was not obvious to the eyes but having read the 
work of Fauroux (2002: 10-17), who developed the method A+ which acknowledges micro-
local power structures, I could progressively make sense of the situation I was confronted 
with: while seating with 10 women from this specific village to discuss conservation, the rules 
of the protected area, their use of forest resources, I was actively trying to hear everybody’s 
opinion on such matters. Yet, only one woman would reply to my questions. The others 
would stay silent and even if I would ask the question to someone else, the same lady would 
speak. She was one of the oldest women in the village. Later on, I also noticed that a man was 
seating in the back of the women group, whispering answers. I am still not sure if he was 
there out of curiosity, like the dozens of children seating around us, or if this was something 
Fauroux would have also described as an illustration of the “numerous and intertwined 
   20 
 
powers that confront each other within complex structures and render any local decision-
making mechanism completely opaque” (ibid: 9).  
 
Such methodological difficulties occurred several times in the beginning of my fieldwork and 
I quickly realised that certain research tools promoted in the books I had been reading before 
my departure to Madagascar, such as focus groups or “community mapping exercises” to 
research land use patterns, proved to be rather unreliable in my fieldwork setting. Creating 
trust with my respondents and understanding what silence or humour could mean in specific 
situations became crucial when trying to go beyond the methodological difficulties 
encountered in the first two weeks of my research. It is through a lot of participant 
observations and by staying with Aldin in the villages where our respondents lived that 
informal conversations and confidences progressively opened up and that the zones of 
translation which will be detailed throughout this thesis became explicit.   
 
Conducting social science research in settings where people constantly translate meanings, 
symbols and messages surely wasn’t something an academic book on research methods could 
have prepared me to. The role of the researcher, specifically in the setting of Antanmamo, was 
a difficult “hat” to wear because people living in Antanmamo had grown accustomed to 
interacting with only three different types of foreigners: the vazaha working for WWF, the 
vazaha coming in 4 wheel drives working for development and conservation NGOs such as 
ASOS, PAM or CARE, and, last but not least, the vazaha studying biology or ecology and 
interested in endemic animals and endemic plants. As a result, forest users became familiar 
with the expectations such vazaha had in mind when coming to Antanmamo: they were either 
looking for a guide in the forest to show them plants and animals or looking for local 
consultation to set up another development or conservation project in the area. Most forest 
users also knew what the vazaha wanted to hear. In this context, trying to explain to my 
respondents that I was neither a WWF agent nor a student in ecology became a lengthy 
process. In some villages, being seen as a “researcher” meant people would never tell you 
they ever did hatsake (slash and burn agriculture), even though they would take you to their 
hatsake fields the week after to pick up firewood; in the village at the top of the protected 
area, being a “researcher” meant a lot of distrust and fear from the villagers. According to 
them, if I was a vazaha I was necessarily working for WWF, in one way or another. My only 
remedy to those methodological difficulties was time and patience to gain their trust. 
Participant observation was probably the most useful research method to bridge this “trust” 
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gap and I sometimes got the impression that they were too busy making fun of my bizarre 
Western habits while dressing up, cooking or planting sweet potatoes that they had almost 
forgotten I was a “researcher” collecting information. Another important aspect that enabled 
me to go beyond my role and perceived identity as a researcher, which probably does not 
feature in academic books about anthropological research yet, was to return to my fieldwork 
sites. Six months after my first fieldwork in Madagascar, I went back to Antanmamo. One of 
my teachers who had himself been back to his fieldwork site a year after his initial visit 
advised us to do the same: “if you go back, people will think you respected your promise and 
their trust in you will grow. I can assure you that you will get very different information” he 
said. By coincidence or not, when I went back to the village located at the top of the protected 
area six months after my last visit, I was told by one of my key informants that they were 
“honoured Aldin and the vazaha walked all the way to our village because even people from 
Antanmamo [name of the main village located south of the protected area, where the local 
school, hospital and office of the mayor are located] do not come all the way here to visit us, 
even though we share the same blood and come from the same ethnic group”. Of course, 
collecting reliable data does not only simply require walking to a remote location to show 
your honesty and commitment to others. But when faced with a context with significant 
tensions and influential power structures, doing so greatly helped me in overcoming a number 
of methodological barriers.  
 
Outside Antanmamo, it is not my role as a researcher that seemed to slow down the process of 
data collection with Air France, WWF and GoodPlanet’s spokespersons but, rather, the fact 
that I was studying anthropology and had lived in one of the PHCF intervention sites for two 
months. My only remedy to overcome those methodological barriers was, in this case not time 
and patience but, instead, a lot of desk research to know my topic well and a significant 
amount of literature review to learn how to speak the same language as my respondents 
during interviews. In a sense, being a researcher in those different spatial and cultural settings 
also made me joined the zones of translation I will be analysing throughout this study.  
 
Thesis outline 
Broadly speaking, this thesis is divided into three main parts. The first one, “partnership”, 
focuses on NGO-private companies relations analysed through elite actor narratives and 
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practices. The second and third parts of this study focus on how elite actors’ ideas and actions 
are translated into practice, across distances.  
 
Background  
The project I studied for the purpose of this research is a Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) pilot project funded by Air France, supervised 
by a French NGO called GoodPlanet and implemented in Madagascar by the international and 
Malagasy branches of the environmental NGO World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The project is 
called Programme Holistique de la Conservation des Forêts (PHCF) or Holistic Program for 
Forests Conservation. There are 5 sites of intervention in Madagascar and, taken as a whole, 
the project covers 500,000 hectares of land. The objective of the PHCF is to create protected 
areas and subsequently transfer the management of those areas to forest users. Once forest 
management is transferred to the community, WWF helps forest users to set up reforestation 
programs and develop income-generating activities that are alternative to slash and burn 
agriculture. Simultaneously, WWF and GoodPlanet agents conduct scientific research to 
calculate the amount of carbon retained in the forests where the project is implemented. In the 
long-term, all partners of the PHCF – and most particularly Air France – hope that enough 
carbon will be stocked in those protected forests to potentially enter a carbon market. My case 
study was conducted in a site project located in the South-East region of the island, 150 km 
from the city of Fort-Dauphin, in the protected area of Antanmamo
2
.  
 
Relevance 
The question of environmental management and biodiversity conservation has found echoes 
in many African countries. In the past two centuries, I would argue that the matter has greatly 
affected local politics and, in some cases, everyday life in a number of countries on the 
continent. The greening of institutions a number of authors refer to has not been limited to 
international organisations (Watts, 2002). In various African countries, and especially those 
with high rates of endemic species and considerable forest resources, there has also been a 
greening of local institutions, grassroots organisations and movements. So why focus on 
Madagascar to research environmental politics? Two main reasons will be advanced to justify 
the case study of this thesis.  
 
                                                 
2 To protect the privacy of villagers, names of places and individuals in this thesis are fictional.  
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First of all, I decided to work on Madagascar because it is a country that has been branded as 
“special” and “unique” by a variety of actors in the past two centuries. One reason for such 
branding is, of course, the geographical isolation of Madagascar from the rest of the African 
continent. Another reason, and probably the most influential, is the ecological uniqueness of 
the island – mainly due to its historical and geographical separation from the African 
continent. If I decided to choose Madagascar for my case study, it is because the island has 
attracted specific actors who have talked about Madagascar in a specific way: an Eden for 
biologists, a place for men to reunite with Nature, “a Promised Land for naturalists”, and a 
“world apart”. In other terms, a number of actors throughout history, from colonial 
missionaries to 20
th
 century naturalists and contemporary international NGOs have branded 
Madagascar as a unique place in the world, an environmental jewel with a biodiversity 
nowhere to be found, not even in the rest of Africa. This branding has, in turn, greatly 
influenced local politics to the extent that authors like Goedefroit and Revéret (2007) argue 
Madagascar has become the receiver of a considerable amount of development and 
conservation projects based on its “biodiversity” uniqueness and, as a result, given a central 
place to an ideology of biodiversity conservation in its public policies. Choosing Madagascar 
to research environmental politics in Africa therefore appeared as a relevant case study 
choice. What I intend to look at throughout this thesis is a direct result of such branding of the 
island: two foreign environmental NGOs and one airplane private company teaming up to 
access Madagascar using specific messages. In other terms, I intend to analyse what the 
consequences of such branding are and how those messages are translated in Madagascar. An 
in-depth justification for this case study as well as an analysis of the historical and 
contemporary processes of branding Madagascar will be given detailed emphasis in the 
second part of this thesis (starting from page 71).    
 
Second, the research locations, Paris and Madagascar, were of crucial relevance because a 
central term analysed throughout this study is the notion of “translation”: how messages, 
symbols, definitions and values are communicated and received from one place to another. 
Choosing the PHCF as a case study for my research was therefore relevant in the sense that it 
is a project that links Paris – and in a broader sense France – with Madagascar. Yet, those two 
places already have a history of connections, exchanges, mediation and translation. As it will 
be argued in the second part of this thesis, the majority of those exchanges and translation 
processes started three centuries ago, before Madagascar became a French colony. But they 
still exist today, 50 years after the independence of Madagascar.   
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Part 1. 
 
 
PARTNERSHIP 
 
 
Partner. /ˈpɑːtnə/ noun. a person who takes part in an undertaking with another or others, 
especially in a business or firm with shared risks and profits
3
. 
 
 
1.1. Private companies and NGOs : from foes to partners 
 
The PHCF is a project funded by Air France, mediated by GoodPlanet and implemented 
locally by WWF-International and WWF-Madagascar. In this regard, the PHCF is a great 
example of what I witnessed during the conference I attended in Paris: a private company 
teaming up with a French foundation and an international environmental NGO in the name of 
environmental sustainability.  
 
As we will see in this chapter, Air France, WWF and GoodPlanet’s incentives to engage in a 
project in Madagascar are rooted in multiple factors, the most notable being Corporate Social 
Responsibility. This demonstration of “transnational” responsibility under the form of the 
PHCF, however, does not happen in a vacuum. A growing number of NGOs have developed 
corporate partnership strategies and programs to guide private companies on the path towards 
“sustainable development”. Similarly, many transnational companies now incorporate social 
and ecological responsibility into their business plans and, as part of such frameworks, invest 
in conservation programs around the world. Conservation International seems to have been an 
avant-garde in this trend. The US-based environmental NGO partners with Monsanto in 
Brazil, Ebay in Mexico and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Toyota in the Philippines, 
Exxon Mobil Corporation in Papua New Guinea, Chevron in Indonesia, Cathay Pacific in 
rural China, Total in New Caledonia, and Dell in Madagascar. The list of Conservation 
International’s corporate partners includes more than 59 transnational companies. The same 
observation applies to WWF, one of the most renowned conservation organisations 
campaigning for wildlife protection. Corporate partners of WWF include Bank of America 
                                                 
3 Oxford Dictionaries definition. See http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/partner 
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(see pictures below), which now offers WWF credit cards to its customers, Lafarge, the world 
leader in construction materials that also invests in reforestation programs in 11 countries 
around the world, and Coca-Cola, which now campaigns for the safeguard of polar bears in 
the Arctic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WWF representative with Lafarge spokesperson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WWF partnership with Bank of America, as promoted on WWF Website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of WWF corporate partners in 2011. 
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Collaborations between NGOs and private companies are not new. As Rajak suggests (2011: 
13), similarities exist when looking comparing old regimes of corporate paternalism led by 
philanthropic industrialists in Victorian Britain with the contemporary framework of 
Corporate Social Responsibility. The difference between those two eras, however, embeds in 
in the word “partnership”. Today, investing in a development project is no longer just about 
philanthropy. Instead, it has become an integral part of a company’s business strategy: it is 
business to be sustainable. In other terms, corporations no longer simply provide funds to 
charity or environmental organisations, they also share logos, strategies, image, network and 
skills.   
 
Those relatively recent partnerships between NGOs and transnational companies have 
sparked debate within the NGO community and beyond. If there seems to be a trend in 
environmental politics, this does not necessarily mean that such a shift has found complete 
unanimity among all. Many environmental organisations still refuse to partner with 
corporations on the basis that such alliances are “pacts with the devil” and “greenwashing”. 
According to a team of journalists who investigated on a newly-established partnership 
between an international environmental NGO and a French bank – which, as part of its 
investment activities, provides funds to oil companies –, collaborations between NGOs and 
the corporate world reflect a wider “value crisis” in society (France 2, May 20124.). Within 
academia, considerable scepticism has been raised as to the real changes brought by such 
partnerships over management systems: do companies really change their practices once they 
have entered into a partnership with an environmental NGO? According to Utting (quoted in 
Hamann & Acutt, 2003: 258), using voluntary frameworks such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility when creating NGO-private companies' partnerships allows a company to 
simply make partial, superficial or image-related changes to give the impression that it is 
accommodating social interests despite a fairly minimalist agenda. For others, such 
partnerships between civil society groups and the private sector bridge numerous gaps (Dahan 
et al., 2010). By joining forces, NGOs and private companies can complement each other 
skills, make use of each other’s network and, on the NGO’s side, private companies represent 
an important source of income that may not be found elsewhere (ibid).  
                                                 
4 According to the information collected during the journalists’ investigation, the environmental NGO receives 400.000 
Euros per year from the French bank for the partnership they have agreed upon. Full video on: http://www.pluzz.fr/cash-
investigation-2012-05-04-22h25.html  
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One reason why the topic is generating so much discussion within different sectors of society 
is because this shift in business-NGOs relations increasingly questions our expectations, as 
researchers, anthropologists, consumers, or citizens. Can NGOs still protect our planet if they 
now partner with the actors they were fighting against a few years ago? Can I really trust that 
the product I am buying is sustainable because of the green logo on its package? If 
transnational corporations become the main source of funding for NGOs, do NGOs still have 
enough power and influence to compel their own donors to reduce their carbon footprint? For 
a very long time, private companies were seen as the source of the problem and NGOs, in 
most cases, as the solution to the problem.  
 
NGOs, as part of civil society, are perceived as opinion leaders. As such, the majority of 
society expects NGOs to raise awareness about issues that affect the general public but also to 
pressure groups, companies and governments to bring about change. In fact, NGOs and 
private companies seem to have mutually incompatible goals. Their balance of power 
somewhat recalls a David versus Goliath battle. So how can their objectives and practices be 
reconciled? A look at the academic literature published on this topic illustrates well the 
expectations and presumptions the majority of us have when looking at the changing relations 
between NGOs and transnational corporations: Strange Attractor (SustainAbility, 1996), A 
Strange Affair? (Enderle and Peters, 1998), and Strange Bedfellows (Wieland, 2009). The 
relationship between private companies and NGOs has much very changed over the years. So 
what does this mean? If the characteristics of NGOs and private companies are changing, so 
should our expectations? Or should we continue to believe that NGOs will remain the young 
David who defeats the all-powerful Goliath? Conventional definitions of NGOs, as watchdogs 
keeping their eyes on profit-making corporations that are taking power away from the state, 
are challenged.   
 
As explained earlier, NGOs are engaging in new ways with the private sector. Yet, the 
relationship between NGOs and the business world remains weakly researched. For the 
purpose of this chapter, we will therefore try to understand the changes that have taken place 
between transnational companies and international NGOs, analyse how such alliances are 
created and negotiated, and situate power in those relations. It shall be noted that the purpose 
of this thesis is neither to assess nor to judge whether those partnerships are desirable. Instead, 
this study seeks to understand why and how did two hitherto disconnected registers reconnect?  
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The first part of this chapter will elaborate on the “why” question: why do certain NGOs such 
as GoodPlanet and WWF and private companies such as Air France decide to team up in the 
name of sustainable development? How has the relationship between private companies and 
NGOs moved from confrontation to collaboration, alliance and partnership?  
The second part of this chapter will track processes of negotiations. How do Air France, 
WWF, and GoodPlanet negotiate the “terms of the contract”? What are the obstacles to such 
collaborations? Are all partners equal? How is the language of partnership created, enacted 
and maintained? We will see that as the relationship between the different actors evolves, 
there is a shift from learning the language of the other to mimicking the other, that is, tapping 
into each other’s registers, discourses, organisational practices, formats, and codes.  
In the third and last section of this chapter, we will discuss the reliability of those alliances 
between NGOs and corporations. It will be argued that such partnerships should be seen as 
“phenomenologies” in the sense that demarcating lines of responsibility between the different 
stakeholders remain. Even though one may describe translocal schemes such as the PHCF as 
collaborative ventures “that subsume diverse projects and potentially divergent interests and 
values – communal and commercial, ecological and social – within a collective project”, it is 
important to question the very term of “partnership”, that is, how and when it is used by the 
different actors implicated in the project.  
 
A chronology of private companies-NGOs relations 
The following section will serve as an analytical exercise to understand the changes that have 
occurred over the past years between NGOs and private companies. As explained earlier, 
there is a shift in contemporary environmental politics. Previously seen as foes with 
antithetical practices and aspirations, NGOs and transnational corporations increasingly tend 
to look at each other as potential partners. I have witnessed such a trend on various occasions 
during my fieldwork, be it at a conference about tropical forests, in the office of Air France 
Director for Sustainable Development or while engaging with NGO workers in Paris, 
Antananarivo and Fort-Dauphin. It is this very trend that I aim to describe and explain here. 
As stated earlier, the PHCF does not happen in a vacuum. One cannot understand the factors 
that have driven Air France, GoodPlanet and WWF to partner for an environmental project in 
Madagascar without situating the PHCF in a wider shift in environmental governance. In 
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other terms, it is important to analyse the project studied here as embedded into and framed by 
historically constituted structural relations.  
 
The following section intends to answer the “why” question: why do companies, such as Air 
France, create alliances with NGOs, such as GoodPlanet and WWF – and vice versa?  
 
GLOBALISATION, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY 
The story of the multi-scales and multi-actor partnerships described in this thesis is 
inextricably linked to the story of globalisation and neoliberalism. Some even suggest that 
alliances between NGOs and private companies are direct products of globalisation and 
neoliberalism combined (Watts, 2002). Globalisation forces, let them be political, economic, 
social or cultural, have changed the spatial localisation of practices of governance and 
considerably altered Westphalian sovereignty. In this sense, the story of NGO-private 
companies partnership is also about governance: why are private companies and NGOs 
increasingly taking the lead in tasks that were conventionally assigned to the state, including 
development schemes and environmental protection? The changing role of the modern state in 
a context of rapid globalisation has generated a long-lasting debate within academia. 
Concerns have been raised in anthropology as to how much power the state actually has when 
it comes to allowing – or blocking – the continuous flow of capital, ideas and goods produced 
under neoliberalism? According to Ferguson (2005: 379), neoliberalism significantly 
decreased modern state’s capacity to manage the adverse consequences of globalisation. The 
result of such a shift in power balance, the author argues, is the creation of a governance gap 
whereby the state’s capacity to govern is outsourced (ibid). For Ferguson and Gupta (2002: 
982), one of the most renowned academics involved in this debate, “an increasingly 
transnational political economy today poses new challenges to familiar forms of state 
spatialisation”. The state, they claim, no longer has the monopoly on improvement and social 
order schemes. The arguments advanced above strongly differ with Scott’s line of thinking in 
Seeing Like a State (1998). The difference between Scott’s (1998) and Ferguson and Gupta’s 
(2005; 2002) analysis embeds in their distinctive definitions of globalisation: Scott sees it as a 
compressing process leading to homogenisation whereas Ferguson and Gupta define 
globalisation as a synonym of distanciation, denationalisation and decentralisation. In other 
terms, the latter two authors argue that globalisation has linked distant localities, distant 
actors, distant discourses and distant practices. Lewis and Mosse (2006: 2) share a similar line 
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of thinking when affirming that neoliberalism tendency for decentralisation has multiplied the 
number of organisations and intermediary networks and strongly diversified sources of 
influence and power.   
The limit in Scott’s argumentation was pointed out by Li in Beyond ‘the State’ and Failed 
Schemes (2005). In her article, Li suggests that “rather than emerging fully formed from a 
single source, many improvement schemes are formed through an assemblage of objectives, 
knowledge, techniques, and practices of diverse provenances,” and all pursue different 
agendas (2005: 386). Because the state is no longer the exclusive actor in the creation and 
management of social order projects, an increasing number of anonymous and distant actors 
have engaged in the practice of governance. Going beyond Scott’s analysis, Li therefore 
stresses the importance of acknowledging all the  
“missionaries, social reformers, scientists, political activists, ethnographers, and other experts 
who routinely diagnose deficiencies in the population or some segment of it, and who propose 
calculated schemes of improvement. Today they are joined by the misnamed ‘nongovernmental’ 
organisations, both national and transnational, which are involved in arenas such as public 
health, welfare, agricultural extension, conservation, human rights, good governance, and, 
increasingly, peace building— all elements of the hydra-headed endeavour we have come to 
know as “development” (Li, 2005 : 386). 
Globalisation has indeed significantly reconfigured the interconnections between the global 
and the local.  
 
FROM A GOVERNANCE GAP TO TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENTALITY 
To describe this new form of governance that bypasses national borders and encompasses 
different modes and scales of governing, Ferguson and Gupta (2002: 989) use the concept of 
“transnational governmentality” as an extension of the idea of “governmentality” first 
introduced by Foucault in 1991. Such a formulation, the two authors claim, describes not only 
“new strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by the WTO and the structural 
adjustment programs implemented by IMF, but also transnational alliances forged by activists 
and grassroots organisations and the proliferation of voluntary organisations supported by 
complex networks of international and transnational funding and personnel” (ibid: 990). In 
this context, it no longer comes as a surprise to see that a number of international institutions 
including the IMF now enjoy almost as much power to govern as most nation states do. But 
while it is important to stress the influence of new players in global governance, it is equally 
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important to stress that “transnational governmentality” does not necessarily mean less 
governance. Instead, the concept equals to the profusion of new modes of governance. Placed 
back in relation to the role of the state, “transnational governmentality” also means that the 
modern state as an apparatus of power has not completely vanished from the spheres of 
governance. As Elyachar (2003: 591; 597) points out in her analysis of the term 
“governmentality”, which she conceives more as “a practice than a concept”, “the lines 
between the state, international organisations, and civil society that is assumed to lie outside 
the state are far fuzzier than we often realise […] power is not located in specific structures or 
institutions; rather, it is diffused throughout society and thus dissolved as a specific form of 
power”. In other terms, international organisations and civil groups still need to enter into 
negotiations with the state to access power. The modern state, in a context of power 
reconfiguration, has therefore become a vehicle through which transnational entities seek to 
expand authority and influence. In this analysis of the emerging modality of power, it is thus 
important to go beyond a Foucauldian approach that would restrict our localisation of power 
to binary scales such as state versus NGO, global versus state and local versus global. One 
way to go beyond such a limited approach, Elychar continues (ibid: 598), is to look at 
transnational governmentality as a set of hybrid forms of governance emerging at the 
“interstice” of the state, international organisations and NGOs.   
 
The shift in the spatialisation of governance triggered a parallel change in the spatialisation of 
accountability. Because the state was becoming less capable of meetings its citizens’ demands 
and calls for responsibility, civil society started to look for accountability elsewhere. And if 
not nationally, the answer was to be found internationally. In other terms, if the causes behind 
protests were becoming global, so should the actions and solutions developed against such 
problems. Along a similar line of observation, Elyachar (2003: 596-7) argues that  
“the modern state appears as but one moment in a longer historical process of the evolution of 
forms of governmentality, and ceases to figure as the sole, or even most important, container of 
power. In political protest actions at the turn of the millennium such as the anti-globalisation 
movement, it is often not the state, but rather the World Trade Organization and the World Bank 
— international or global organisations — that may be ‘overvalued’. The state often disappears 
from view as the object of political protest. Likewise, when world leaders of states and business 
gathered in Okinawa in July 2000 to discuss the most pressing problems of the global era, they, 
too, called for new forms of ‘global governance — new, cooperative, though as yet largely 
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unspecified way of running world affairs in response to the massive changes wrought by 
globalisation and rapid technological change”.  
One of the most “pressing problems of the global era” discussed when international state and 
business leaders gathered in Okinawa was the environment. Biodiversity, climate change, and 
environmental degradation all became top-priority issues on world leaders’ agenda. Images of 
ice glaciers melting in Antarctica and forests being cut down in the Amazon rainforest 
become symbols of an increasingly powerful discourse about a globally-shaped but globally-
harmed environment. Human actions, and most importantly, industrial activities led by 
transnational corporations were identified as the main causes of environmental degradation. 
As a result of the states’ decreasing capacities to manage the adverse consequences of 
globalisation, including environmental repercussions of transnational corporations’ activities 
within state borders, new actors started to take the lead in the fight for environmental 
protection. The deepening of the reach of transnational capital had as its counterpoint a 
proliferation of social movements and actors linking economic justice with environmental 
causes. Such actors included non-governmental organisations, quasi-autonomous entities with 
extended networks across national boundaries. As Tsing explains (2000: 331), “beginning 
most intensely in the 1980s, social movements – including environmentalism, human rights, 
indigenous rights, and feminist causes – extended themselves through NGOs; they sought to 
work around the restrictions of nation-states by forging transnational lines of financial, 
scientific, and political support”. For this reason, Tsing continues, “global environmentalism 
participated in building another image of the global, in which globality represented the goal of 
a process of building transnational political and cultural ties […] The global here is an ever-
ending process of ‘networking’ and building lines of support” (ibid).   
 
Because of the emphasis placed on the global characteristic of climate change, emerging 
social movements and NGOs have strongly pushed for the creation – or reinforcement – of 
global institutions and regulations as a way to bridge the accountability gap. New social 
movements therefore took part in “an effort by national and global civil society”, through 
social networks and transnational coalitions, “to create some sort of control over transnational 
corporations and rogue states,” Watts explains (2002: 1315). This call for greater 
accountability has brought numerous changes to environmental politics in the last three 
decades. The most notable change, Foster (2005: 1314) points out, is the “greening” of 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and the United 
Nations, which central development agendas revolve around “the need for a new multilateral 
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environmental agency to regulate the global commons”. Calls for global accountability have 
also led to the creation of worldwide awareness-raising events reinforcing the centrality and 
urgency of environmental action, starting with the first Earth Day as early as 1970 and the Rio 
Summit in 1992.  
 
In The Will to Improve (2007), Li analyses the Indonesian’s government attempts to improve 
landscapes and livelihoods through national and international institutions. The author argues 
that “the will to improve”, increasingly expressed by the transnational actors identified earlier, 
materialises once a situation is problematised and deficiencies are identified. “The 
identification of a problem,” she continues, “is intimately linked to the availability of a 
solution” (2007: 7). Li’s analysis is very helpful when trying to deconstruct environmental 
politics and understanding the major shifts and realignments in environmental governance 
since the 1970s. When applying Li’s formula to the object of our study here, namely 
sustainable development, we see that a problem has been identified, i.e. global climate 
change, and so have deficiencies, i.e. the lack of accountability. “The availability of a 
solution”, however, is yet to be identified. In fact, the question has been a continuous source 
of debate at both the international and national levels. Who should be responsible for tackling 
environmental problems and how should this responsibility be translated?  
 
NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: COMPANIES, CIVIL SOCIETY 
AND NGOS  
“Long-standing enemies must shift from  
mutual subversion to new forms of symbiosis” 
Elkington, 1998: 37 
 
As explained earlier, new actors progressively made their way into environmental governance 
as a direct result of the “governance gap” created by globalisation and neoliberalism. In their 
quests for accountability, those new actors, instead of going to the state, started going directly 
to the entities they identified as the root causes of their problems: transnational private 
companies. Transnational companies became one of the primary targets of environmental 
campaigns and movements denouncing the industrial exploitation of natural resources – and 
the economic, social and ecological consequences linked to it – and the ecological footprint of 
such corporations. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Fund, Sierra Club, the 
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Rainforest Alliance … the list of transnational environmental organisations which actively 
campaigned against the adverse consequences of private companies’ activities worldwide is 
extensive. Over the years, their lobbying power at the level of international institutions and 
state governments also considerably increased.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greenpeace campaign against Indian car manufacturer Tata, 2008 
 
Considering private companies often were NGOs’ first targets for campaign and action, one 
can imagine that the relationship between the two entities must have been rather tense. Images 
of civil society groups protesting against Shell oil-extraction activities in Nigeria are one of 
the many illustrations of the conflicting relationship between NGOs and transnational 
corporations (see picture below). Taking into account the distinctive organisational cultures 
and expectations raised by each entity, it does indeed seem like private companies and NGOs 
have mutually incompatible goals. One the one hand, private companies are often portrayed as 
corporations guided by the accumulation of short-term profit, while NGOs, on the other hand, 
are seen as organisations focusing primarily on improvement and development schemes that 
require long-term commitments to the well-being of communities or ecosystems. Yet, looking 
at contemporary environmental politics, one realises that an important shift has occurred 
between private companies and NGOs since their first interactions. 
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Members of the Nigeria's Ogoni community protest against Shell in New York. Associated Press, 2009 
 
Despite a number of differences, NGOs and private companies are starting to make space for 
each other in their internal strategies and developments: while transnational corporations are 
more and more concerned with their public image and reputation, a growing number of NGOs 
are calling for increased cooperation with the corporate world on the basis that “if you want to 
change the system, you have to work within the system”. In this context, affirming that a 
private company only aims at maximising its profits seems to be an invalid statement. 
Corporate performance is no longer based solely on productivity, sales and benefits but also 
on the involvement and investment a company is ready to make to demonstrate its 
commitment to the well-being of society. NGOs and the private sector have recently initiated 
a remarkable, though precarious, movement away from confrontation towards dialogue and 
cooperation. In the words of Elkington (1998: 38), “it is clear that we now stand on the 
threshold of a new era in the relationships between business and its many stakeholders”.  
 
But while it is essential to acknowledge the scale and importance of this trend towards 
partnership, it is equally important to bear in mind that alliances between NGOs and the 
corporate world do not make complete unanimity. Only a small number of NGOs have taken 
a cohesive position within their organisation regarding partnerships with transnational private 
companies. NGOs’ directors, managers and employees may often have diverging positions on 
the question. Sharing similar concerns, Elkington (1998: 38) explains that while 
“some will succeed in attracting powerful partners, some will not. But the terms and conditions 
of these partnerships will have changed profoundly. In the old order, very few campaigning 
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groups, or NGOs as they are better known, were prepared to work directly with industry. Some 
never will, but longer term they will probably turn out to be in the minority. What is different 
today, however, is that the NGOs are increasingly in a position of power – and some are 
preparing to use it in novel ways, working with business and through markets”.  
For this reason, it is judicious to frame the debate on NGO-private companies partnership as a 
discussion about unfixed modes of green governance defined here as “the forms of calculated 
practice at different scales directing categories of social agents in a particular manner for 
particular ends” (Watts, 2002: 1315). Environmental governance remains open to changes and 
contests.  
 
CREATING RESPONSIVE AND RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
“….the twenty-first century will be the age of 
alliances where collaboration between non-
profit and corporations will grow in frequency 
and strategic importance emigrating from the 
traditional philanthropy toward deeper, 
strategic alliances”  
James Austin, 2001.  
 
If experts all agree that there is a shift in NGO-private companies relations, their explanations 
of it somewhat varies. For Heap (2000), a researcher at the International NGO Training and 
Research Centre (INTRAC) who has written extensively on NGOs’ reconciliation with the 
private sector, the shift towards partnership is rooted in globalisation, that is, “the increasingly 
multinational nature of business”. The author argues that globalisation has reduced the power 
of nation states to affect development while simultaneously increasing the power of the 
private sector in the same field. “Multinational corporations,” he continues, “account for over 
one quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP) and with such massive resources at 
their disposal, there is increasing recognition that with global influence comes global 
responsibility” (ibid). In Heap’s words, “the welfare state has giving way to business welfare” 
(ibid). Watts (2002: 1315), renowned for his concepts of “green capitalism” and “green 
governmentality”, argues that the shift towards partnership embeds in  
“the restructuring of world capitalism and its multilateral institutions such as the World Bank 
and the IMF who have now entered, with the assistance of the Internet, the popular lexicon of 
green politics […] ‘Command-and-control’ regulatory approaches have been under assault since 
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the neoliberal counterrevolution of the late 1970s, and market- and civic-driven economic 
approaches – eco-taxes, “best practices” environmental management, green consumer activism, 
community-driven environmental regulation, and more collaborative models of environmental 
governance – have assumed a new visibility,” he explains.  
One of the most recent illustrations of “market- and civic-driven” economic approaches is 
the framework of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR, also referred to as 
“corporate citizenship”, is a self-regulating mechanism that emerged in the 1970s and was 
developed by multinational corporations as a response to civil society’s request for 
accountability. Applying CSR allows a company to ensure its business strategies embrace 
responsibility, comply with ethical standards and international norms, and invest in 
programs that have a positive impact on the environment and communities affected by the 
company’s activities. CSR is synonym with accommodation in the sense that it derives 
directly from the way companies choose to respond to the economic, political and 
structural drivers of change. Representatives from the business sector themselves affirm 
that CSR is as a response to changed social expectations and an adaptation to new global 
circumstances (Hamann and Acutt, 2003: 258). Placed back in the context of the PHCF, 
Air France Director for Sustainable Development Pierre Caussade clearly sees his 
company’s financial investment in the project as a response to long-lasting calls from civil 
society for accountability [interview, January 19, 2012]. For Air France,  
"accepting to be part of this project was a way for us to respond to the challenges raised by 
public interpellations about our sector and field of activity concerning the issue of climate 
change. This task was the assignment I was given by the general director when I first came into 
office, we communicated internally and externally about this and we decided to call our 
business plan for sustainable development the ‘climate plan’. 
[…] Our implication in Madagascar is not linked at all to any governmental obligations or any 
regulation from Europe or elsewhere, it is purely a willingness from our side to say 'we want to 
engage and we want to act concretely'. So there are actions that are proper to our business like 
the reduction of fuel consumption, which is part of our business, the modernisation of our fleet, 
which is also part of our business, and then … well we considered that this was not enough. 
The political vision and engagement brought forward by our former president was a long-term 
vision. He thought that it was necessary to demonstrate our willingness through other actions 
than modernising our fleet and reducing our emissions, to show that we really want to be 
involved. It is at this same moment that the project in Madagascar was brought up, and then we 
thought 'wow, this is exactly what we need’! It is a very ambitious project that is coming just 
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right on time, it is coherent on the scientific level, it is coherent on the local level because 
Malagasy are implicated locally so … let's go!," Pierre Caussade explains [ibid].  
As stated by Pierre Caussade, it is Air France’s CSR agenda that encouraged the airplane 
company to partner with two environmental NGOs for an anti-deforestation project in 
Madagascar. The shift in environmental governance, Hamann and Acutt argue (2003: 256), 
took place when large transnational companies which had chosen the path towards CSR 
started to present themselves – and became seen – as potentially important rural 
development agents. Responsibility became an integral part of everyday business. Along a 
similar line of thinking, Rajak (2011: 2-3) affirms that NGOs and private companies have 
managed to find common grounds and buried the hatch as a result of the “disenchantment 
with the rampant free market fetishism and hard-line neoliberalism of the 1980s”. Such a 
disenchantment, which she qualifies as “the happy confluence of economic value and 
ethical values packaged together in the new human (or humane) face of capitalism”, has 
given way to the “(re)birth of an era of compassionate capitalism with corporate citizens as 
its midwives offering, it appears, moral and perhaps even spiritual revitalisation of the 
‘Market’”.   
 
According to Rajak’s analysis, one of the very few studies published on the anthropology of 
CSR, it is at the World Summit in Johannesburg in 2002 that transnational corporations 
became firmly established at the vanguard of the global development and environmental 
agenda. The most illustrative image of the latter statement is an article Rajak read in the 
British newspaper The Guardian about the event in 2002. The article, she continues, explains 
that “seating next to Tony Blair on his flight to the summit was Sir Robert Wilson, the then 
CEO of the world’s largest mining company, Rio Tinto […] Surely, this symbolised the 
extent to which big business has been embraced as both a partner and advisor in international 
development planning” (quoted in Rajak, 2011: 10-11). But what could the agenda of such 
key representatives from multinational corporations be about? For Rajak, the answer is 
sustainable development. “CSR has a powerful capacity to adapt, incorporate and offer itself 
up as the answer to an apparently limitless range of global concerns within the all-
encompassing commitment to sustainable development: from good governance, anti-
corruption and responsible payment of revenues to governments, to environmental 
stewardship, biodiversity and climate change […] At the start of the 21st century, few goals 
have appeared so persuasive in their capacity to recruit support from diverse corners as that of 
sustainable development,” the author argues (Rajak, 2011: 12). Sustainable development, as 
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ambiguous as the term might be, has the capacity to connect diverging and previously 
conflicting actors, discourses and practices. The term has been used repeatedly, by different 
actors and to pursue different agendas, to the extent that some argue its very definition has 
become void and porous. For Watts (2002: 1314-5),  
“these struggles over the global commons and corporate responsibility may strike us as wholly 
commonplace and pedestrian, but it is precisely their quotidian character that marks the extent to 
which governing nature is now so deeply embedded in our early 21st century political identities. 
The new lexicon [of sustainable development] is so endemic that it appears with as much 
frequency in the frothy promotional literature of the World Bank as in the rhetoric of the Sierra 
Club, the US military, or the myriads of Third World grassroots environmental and community 
movements. Whatever its semantic ambiguity, sustainability has the effect of linking three hitherto 
relatively disconnected discourses”.  
As Watts clearly illustrates in the above statements, the rhetoric of sustainable development 
did indeed manage to make entities as different as international institutions regulating trade, 
environmental NGOs fighting for biodiversity protection but also nation states and 
community organisations all speak the same language of “sustainability”. The rhetoric of 
sustainable development, by bringing “hitherto relatively disconnected discourses” together, 
has in turn created a new language and practice, namely, partnership (ibid). In other terms, the 
formalisation of previously conflicting exchanges between NGOs and private companies has 
materialised under the form of partnership. According to Mosse (2004), who has written 
extensively on how development projects work – rather than whether they work –, concepts 
such as “sustainable development” or “partnership” are purposely porous and ambiguous. The 
author, who emphasises the value and power of vague words, argues that “partnership” is one 
of the “mobilising metaphors” produced by policy-makers or project planners whose 
“vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological 
differences, to allow compromise and the enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, 
to distribute agency and to multiply criteria of success within project systems” (2004: 663). In 
other words, such ambiguities in concepts serve to accommodate the distinctive interests and 
priorities of all the actors involved into one unique framework. Because “sustainable 
development” remains ambiguous, the use of the concept is accessible to all and everyone can 
use it for their own agenda.  
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GOING BEYOND PHILANTHROPY: NGO-PRIVATE COMPANIES’ PARTNERSHIP  
As illustrated earlier, companies have extended their hands to their former combatants 
through the language of sustainable development and CSR. “As big business is brought more 
closely into the development process – not only as an agent of empowerment but as its 
architect – novel regimes of local, national and global responsibility are emerging in which 
corporations are elevated as guardians of the social order and purveyors of a new global moral 
authority,” Rajak argues (2011: 2). This shift in the politics of responsibility reminds us that 
relations between transnational companies and NGOs have evolved from a movement 
amongst campaigners calling for companies’ accountability to a discourse and practice of 
partnership led, in most cases, by corporations themselves. Rajak (2011: 2) therefore notes it 
has become “commonplace to hear the language of commerce and that of community, of 
enterprise and the social coupled together where once they were seen as antithetical”. 
Partnership seems to have become the most powerful narrative within the discourse of CSR. 
Air France Director for Sustainable Development is aware that such demonstrations of 
environmental engagement from a transnational corporation with a rather large carbon 
footprint may challenge conventional perceptions of business.  
“I understand it might be surprising because, in the end, people may wonder how can a 
company invest so much money for a cause they wouldn’t think Air France could be implicated 
in? But it is called sponsorship! The novelty, that no one would have ever thought about 5 or 6 
years ago, is to say that we can enlarge our politics of sponsorship to actions that are more 
environmentally-friendly even though it remains actions linked to development. I mean, it is 
not just about the environment, we are not taking care of corals here, it is a project that enables 
Malagasy to have enough to eat. So we are still very close to the humanitarian aspect but I 
prefer to use the expression development aid to countries who really need it instead. I am not 
saying that we owe them a debt because Air France is not indebted to the Malagasy state, but 
we are a company from the North in a rich country. The status we have today in Madagascar, 
we inherit from history,” Air France Director for Sustainable Development comments 
[interview, January 19, 2012].  
As NGOs and private companies become partners, a whole new lexicon appears. In fact, a 
growing number of NGOs and private companies now refer to each other as “stakeholders”, a 
term multinational corporations themselves started to use to identify the actors implicated in 
or affected by the corporation’s activities, as illustrated by Pierre Caussade’s description of 
Air France’s stakeholders.   
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“It is since 2006 and 2007 that we thought about environmental matters. I mean, when you are 
establishing a sustainable development strategy you are interested in what we call 'stakeholders'. 
Those stakeholders are our customers, our supplies, sub-contractors, our neighbours and … 
obviously when it comes to society matters and environmental ones, there are stakeholders that 
have a very very important role and those actors are NGOs. We started being implicated in 
environmental matters much earlier but today we can really tell that the most important 
stakeholders at the environmental level are NGOs, WWF being one of the top references in this 
sector,” he explains [interview, January 19, 2012]. 
But, in addition to private companies’ growing determination to demonstrate responsibility, 
what other factors could encourage corporations to engage with “the most important 
stakeholders at the environmental level”, that is, NGOs? According to Dahan et al. (2010: 
326), a group of researchers specialised in international business, strategy and management,   
“multinational enterprises (MNEs) face a range of challenges when entering developing 
countries, including the need to adapt their business models to local markets' cultural, 
economic, institutional and geographic features. Where they lack the tangible resources or 
intangible knowledge needed to address these challenges, MNEs may consider collaborating 
NGOs to help facilitate new modes of value creation. In such cross-sector partnerships, parties 
contribute complementary capabilities along each stage of the value chain to develop products 
or services that neither could produce alone, creating and delivering value in novel ways while 
minimising costs and risks”.  
And if we turn the question the other way round, what could encourage NGOs to engage with 
transnational corporations as stakeholders? This is a question worth asking as, in most cases, 
researchers tend to situate changes in operations and strategies only on the business side. A 
number of studies documenting NGO-private companies’ relations suggest that the shift in 
environmental politics results from the adaptation of the business world to NGOs’ demands – 
and not the other way around. However, it is important to realise that within the spheres of 
NGOs themselves, considerable transformations in the characteristics and paradigms of those 
non-government organisations are taking place. Heap (2000: 557) shares a similar line of 
argumentation when he notes that “even the language used to describe NGOs is changing and 
identities and boundaries are clearly shifting. We see certain NGOs run counter to the 
traditional spirit of voluntarism, commercial consultancy firms competing with established 
NGOs to operate programmes in former NGO territory, and NGOs setting up commercial 
consultancy wings”. Heap even takes his argument further by arguing that NGOs and private 
companies should no longer be studies as separate sectors because such an approach ignores 
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the “considerable blurring of the boundaries between some voluntary organisations and their 
counterparts in the statutory and private sectors” (ibid).  
 
Looking at the chronology detailed earlier in this chapter, one realises that environmental 
politics has constantly changed since its defining moments in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
One of the most crucial differences with environmental governance forty years ago is that a 
growing number of transnational companies are moving away from conventional corporate 
philanthropy to engage in partnerships with civil society groups. As Heap (2000: 555) clearly 
explains, “relations have moved beyond the purely philanthropic, with corporations giving 
money to good causes, and the highly antagonistic, with organisations protesting a company's 
operations, to a situation where the two sectors often work in partnership to address core 
business issues such as environmental management”. The change, in other terms, is from a 
traditional sponsorship approach, whereby NGOs gathered funding to implement programs 
and raise awareness, to a partnership strategy which often implies lengthier negotiations and 
clearer commitments from either side. When I met with Air France Director for Sustainable 
Development Pierre Caussade in Paris – one of the key actors in the creation of the PHCF – I 
realised that the journey of sustainable development, from the 2002 World Summit in 
Johannesburg to the offices – and language – of transnational corporations had successfully 
reached its final destination. For Pierre Caussade, partnerships between NGOs and private 
companies such as the PHCF represent 
"a very powerful aspect of the evolution of our society in general, even if the PHCF remains a 
small project at the planet level. But there is a formula that I really like to use and it says: 
'change one thing, change everything'. We know that one way of making things move in politics 
or in society in general is through little action that can have a sort of snowball effect. And here, 
we’re talking about quite a big project so we hope that in the end, it will boost things a little, 
including maybe the organisation of life in Madagascar and, who knows, maybe it will boost 
things related to major climate issues and major international issues" [interview, January 19, 
2012].  
Air France’s strategy to implement the PHCF is particularly illustrative of this move from 
mere corporate philanthropy, here assured by the humanitarian division of Air France known 
as Air France Foundation, to corporate social responsibility through partnerships, here with 
WWF and GoodPlanet. Because environmental responsibility now represents a business 
strategy in itself, Air France took the PHCF as an opportunity to make a distinction between 
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its twenty-year-old program for humanitarian actions under Air France Foundation and its 
newly-established “climate plan”, Air France’s translation of CSR.  
“Until spring 2007, the only relation Air France had with NGOs was actually between Air 
France Foundation
5
 and NGOs, this relationship was limited to the humanitarian register. But 
the tradition of sponsorship is actually anchored in the genes of our company. So when it was 
decided that we would go along with this project, we, when I say we it means the direction of 
the company, we asked ourselves whether we should inscribe this project as part of Air France 
Foundation or not. And in order to avoid the confusion, and since here it was a very specific 
project focused on environmental preoccupations, namely the fight against deforestation, which 
has a very strong link with the problematic of climate change framed within the politics of 
REDD from the United Nations, we thought well it is definitely another register. There is a 
preoccupation linked to our activity, our work and actions in the environmental field and most 
particularly in the domain of climate change so we are here dealing with a different register so 
we concluded we should bring the project directly at the core of our business,” Air France 
Director for Sustainable Development explains [interview, January 19, 2012].  
As illustrated throughout this chapter, relations between NGOs and transnational companies 
have significantly evolved over the years. From antithetic actors, sometimes involved in 
philanthropy, sometimes implicated in conflicting relations, NGOs and private companies 
increasingly refer to each other as fundamental “stakeholders” and partners. This is not to say 
that partnerships between civil society groups and the corporate world are exceptionally new, 
unanimous and modern. As early as the 18
th
 century, the private sector was already involved 
in corporate philanthropy much before concepts such as “corporate social responsibility” or 
“sustainable development” emerged (Rajak, 2011: 13). The difference, however, is in the 
relationship between both bodies and the characteristics of both entities. Transnational 
companies such as Air France now design and incorporate “climate plan” within their own 
business strategies while NGOs increasingly speak the language of the corporate world and 
compete with consultancy agencies when it comes to advising corporations on how to be 
“green(er)”. On the one hand, business has become responsibility. On the other hand, 
responsibility now means business.  
 
Now that we have analysed the chronology of NGOs-private companies relations and 
identified the factors explaining such an evolution, we will focus on the “how” question: how 
                                                 
5 Air France Foundation was created in 1992 as the philanthropy branch of the French airline. The Foundation supports 
projects from organisations or Air France staff that can enable children, children with disabilities and children in great 
difficulty to have access to education, leisure and culture.  
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is this shift translated in practice? And how do NGOs and private companies negotiate the 
terms of their newly-established partnership?  
 
1.2. Becoming partners: the creation of the PHCF 
 
“Experience suggests that decision-making knowledge, including 
apparently hard economic facts and statistics, are the outcome of 
complex relationships including negotiations over status, access, 
disciplinary points of view, team leadership struggles, conflict 
management or compliance with client frameworks defining what 
counts as knowledge”. 
Mosse, 2011: 10 
 
As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, the factor that primarily drove Air France 
into a partnership with WWF and GoodPlanet was the company’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility agenda. Air France “climate plan” was developed by the company itself as a 
way to demonstrate its responsiveness to environmental challenges. As an engagement to 
support the fight against global climate change, Air France’s “climate plan” was intended to 
facilitate the company’s “participation in programs concerned with environmental protection 
conducted by NGOs, the project in Madagascar being one illustration of that plan,” Pierre 
Caussade explains while reading his “climate plan “ document aloud during our interview 
[interview, January 19, 2012]. In parallel, we have seen earlier that a growing number of 
NGOs are extending their hands to their former “foes” and “targets” through partnerships on 
the basis that “we cannot change things if we are always located outside the system, we need 
to work inside the system,” a former Communication Officer at WWF-International states 
[interview, January 16, 2012].  
 
Now that we have analysed the factors that drove Air France, WWF-International and 
GoodPlanet into a partnership for environmental protection in Madagascar, let us look at how 
the process of creating and maintaining the partnership took place. How did the different 
actors manage to reach a consensus, if any, on the “terms of the contract”? What is negotiated 
when actors with distinctive organisational structures, directives, interests and, very often, 
diverging agendas team up under the form of a partnership? And what is the level of risk 
involved in such alliances?  
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The objective of this thesis as a whole is to take a specific case study of an anti-deforestation 
project and track the latter from the day of its creation to its implementation. Doing so is a 
rather classical method for analysis, even though it shall be noted that most studies published 
on this topic focus on the implementation of a project – and its consequences – while avoiding 
in-depth analysis of the project’s creation. Similarly, most research findings focus on the 
political, social and cultural contexts that reinforced the legitimacy of the project. The project 
is therefore seen as just another scheme to further advance a “global environmental 
knowledge” mainly shaped by Western actors. In fact, I also look at the PHCF as an idea 
based on a somewhat “global” environmental knowledge and interpretation of what good 
natural management should be. Yet, what needs to be stressed here is that putting such types 
of projects into the “global” box blinds us to all the dynamics at play when an idea like the 
PHCF is created. It blinds us to the disagreements that take place when different stakeholders 
try to agree on a concept like “protected area”, it blinds us to the power relations existing 
between actors who should be “partners”, it blinds us to all the rules that regulate such 
partnerships, and, last but not least, it blinds us to the difficulty and complexity of creating a 
project like the PHCF. It is important to realise that decision-makers are not necessarily a 
homogenous group: when an idea like the PHCF is being discussed, a multiplicity of interests 
are at stakes and not every “stakeholder” gets the same level of authority.  
 
As Tsing (2000) suggests, the connections operating under neoliberalism are not just spheres 
of exchange where elements travel from one place to another. There are also spaces where 
ideas and actions are constantly being negotiated, contested and mediated. “The universal is at 
the heart of contemporary humanist projects: scientists, economic reformers, and social justice 
advocates all appeal to the universal. Yet, universals, taken at their face value, erase the 
making of global connections,” the author maintains (2005: 6). In fact the “global” is in many 
studies assimilated with a homogeneity that is too often taken for granted. For the purpose of 
this thesis, I will therefore intend to demonstrate that the PHCF is the result of multiple 
connections, disagreements and negotiations.  
 
CONNECTIONS  
The story of the PHCF starts with one person: Yann Arthus-Bertrand. Outside France, his 
name probably doesn’t ring any bell. But, in “The Hexagon”, he is the 14th most appreciated 
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personality
6
. Following an agreement with UNESCO, Yann Arthus Bertrand travelled the 
globe to take pictures of the earth from a helicopter. Most families – including mine – have 
his photography book The Earth from above (2005) on their coffee table and all of them have 
watched Home, his poignant documentary on climate change. An acclaimed photographer, he 
is now better known as an ecologist who received several awards for his work, including the 
title of Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur in 2005 and Officier de l'Ordre national du Mérite 
from the French President three years later.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photographer Yann Arthus Bertrand 
But if the splendour of his pictures has made global unanimity, the same cannot be said about 
his working method. According to French economics magazine Challenges, Yann Arthus 
Bertrand spent more than 2300 hours aboard his helicopter or the equivalent of 1667 tons of 
carbon
7
 to accomplish his ten-year-long assignment. So when the photographer takes his 
ecologist-activist hat to lecture the French Parliament and a group of industrialists about the 
actions they should take against climate change, criticisms of this contradictory “heli-
cologist” arise. To confront those critiques, the photographer decided to reduce – or at least 
compensate – his own carbon footprint by financing projects ranging from renewable energies 
to reforestation. 
“I am always astonished to see that customers do not compensate more for their carbon 
emissions. When someone takes a plane, he or she has the duty to find a system to compensate 
for the trip. Really, I am always surprise that customers don’t do it, that they are not capable of 
investing 10 or 5 euros for carbon compensation. People criticise me because I took planes to 
                                                 
6
 See http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Images/Le-Top-50-du-JDD/Top-50-JDD-personnalite-preferee-des-Francais-Yann-Arthus-
Bertrand-211680/#highlight  
7   See Challenges, July 2008 on http://www.challenges.fr/magazine/20080207.CHA7112/fertile.html 
   47 
 
take my pictures, but the only person who tried to find a way to compensate for his own 
emissions, it’s me. So, that’s it, because people were blaming me for polluting the Earth while 
taking my photos, I got the idea of this project as a way to start compensating for my own 
emissions, to show that I care,” Yann Arthus Bertrand explains [interview, January 18, 2012].  
   
In 2005, his foundation GoodPlanet was created. A year after, Action Carbone, the program 
that would enable companies, institutions, or individuals to reduce their carbon footprints by 
participating – and investing – in a voluntary carbon compensation system in return for fiscal 
reduction was launched. Voluntary carbon compensation here means calculating one’s 
emission of carbon during a flight from Paris to New York, for instance, and choosing how 
much to compensate through financial donation. 85 percent of the payment goes to the 
financing of sustainable development projects, such as reforestation programs in Madagascar 
or the construction of biogas reservoirs in China; and the remaining 15 percent cover the 
“functioning cost of the program8”. So how did Yann Arthus Bertrand’s original idea of 
compensating for his own helicopter’s carbon emissions grow from a personal engagement 
for “responsibility” to the PHCF, “the world most important program of its kind funded by 
one private company
9”?  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
GoodPlanet President Yann Arthus Bertrand 
Once again, the answer takes us back to the same actor: Yann Arthus Bertrand. Before a 
partnership was created between Air France and his foundation, Yann Arthus-Bertrand was 
working independently for Air France as a photographer. Many of the pictures he captured for 
The Earth from Above (2002) were published in Air France Magazine. And since 2000, Yann 
Arthus Bertrand frequently contributes to the airline’s magazine edition in which he even has 
his own column to write articles about the environment and honour charity projects. 
                                                 
8 See GoodPlanet website on http://www.actioncarbone.org/airfrance/ 
9 See GoodPlanet website on http://www.actioncarbone.org/index.php/fr/partenaires/103-air-france 
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According to a number of my respondents in Paris, who were either friends or professional 
relations of the photographer, Yann Arthus Bertrand’s close tie with Air France goes beyond 
the professional level. Yann, they said, is also a close friend of Jean-Cyril Spinetta, Air France 
former general director [interview, January 13, 2012]. As one journalist explained,  
“Yann is the one who got the idea for this PHCF project. And because he is a personal and close 
friend of Spinetta, Yann told Spinetta that Air France should do something … that the company 
should get involved in an environmental project. I mean basically, he convinced him to support 
the project … you know, Yann is very convincing, he knows how to present himself as a sort of 
saviour of the planet. He told Spinetta ‘you have to do something about this, you’ll have to 
invest millions of euros, but we will find the right place for you to do it’” [interview, January 
13, 2012].  
Interestingly, Yann Arthus-Bertrand does not hide his personal ties with the company’s top 
managers and, instead, prefers to see such relations as connections leading to opportunities. 
“Considering the close relation I have with Air France, I have met several times with Mr 
Spinetta and one day I told him: it is necessary to do something. He replied ‘ok, just find me a 
project,” the photographer states [interview, January 18, 2012].  
 
The argument developed by Mosse in one of his most acclaimed work Cultivating 
Development (2005), in which he argues that the success of a development project can be 
measured by the number of networks it relies on, seems very relevant when looking at the 
PHCF and the important role played by specific actors in its creation. According to Mosse 
(2005: 172) a project can only be successful if “there is an imperative to connect, to link or 
network” because a development scheme requires “strong institutional links and extended 
networks to build its reputation”. Based on his observations of the creation and 
implementation of a British project in rural India, the author concludes that such improvement 
schemes rely on “a widening circle of individuals and institutions who would underpin the 
project as a ‘system of representations’ […] and constitute a reliable interpretive community, 
a group of ‘believers’” (ibid). It is this very group of “believers” that Yann Arthus-Bertrand 
seems to have found among Air France leaders, WWF-International and WWF Madagascar 
representatives and … himself, Yann being possibly the most faithful believer in the PHCF. 
Interestingly, the reliability of the newly-established “interpretive community” partly relies on 
the fact that each actor stresses the “belief” and “faith” of the other in the project. For 
GoodPlanet officer, who acknowledges that the PHCF came into being because “there was a 
privileged gate open and privileged ties” to facilitate the process, Air France is 
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“a company that made sense to finance a project against climate change, which really is the 
angle of the project. And Air France didn’t include the PHCF into its Foundation but, instead, 
they made it separate and incorporated it as a program part of Air France environmental politics. 
So, in a way, it’s really part of their business strategy, it’s not a foundation-type project” 
[interview with Action Carbone Officer, January 17, 2012]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Air France-KLM Director Jean-Cyril Spinetta with Yann Arthus-Bertrand at a press conference 
But how was this community of believers created in the first place? Were all actors 
“believers” from the start of the project? As it will be argued in the following section, 
constructing a community of partners and believers is a lengthy process during which image, 
objectives and organisational practices need to be negotiated and, in some cases, adjusted.   
 
 
FROM LEARNING THE LANGUAGE OF THE OTHER…  
A partnership between a private company and two NGOs is, in a way or another, about image. 
It is mainly about improving the public image of a company that carries a significant carbon 
footprint record. But it is also about two NGOs reassessing their image. On the one hand, a 
partnership might help a company improve its image and, in the longer run, improve 
additional aspects of its organisation, including productivity and profits. On the other hand, 
going into a partnership with a transnational corporation for an environmental NGO is a 
complex process that may greatly compromise the organisation’s public image. So what 
happens when those two dynamics come together? According to Pierre Caussade, who 
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experienced the difficulties of reconciling different interests and organisational practices in 
the initial stage of the program, working with a NGO is a rather “particular” experience.  
“I will give you a bit of an insight into the atmosphere when we decided to hold a press 
conference in Madagascar to launch the project: at the beginning, WWF refused to participate 
in the conference. They were actually inside the conference room but they did not want to 
speak. Well this didn’t last for long and now we are three into this partnership and everything is 
going well […] But I think they were uncomfortable and probably embarrassed by the very 
mediatic side of Yann Arthus Bertrand. And the fact that they are working with a big business 
and, what’s more, an airline company … well I guess they were being cautious,” Air France 
Director for Sustainable Development explains [interview, January 19, 2012].  
A former Communication Officer at WWF-International who was very much implicated in 
communicating about the project to the general public on WWF website shared the same 
observation. 
“I think that WWF was also a bit reluctant to partner with GoodPlanet because of the mediatic 
aspect of Yann Arthus Bertrand. WWF feared it would undermine its credibility. So, for 
example, when the first press conference was launched in Madagascar in 2008, WWF refused to 
speak. They listened to GoodPlanet and Air France’s presentations but they were all seating in 
the back, discretely,” he said [interview, January 16, 2012]. 
Such observations are particularly interesting given the increasing scrutiny paid to NGO-
private companies relations. It is often assumed that a number of NGOs engage in such 
partnerships with closed eyes because of the financial gain they receive when forging such 
alliances10. What is far less explained, however, is that in this transitional phase of 
environmental politics, NGOs, and in this particular case WWF, are left caught in between. 
On the one hand, there is a growing demand from the corporate sector to receive assistance 
from NGOs on how to become both green and corporate. Such demands often come with 
financial means that the majority of NGOS could not expect to find elsewhere. On the other 
hand, NGOs that intend to team up with private companies are confronted with the very 
expectations they initially raised: being opinion leaders fighting against corporate greed. As a 
result, there is a growing apprehension from various sectors of society that NGOs will be less 
and less capable of defending the general public’s rights given conventional “opinion leaders” 
                                                 
10 The amount of money transferred from Air France to WWF and GoodPlanet as part of the PHCF was not communicated 
to me. However, a look at other partnerships between WWF and private companies can provide an estimation of the 
financial gain involved in such partnerships. When WWF France partnered with Credit Agricole, a French bank, it was 
agreed that WWF would receive 400,000 Euros per year (France 2, May 2012).  
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have become linked with one of the root causes of the public’s problem, namely corporations’ 
activities. Simultaneously, corporations themselves increasingly expect NGOs to support their 
sustainable development agenda.  
 
The transition in NGO-corporations relations often leads to situations where non-for-profit 
organisations need to mediate directives, objectives and expectations with their multiple 
official and unofficial partners. As stated earlier, the shift in environmental politics is, above 
all, a shift in expectations. Expectations as to who can be the authority regulating 
environmental governance, who is sustainable and who isn’t, who fights for environmental 
protection and who is responsible for the lack of environmental protection. For WWF, 
translating such a shift in expectations remains a difficult task because it implies balancing 
risks and opportunities: risk of compromising their public image, opportunity to answer 
corporations’ demands for sustainable development. The result of such mediations is a change 
in definition: who can be considered as a partner and benefit from WWF image – and logo – 
and who can’t? As former WWF-International Communication Officer explains,  
“to be eligible for a partnership with WWF [here referring to WWF-International], meaning that 
the private company can use our logo for instance, the company must have internal sustainable 
initiatives such as waste management for example within its own policy. So if it is a company 
using wood, we look at what type of wood they use, etc. These are the criterion we often look at 
when considering working with ‘big polluters’. However, there are certain sectors with whom 
we refuse to partner. For instance, we will never work with a company that works in the 
tobacco, oil, weapon or car industry. For us, those are taboo sectors. When it comes to the 
airline sector … let’s say that it is a grey sector, even though we know that many NGOs 
consider the activities of aerial companies to be way too polluting. At WWF, the first 
partnership we created with the aviation sector was developed by WWF Holland with KLM. 
And because WWF considers it a grey sector, the partnership could happen and this decision 
was never questioned. For the PHCF partnership … it is a different story. It wasn’t made as 
official as other partnerships we have, like the one with Lafarge for instance. With Lafarge, 
there was an exchange of logo quite rapidly. Here, in the case of the PHCF, everything goes 
through GoodPlanet. Also, Air France has no obligation under this project or any other to 
reduce its carbon emission. So it is a little more complicated” [interview, January 16, 2012]. 
We see that as the idea and practice of partnership grows within the NGO, a whole new set of 
regulations with categories of “good” versus “bad” companies, or “black” versus “white” – 
and grey – sectors is established. However, as the network of the NGO develops and becomes 
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more and more global, different frameworks are implemented and each national or regional 
agency of the global NGO can adapt its corporate partnership strategy. This “re-localisation” 
of WWF means that WWF-Holland might consider a company sustainable and, as such, a 
potential partner, while WWF-France might not. The definition of who can be a partner and 
who cannot therefore becomes even more contested within the same network. A clear 
illustration of the latter statement occurred in the initial phase of the PHCF, when GoodPlanet 
first approached WWF-France to set up a partnership for a project in Madagascar with Air 
France. Besides the fact that GoodPlanet is located inside WWF-France office, GoodPlanet 
contacted WWF-France specifically because WWF has a policy of “respect of territoriality”, 
former WWF-International Communication Officer explains [interview, January 16, 2012]. 
WWF’s policy of territoriality implies that “a NGO which would like to work with us should 
contact WWF local agency first, if both parties are located in the same country. So the reason 
why GoodPlanet initially approached WWF-France is most probably because Air France is 
the exclusive financial sponsor of the project and it is a French company,” he added [ibid]. 
However, WWF-France refused the offer of a partnership for the PHCF and redirected 
GoodPlanet to WWF-International, based in Switzerland.  
 
But what could explain such a reaction from WWF-France – a branch of the global network 
which, one of my respondents affirmed, very often has more power than the headquarter 
office itself? WWF-International Communication Officer does not know the answer. But, 
according to him, “it is possible that WWF-France thought that the project was too big. They 
probably regret their decision today. WWF-International, on the contrary, can decide by itself 
whether it should follow a project or not, and judge whether a project is too big or if it is 
feasible. Their margin of manoeuvre to take that kind of decision is much bigger than WWF-
France for instance” [ibid]. Despite my attempts to meet with representatives from WWF 
France while in Paris, I was never given an official answer about WWF-France’s decision to 
reject GoodPlanet’s proposal for the PHCF. In the words of Air France Director for 
Sustainable Development and GoodPlanet Officer, WWF-France’s reaction remains a 
“mystery”. Interestingly, a few months after I conducted my interviews in Paris, I was 
watching a documentary called Cash Investigation on French TV exploring WWF and its 
relationship with its new corporate partners (France 2, May 2012). While reading a paper that 
the journalists had handed over to her showing the name of private companies which were 
investing in “green funds”, including Air France, a WWF-France spokesperson said she was 
surprised the plane company was on the list considering “they were very big polluters”. “We 
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could never do such a thing with Air France because … well, I mean considering their carbon 
footprint it wouldn’t make sense” (ibid). Many questions arise when realising that the same 
NGO doesn’t react the same way when confronted with the same project, situation or 
potential partner. Undeniably, part of the answer embeds in the issue of “image”. Could it be 
that WWF-France redirected GoodPlanet to WWF-International knowing that, when a 
proposition for a partnership with a “big polluter” from a “grey sector” is made, an 
international organisation has less risk of compromising its public image than the national 
branch of the same NGO, which is far more attached to national directives and far more 
accessible to the French public for accountability? As the reaction of WWF-France towards 
the PHCF illustrates, NGOs are very cautious about maintaining their public image. 
Maintaining territorial flexibility in regulations and strategies related to corporate partnership 
is, in this regard, a way for NGOs to balance between their public’s expectations and the 
private sector’s demand. As WWF Director for the Indian Ocean region explains,  
 “there are many different criteria, we’re a complicated network because we have many 
branches around the world and it’s impossible to have everybody agree on the top so there are 
different processes and sort of standards in terms of real partnership. Partnership is not always a 
contractual relation it’s actually coming together saying we both want to do something and 
work together. Teams are on different terms and different strengths to do it. So pure funding 
from private sector that comes as a grant or a proposal is one thing but when you enter a 
partnership say with a private sector partner it’s different. We’ve got partners with a couple of 
private sector producers here in Madagascar and we partner with them for a variety of reasons 
first and foremost because their practices are at the leading edge of business when it comes to 
good quality sustainable management practices [Interview with Richard Hughes, 5 March 
2012].  
But, as we have seen in the formation phase of the PHCF, being at the leading edge of 
business when it comes to sustainable management practices is not always enough to 
convince NGOs to forge alliances. NGOs now represent a very extensive network with 
different organisational practices, some being more open to partnerships with private 
companies, others a bit less. In this context, becoming partners has become a highly regulated 
– yet flexible – process. NGOs establish sets of rules that, in the first place, define who can be 
a partner and who can’t and, secondly, regulate the extent of the partnership.  
 
One of the most important aspects of that extent is image: if a private company becomes a 
partner, can the company use the logo of the NGO as a publicity strategy to boost the 
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corporation’s image? If NGOs and transnational corporations seem to increasingly talk the 
same language, to which extent do they share image? The example of the PHCF seems to 
show that, when all actors start working together within the framework of a partnership, 
NGOs and transnational corporations only share image to a limited extent. One of the most 
explicit illustrations of the latter statement is that, even though WWF-International accepted 
to take part in the project proposed by GoodPlanet, WWF did not welcome the idea of having 
an official and direct partnership with Air France. As a consequence, two separate 
partnerships were established. GoodPlanet would partner with Air France, and in parallel, 
GoodPlanet would partner with WWF-International. But, interestingly, the PHCF did not start 
as a tri-party partnership. As former WWF-International Communication Officer testifies,  
“there were a lot of discussions and exchanges going on because here at WWF we have a very 
clear policy when it comes to partnerships with the private sector. So at the beginning, there 
were two partnerships: one between GoodPlanet and WWF and one between GoodPlanet and 
Air France, but there was never one that directly linked WWF to Air France. When the project 
first started and brochures started to be published, WWF did not agree that Air France could use 
their logo on any of their communication materials. This was written in and strictly regulated by 
a Communication Protocol, a paper that GoodPlanet officer, Air France Communication 
spokesperson and I wrote to facilitate communication between all the actors implicated in the 
project,” he added [interview, January 16, 2012]. 
Even though I did not receive access to that document during my fieldwork, all of my 
respondents implicated in the creation and management of the PHCF referred to it when asked 
about “the difficulties of being partners”. GoodPlanet Officer remembers that the process of 
creating the project “was complicated because there were discussions regarding the protocol 
of communication as WWF did not want to be linked to an airplane company” [interview, 
January 17, 2012]. In the “Communication Protocol”, it was therefore emphasised that Air 
France could not use the logo of WWF in any of its communication materials. The existence 
of such a document demonstrates that NGOs-private companies partnership are highly 
regulated contracts. As Air France Director for Sustainable Development explains, “when you 
invest this amount of money, it is necessary to write down in black and white the 
engagements, rights and duties of everyone involved in this project” [interview, January 19, 
2012]. Communication is controlled and so is image: not everyone deserves the black and 
white panda on their brochure. More than a year after the first negotiations had started, it was 
finally decided that, mainly for logistical reasons, a tri-party partnership should be created 
between Air France, GoodPlanet and WWF. And only a few months after the PHCF was 
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officially launched could Air France legally use WWF panda on its communication materials 
– and vice versa. But WWF Communication Officer adds: “in the facts we do talk about a tri-
partnership but on paper there is no direct contract between WWF and Air France” [interview, 
January 16, 2012]. Looking at all the negotiations that took place between the different actors, 
the issue of the logo is particularly interesting given the importance of image in any marketing 
strategy. A NGO’s logo, just like an environmental label, is usually perceived as the key to 
legitimacy and trust: if a customer sees the image of a renowned NGO on the advertising or 
brochure of a private company, the image of the logo is likely to give the customer an ethical, 
ecologically-friendly and trustworthy vision of the product, advertising, brochure, or website 
he or she is looking at.  
 
This latter observation was demonstrated by a team of researchers from Dauphine University 
who examined the influence of “greenwashing”, here referring to “communication operations 
intended to valorise environmental engagements despite the absence of actions taken to justify 
that level of communication”, on the ecological image of a product and advertiser (Laveneux, 
Benoit-Moreau & Parguel, 2009: 8). Based on surveys conducted with 640 respondents, 
Laveneux, Benoit-Moreau and Parguel (ibid) concluded that out of the green colour, the word 
‘sustainable’ and an auto-proclaimed label, only the label has a positive impact on the 
formation of an ecological image in the eyes of participants. Research findings also point out 
that a label – in most cases, identified by a logo – is the most credible element for respondents 
to make a diagnostic as to the ecological characteristic of the product and the advertiser. What 
this research clearly illustrates is that putting a green colour or using ambiguous words such 
as “sustainable” in communication materials have become obsolete advertising strategies to 
convince the public – and customers – of a company’s true commitment to the environment. 
Taking these factors into account, one can understand why a growing number of private 
companies have sought assistance from external sustainable development experts, including 
NGOs, on this matter. In fact, private companies are increasingly aware of a rising form of 
scepticism towards ecology. According to a survey conducted by the French Communication 
and Information Association for Sustainable Development (Acidd) and the Corporate 
Communication Association (Ujjef), 31 percent of all companies interviewed for the research 
– 106 in total – identify being accused of “greenwashing” by the public and the media as the 
highest risk involved in corporate sustainable development, before cost or maturity of the 
market (2010: 9). One way of overcoming this risk is to partner with an institution that 
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already enjoys a fair deal of legitimacy among the company’s primary targets: namely 
customers, the general public, journalists and internal staff (ibid). 
 
 As previously mentioned in this thesis, the organisations with a fair – yet increasingly 
challenged – deal of legitimacy are (environmental) NGOs. Like WWF with its black and 
white panda, most NGOs have symbolic images that the general public commonly identifies 
with the organisation. For popular NGOs with renowned activities around the world, the logo 
often fosters trust and credibility in the eyes of the public. And for private companies 
struggling to find a balance between the risk of greenwashing accusations and the danger of 
being confronted with eco-scepticism, adding the logo of a world-famous NGO to the 
company’s communication materials may come as an effective strategy to convince 
customers, internal staff and the general public of their true corporate commitment to the 
environment. At WWF, the use of the panda’s logo is formalised under a “license agreement” 
that is available even to companies with whom WWF does not wish to sign a partnership 
with, even though such agreements come with a financial cost for the company. What is 
interesting to note, however, is that NGOs are not the primary targets of private companies in 
their communication actions. According to the research conducted by Ujjef and Acidd 
mentioned earlier, the principal targets of companies promoting their sustainable development 
actions are customers, internal staff, journalists and the general public (2010: 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greenwashing the Emissions? source: Cartoon Movement 
What this tells us is that even though companies do not seem to be targeting NGOs in their 
communication materials, they do seem to be the direct intermediaries for corporations to 
reach their primary target. A partnership between a NGO and a private company can therefore 
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also be seen as a communication tool: it is a company’s way of communicating its public, 
staff and customers about its internal change of paradigm. Similarly, it is the NGO’s way of 
communicating its public, staff, network and other NGOs about its own shift in paradigm too. 
The encounter of those different organisational and regulatory practices is best illustrated in 
Air France Director for Sustainable Development’s description of the initial phase of the 
project:  
“What I discovered is that working with a NGO is very particular, especially when you are 
implementing a partnership of such a size. We were not simply giving 50,000 euros, it was 5 
million euros, so we had to know what we were putting ourselves into. The interface between 
the NGO world and the business world are two completely different worlds that do not work 
with the same rules, the same usages. This applies even more when you talk about a partnership 
that involves two NGOs … well even three NGOs actually since both WWF-International and 
the local branch in Madagascar are involved. At the beginning it was very complicated to the 
extent that it almost took us a year to sign the convention that was finally signed in May or June 
2008” [interview, 19 January, 2012].  
In the case of the PHCF, we have seen that finding the right balance between NGOs’ 
directives and Air France’s demand for green assistance – even when that means assistance in 
image – was a lengthy process of negotiations. Creating a partnership is a set of complex 
relations between entities with distinctive prerogatives and sometimes opposing definitions of 
concepts yet located at the chore of their alliance, such as “sustainability”: who is viewed as 
sustainable, who isn’t? What can a company do to be seen as sustainable? But, despite the 
complexity of learning the language and practice of the other, the increased use of the term 
“partnership” to describe NGO-private companies evolving relations suggests that NGOs and 
private companies are gathering efforts to put differences aside.  
 
… TO MIMICKING THE OTHER 
As outlined in this thesis, a number of NGOs and private companies have sought to formalise 
their relationships through partnerships. Throughout this process, both entities have learned to 
speak the same language in order to forge alliances and shape a homogenous line of action. 
Such a statement is supported by a research conducted by Ujjef and Acidd (2010: 12) which 
concludes that 86 percent of the 106 companies participating in the survey identify “speaking 
the same language” as a top priority when they collaborate with third party agents or 
consultants, including NGOs (2010: 12). The direct result of such a trend is a growing 
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tendency from both entities to mimic one another: through partnerships, NGOs and 
transnational private companies tap into each other’s registers, organisational formats and 
characteristics. The process of mimicking NGOs’ registers started at Air France in early 
2000s when the plane company created its internal Sustainable Development division. Within 
ten years, Air France had written its first “Environment Report”, signed the United Nations 
Global Compact, integrated the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, published its first CSR 
report, developed a “Climate Action Plan” – mentioned by Pierre Caussade earlier – and 
identified Corporate Social Responsibility as one of its top four priorities for the company’s 
strategic plan. Research by Ujjef and Acidd research reports that 72 percent of the 
corporations interviewed for the study have a separate branch within their company dedicated 
to sustainable development, and 84 percent have elaborated products or services linked to 
sustainable development (2010: 15). Sustainable development, in other words, is becoming an 
integral part of business models.  
 
The same way private companies are opening their business strategies to environmentally-
friendly policies, discourses and actions, NGOs are increasingly opening their doors to 
business-oriented practices. The establishment of a rather recent “Corporate Partnership” 
branch at WWF is one illustration of the latter statement. In addition to Project Manager or 
Campaign Officer, new positions such as Director of Corporate Relations or Vice President of 
Business and Industry were created to reflect the NGO’s shift in organisational practices. 
Business talks and strategies progressively became embedded in NGOs’ format. As Elkington 
(1998: 39-40) suggests,  
“a few leading NGOs, particularly those dedicated to wildlife conservation, developed huge 
corporate sponsorship departments dedicated solely to hunting down deep-pocketed corporate 
donors […] In any event, the conditions in which such partnerships were pursued changed 
dramatically when two things happened in parallel. First, companies, inevitably, became more 
discriminating. They began to insist on a bigger PR bang for their sponsorship buck. And they 
wanted their benefits in the form of an enhanced reputation with selected audiences. As ‘cause-
related marketing’ evolved, some of those NGOs corporate sponsorship departments became 
almost indistinguishable from mainstream advertising or PR agencies. The second shift was 
driven by NGOs’ needs. They found themselves managing increasingly large projects and 
budgets. Their staffs mushroomed and demanded better employment conditions. They found 
they needed people, and project and financial management skills which, they noted, business 
was also rich in. So we saw downsizing companies seconding managers to NGOs, often as a 
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way of easing them into retirement. And we also saw NGOs appointing people from business to 
their boards and top management posts,” he argues (1998: 39-40).  
For Baruah (2007: 243), whose research focuses on water and sanitation services in slums 
provided through NGO-private companies’ partnership in India, the growing demand from the 
corporate sector for assistance in “sustainable development strategies” has led to a rising 
professionalisation of experts and civil society groups – NGOs included. NGOs, moving away 
from their role as corporate greed fighters are now approached by 50 percent of private 
companies for being “external experts” with consultancy advice on CSR policies. NGOs also 
increasingly present themselves as institutions which can assist private companies in investing 
in sustainable projects in Brazil, Nepal or Madagascar. WWF even published an “ideal 
Corporate Responsibility report” on its website, a document filled with recommendations for 
private companies on how to best present one’s CSR policies and results.  
 
NGOs’ move towards corporate-style professionalism also resulted in NGOs hiring a growing 
number of consultants and experts who share a common language with donors and private 
companies and who master the use of words such as sustainability, participation and 
empowerment, Baruah explains (ibid). Newly recruited NGOs’ spokespersons can therefore 
facilitate communication between NGOs and private companies. The words of Emily Kelton, 
WWF-US Director for Corporate Relations, illustrate well this mutual process of mimicking 
one another once NGOs and private companies team up: “you’re big, we’re big, so we 
understand each other […] there is a sense of kinship in being multinationals with global 
brands,” she explains (quoted in Jayawickrama, 2011: 2). When talking to WWF Regional 
Director for the Indian Ocean in his office in Madagascar, who said he had purposely worked 
in the business industry for a while in order to understand it, I noticed that his use of words 
strongly recalled corporate language [interview, March 5, 2012]. “Economic values and 
benefits”, “management”, “market perspective”, “risks”, “better value on the market” … I 
also noticed that he was very much aware of the reasons why corporations decide to go into 
“green partnerships” and what their expectations are in this regard. “If companies have good 
sound environmental practices, it may help their business, they may be able to obtain 
certifications or higher standards or get better value on the market. Then you’ve got 
companies that are extracting resources but maybe they are not benefiting from the 
conservation themselves. So there is a conservation investment that they make but they do it 
either out of industry pressure or industry standards, public image or personal commitment of 
the company,” WWF Regional Director for the Indian Ocean said [interview, March 5, 2012]. 
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NGOs’ growing corporate-style professionalism and willingness to maximize “efficiency” 
was also illustrated to me when I asked WWF Regional Director for the Indian Ocean whether 
the PHCF was a difficult project to manage, considering its intervention sites represented 
500,000 hectares of land across Madagascar. He responded that 
“from a management standpoint, we’re much better off with bigger projects. This is actually one 
of the biggest challenges that WWF globally faces, not just here but in almost all of the 
countries where we implement projects: we have too many small projects. The amount of 
management time you have to put in small projects is not that much compared to a big project. 
You have to put an awful lot for a big project but in relative terms, with a fifty or sixty thousand 
euros project, you need to have all the management in place, write the reports and do financial 
management … and you have to make sure it’s actually guided properly. Whereas if you have a 
five million dollars grant, that management is bigger but you’re much more efficient on how 
you do it. If you have a one year project or a project funded for a year, then you are just waiting 
for the funding for the next year. It’s also very distractive. It’s hard to make it strategic and 
make it very long-term. So with a big project, your cost of management per project on the whole 
is less [interview, March 5, 2012].  
In contrast to a number of grassroots organisations that operate with a small number of people 
in order to promote contact, communication and small-scale achievement, NGOs like WWF 
favour big projects with higher grants, higher efficiency, less management requirements, less 
reports to write, and reduced management costs. Interestingly, this language and such 
practices seem to echo those of a familiar sector…  
 
To understand the process of becoming partners – and mimicking one another – it is useful to 
go back to Mosse’s description of contemporary partnerships. According to Mosse (2005: 
172), partnerships are maintained by “a widening circle of individuals and institutions who 
underpin the project as a ‘system of representations’ and constitute a reliable interpretive 
community […] a group of ‘believers’”. The strength of this “interpretive community of 
believers” is reinforced through various media: on a brochure published by WWF but 
displayed in Air France’s sales offices, on the walls of Air France Director for Sustainable 
Development’s office where Yann Arthus Bertrand’ photographs are hanging, or in a press 
release in which GoodPlanet and WWF take the defence of Air France to respond to an article 
about the PHCF which claims that Air France is buying itself “a right to pollute in 
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Madagascar”11. Creating a partnership means forging alliances by activating networks and 
connections across different sectors and, as Benedict Anderson (1983) would argue, 
constructing an imagined community. In this particularly case, we see that the “community of 
believers” is created by the actors who perceive themselves as being part of that very 
partnership. The difference between the socially constructed community that Anderson 
described in 1991, namely the nation state, and the community of “believers” implicated in 
the PHCF embeds in the social connections linking one partner to another. In contrast to the 
first, which “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion”, members of the PHCF do know each other very well, 
developed personal ties over time and regularly meet and interact with each other (ibid: 224). 
And even when “partners” do not engage with each other over a long period of time, they still 
know that the partnership exists – and therefore, that their community of believers remains – 
thanks to the communication materials published to promote the partnership: brochures, 
website pages, video footages, internal and external reports, press conferences, attendance of 
international events, etc. In other terms, the partnership becomes materialised and maintained 
not only through personal interactions but also by extending networks of communication. The 
believers hold in their mind a mental image of their partnership that is reinforced by various 
media.   
 
But, personal connections and extending networks of communication are not the only factors 
reinforcing the community of believers. As outlined earlier, the use of a similar language and 
the increasing convergence of organisational practices reinforce the uniformity of this 
community. In fact, when people speak the same language, it becomes easier to communicate 
and, therefore, to make concessions. As Air France Director for Sustainable Development 
explains,   
“back in 2008, it was unthinkable to do a brochure for the wider public with the triple logo. But 
it is WWF who suggested the idea. Now we are three and everything is going fine, it is even 
WWF who proposed the logo when we did a conference in Paris and when the brochure was 
designed. That would have been unlikely to happen in the beginning. But now there is really a 
good atmosphere, of respect and trust, we are now the best friends in the word, honestly, it is 
not just a formula, we really are the best friends in the world!” [interview, January 19, 2012] 
                                                 
11 Article published on Rue89, December 2010. See http://www.rue89.com/planete89/2010/12/20/non-planter-
des-forets-nest-pas-acheter-un-droit-a-polluer-181599. 
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Interestingly, there seems to be an additional shift in private companies’ discourse: actors and 
partners are no longer referred to as institutions or corporations but, instead, as people. By 
doing so, the corporation, just like the NGOs, is placed back into a social and living body. The 
private company is de-institutionalised and, in turn, personified. The way actors speak about 
companies progressively changes. This process, whether deliberate or unintentional, serves to 
change the image of the corporation into a person that anybody could become “best friends” 
with, to recall Pierre Caussade’s description above. The community of believers then appears 
to be so strong that even the reluctance of the past has faded away, most particularly when it 
comes to image. So when Yann Arthus-Bertrand noticed in one of Air France’s brochures 
about the PHCF that his foundation’s logo was smaller than Air France’s emblem, he 
immediately called Air France to ask for a bigger GoodPlanet logo: because both partners 
were equal, so should the size of their logos on the website (see images below)12. 
Interestingly, a few months after the partnership was launched, it was the NGO that was 
asking the private company for a bigger logo on their common brochures, and not the other 
way around.  
 
From a bi-partnership 
 Logo of Air France and Actioncarbone (GoodPlanet’s program) on Air France corporate website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Challenges, July 2008 on http://www.challenges.fr/magazine/20080207.CHA7112/fertile.html 
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To a tri-party partnership 
 
 Air France brochure on the PHCF with WWF, GoodPlanet and Air France logo at the bottom 
 
 
ASSESSING RISK(S) 
But what happens to people who don’t speak the same language or do not share the same 
organisational practices? Even though the term partnership enrols a group of different actors, 
the word itself gives the impression that all actors go the same way when, in reality, they 
often understand things differently, as Mosse argues in Cultivating Development (2005). In 
fact, my fieldwork observations brought me to the conclusion that even though the use of the 
word “partnership” is powerful and effective in illustrating a shift in NGO-private companies 
relations, considerable frictions remain when the two entities interact with one another. In 
Friction, Tsing (2005: 1) explains that the title of her book defines the “aspirations for global 
connection and how they come to life in friction, the grip of worldly encounter”. Friction, she 
continues, “shows us where the rubber meets the road. Roads are a good image for 
conceptualising how friction works: roads create pathways that make motion easier and more 
efficient, but in doing so they limit where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a 
structure of confinement,” the author adds (2005: 6). Tsing’s analysis of global forces’ 
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encounter is particularly relevant when looking at the PHCF. Despite the opportunities opened 
by the creation of a partnership between two NGOs and a private company, the example of 
the PHCF shows that as connections grow and alliances are forged, “the ease of travel” 
becomes reduced. In other words, partners are left with very little room for manoeuvre and 
backtrack once they are engaged on the road towards partnership because the term 
“partnership” itself confines all actors to speak the same language and use similar 
organisational practices. If partners do not understand one another, through language or 
through action, the idea of a partnership becomes fragile.  
 
Let us take Tsing’s metaphor further. Let’s consider that language and practice stand for the 
rubber, the partnership stands for the road and the two cars represent the NGO and the private 
company. For actors to remain partners, both cars need to be gripped by the same base and 
drive on the same road. In this process, it is the friction of the rubber with the road that allows 
the two cars to keep going and, eventually, reach the same destination – that is, reach the 
same goal. But what happens when one of the two drivers decide to change direction and go 
off the road? As Tsing reminds us, “a wheel turns because of its encounter with the surface of 
the road; spinning in the air, it goes nowhere” (2005: 5). The car is left without any grip to 
hold on to and the wheel, with no smooth road for its rubber to roll on, is motionless. This 
metaphor applies well to a situation GoodPlanet Officer was confronted with in the initial 
phase of the PHCF. When approaching Air France as a potential financial sponsor for the 
project, he remembers that   
 “we [GoodPlanet and WWF] made a first proposition to Air France but the former director of 
the company more or less insinuated to us that if there was no return on investment under the 
form of carbon credit, he was not interested. This particularly irritated the person from WWF 
who came along with me at the meeting. Later on, that same person got side-lined. So then we 
had to present to the new team for the project to Air France and there were a lot of exchanges, 
especially about the fact that the project would be pure sponsorship and there would be no 
carbon compensation involved. After that, there was the Grenelle de l’Environnement13, so Air 
France did not really know how to position itself anymore and they even considered stopping 
everything because of a potential taxation on kerosene. But finally that didn’t happen. In the 
                                                 
13 Le Grenelle de l’Environnement is a series of political meetings organised in France in 2007 to take long-term 
decisions about the environment and sustainable development, in particular to restore biodiversity through regional 
schemes, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and ameliorate energetic efficiency. This conference was also one of the first 
times the French government reunited civil society groups, private companies and the government to open rooms for talks 
and partnerships. Many NGOs heavily criticised the Grenelle de l’Environnement and the organisations who participated 
in it for engaging with the source of environmental problems, namely, corporations. 
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end, everybody agreed to say that it would be sponsorship and not carbon compensation so, 
after the discussion in May, the project was officially launched in September 2008” [interview 
with GoodPlanet Action Carbone officer, 17 January 2012].  
The question that such a statement raises is the following: can NGOs and private companies 
really overcome their differences and, in some cases, conflicting interests? Is it really possible 
for a NGO to cross its conventional line? And, the other way around, it is really possible for a 
private company to put economic profits and “return on investment” aside in the name of 
sustainability? According to Elkington (1998: 37), many actors from the corporate world and 
environmental activists continue to see the relationship between companies and campaigners 
as “an unending battle between the forces of good and evil, of light and darkness, right and 
wrong”. Even though the term “partnership” gives the impression that NGO-business 
alliances are trouble-tree – especially when members of those partnerships use words such as 
“stakeholders” to reinforce that impression – GoodPlanet program officer’s testimony 
reminds us that NGOs and corporate actors tend to understand things differently. When each 
interpretation becomes confronted with one another, disconnection occurs: some people get 
side-lined for not sharing the same language and others, in the most extreme cases, lose their 
job14.  
 
Interestingly, we also see that there is a strong willingness from both sectors to reinforce that 
a company is not a civil society group and vice versa, despite all the efforts gathered to create 
alliances. There is an inclination on the side of the corporate sector, for instance, to draw the 
line between what a company is and what it is not. Air France Director for Sustainable 
Development repeated several times during my interview with him that, even though the 
plane company is investing 5 million Euros in the PHCF, “at Air France, we do not do 
environmental activism” [interview, January 19, 2012]. “I receive a lot of CVs from 
candidates who would like to work for my division [Sustainable Development] and they often 
stress how ‘committed’ and ‘engaged’ they are. But what we do here is enabling a company to 
                                                 
14 One of my respondents, a journalist working in Paris, informed me that a former steward working at Air France 
contacted him so the journalist would write an article about his story: according to what the steward told him, the steward 
had made a proposition to Air France to fund a project he had in mind in Madagascar. It is a common practice, as part of 
Air France Foundation, to have internal staff submits project ideas to the Foundation. Air France did not accept his offer 
and, when a few months later he heard that his company would invest 5 million euros for a project of 500,000 hectares 
with WWF and Yann Arthus Bertrand’s foundation, he started to speak publicly about his discontentment. A few weeks 
later, he was fired. According to the steward, the reason why Air France fired him is because the company became scared 
of his intention and he was creating trouble for the image of Air France, and the PHCF. The journalist never wrote a story 
about this. Unfortunately, the journalist who informed me about this could not provide me with the contact information of 
the steward and I never managed to get in touch with that person. Air France never confirmed the veracity of this story 
but, based on the journalist’s declarations, I believe this aspect was worth mentioning. 
   66 
 
better understand the challenges ahead. We are not doing humanitarian work,” he added 
[interview, January 19, 2012]. For Air France Director for Sustainable Development, there are 
lines not to be crossed and there is a difference to make between CSR and humanitarian 
action, the first one having a direct impact on business and becoming, more and more, a key 
component of it, the second being part of the register of a different kind of organisation. The 
same observation applies when looking at NGOs. To the question “do you think people’s 
perceptions of private companies are changing considering corporations are increasingly 
involved in development projects?” GoodPlanet officer replied: “no, the reason why we work 
with companies like Air France is because, essentially, they are donors, a source of finance” 
[interview, January 17, 2012]. WWF Regional Director for the Indian Ocean is even clearer 
about it: “No one should ever believe a company invests in something for nothing … because 
they don’t!” [interview, March 5, 2012]. For him, the most valuable aspect of working with 
companies is 
“to understand why they are doing it and what are they gaining from it. It can be defined, 
understood and potentially measured. I know a couple of companies who invest in particular 
programs to create a better and more positive feeling among their workers and that may 
translate into more productive and more dedicated workers. Even some things that appear to be 
purely a gift … it usually isn’t. If a company is smart about it and does it in the right way, they 
can still benefit from it [interview, March 5, 2012].  
As we have seen earlier, there is a tendency from the different actors involved in the 
partnership to tap into each other’s register. This tendency is reinforced by all the 
communication materials that give a visual support to the alliance, such as the green colour 
displayed on all partners’ websites, or a brochure with the logo of each organisations. Because 
all actors involved in the partnership share logos, language and practices, one could easily be 
under the impression that roles and responsibilities become blurred. For instance, the fact that 
WWF and GoodPlanet joined forces to defend Air France in response to a very critical press 
article15 published about the company’s involvement in the PHCF – instead of Air France 
Communication division doing it – suggests that the lines between each sector have become 
obsolete: it is not a NGO defending a private company, it is a partner defending its own 
partner. However, what the declarations from the respondents quoted above show is that, 
when it comes to roles, responsibilities and, most importantly, interests, there are still 
demarcated lines that exist. The private company, for instance, does not want its public to 
                                                 
15 See http://www.rue89.com/planete89/2010/12/20/non-planter-des-forets-nest-pas-acheter-un-droit-a-polluer-181599 
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think it has converted to humanitarian action. Similarly, GoodPlanet and WWF do not want 
their campaigners and followers to see private companies as a new development agent. The 
core belief within NGOs like WWF in this transition phase of environmental politics is that 
corporations remain institutions with whom NGOs should engage with in order to “improve 
the system” and with financial resources they can no longer hope to find elsewhere [interview 
with former WWF-International Communication Officer, January 16, 2012].   
 
Transnational companies are presented as more and more development-oriented entities. 
Some even argue they are increasingly powerful actors in the development world (Rajak, 
2005). But, since the issue of roles is raised here, it is important to ask another question: how 
much of a steady actor are companies as development and environmental partners? Can those 
private companies stick to the plan agreed upon earlier with NGOs in this particular neoliberal 
moment? During her research, Rajak (ibid) noticed that “at the operational level, managers 
expressed feelings of impotence and uncertainty trapped under the weight of the company’s 
rigid hierarchy and opaque bureaucracy. Many local level managers spoke of budgets 
suddenly cut, projects prematurely curtailed, and having to creatively negotiate ways to fulfil 
commitments to their beneficiaries and sustain relationships that they had personally built 
up”. The new dimension to consider when looking at NGO-business partnerships is the 
economic crisis of 2008 that has affected many corporations, even the ones with “good” CSR 
reports and renowned sustainability awards on their office desks. Financial resources have 
become limited and the succession of budget cuts raises a lot of questions as to the role 
companies will or will not play in the future of development and environmental politics. 
Transnational corporations have been approached by a number of NGOs for partnerships 
principally because of their environmentally unsound activities but also because of their 
financial capacities to tackle the environmental damages they caused. But now that this 
financial capacity is at stake, will NGOs continue to perceive companies as needed partners? 
Similarly, will companies continue to play a role in the “sustainability transition”? The 
answer from Air France Director for Sustainable Development gives a very interesting insight 
into a company’s perception of the issue – even though his declaration cannot be generalised 
to the whole corporate sector.  
“There is something we insisted on even though it was a long challenge. In the convention we 
signed with WWF and GoodPlanet we demanded a clause of exclusivity that stipulated that all 
partners should reserve the exclusivity of the project tor Air France and that, if things were to go 
in a different way, they could only change this with our exclusive agreement. The clause also 
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said that, in case of economic reversal and deficit at Air France, Air France had the right to 
interrupt the project with a six-month notice. This clause was added to the Convention a month 
before we actually signed it, and … well, it was our financial management who suggested 
including it in case of reversal. But you know, back then, there was no premise of an economic 
crisis because we signed in 2007. On the contrary, at that time, we were making profits! That’s 
why we could get the money. But within the first year of the project, Air France’s budget turned 
red, economically speaking. So at the end of 2008, we could have used that clause. We would 
like to continue investing in the project despite our financial difficulties but we are no longer 
capable of supporting this project by ourselves. So we told WWF and GoodPlanet to start 
looking for new partners […] It is not our vocation to give millions of euros continuously. And, 
what’s more, the economic situation of the company has significantly deteriorated,” he 
explained [interview, January 19, 2012].  
What we learn from Air France Director for Sustainable Development is that companies are in 
a very complex situation in this particular time of neoliberalism. On the one hand, economic 
“risks” encourage companies to present themselves as “cautious” partners confined to a 
restricting structure – i.e., the market. On the other hand, responsible communication and 
other strategies on the CSR agenda have enabled companies to create attention about their 
action and, undoubtedly, improve their image in the eyes of their customers, their staff and the 
general public. As we see, economic prerogatives and sustainability directives become, in this 
time of economic difficulties, difficult to reconcile.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
As we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, a number of NGOs are increasingly 
abandoning the legislative process when campaigning for accountability and, instead, 
favour direct engagement with corporations. According to Lyon and Maxwell (2008: 243), 
this shift in environmental politics is part of a policy life cycle that is progressively 
changing. Rather than using legislation as a tool for advocacy and a means for 
accountability, civil society groups and NGOs directly ask corporations to improve their 
social or environmental records. The new phase environmental politics is now entering, 
Lyon and Maxwell argue, is “private politics” (ibid). Private, in the sense that politics is no 
longer managed by the public body known as the state.  
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A handful of new actors have emerged on the global scene and considerably reshaped 
state-society relations. In this transitional phase, improvement and development schemes 
are no longer the monopoly of the state. Certain authors attribute this change to a 
governance gap created by globalisation while others point to a broader shift in 
governance, whereby a whole new range of actors, including the state, negotiate power and 
authority. What this chapter intended to outline was why and how this transition towards 
“transgovernmentality” translated into environmental politics.  
 
The example of the PHCF also shows that this new cycle in global environmental politics 
has formalised under the form of partnerships between NGOs and private companies. 
Partnerships are, as we have seen throughout this section, a rearrangement of tasks and 
commitments between the state, companies and civil society. With increasing power and 
legitimacy, NGOs and private companies progressively act as the authorising institutions 
when it comes to “sustainability”: what does it mean to be sustainable? Who can be 
considered as sustainable and who cannot? As authorising agents, NGOs and private 
companies also become the entities with unequivocal power to define the problems that 
need to be solved and the best ways to solve them. Incontestably, there is a mutual shift in 
paradigm: NGOs are increasingly willing to engage with the corporate sector while 
transnational companies seek more and more assistance from external actors on how to 
become “greener”. But looking at the interactions between NGOs and private companies in 
the particular setting of the PHCF we have seen that this change of paradigm requires a 
lengthy process of learning the language and practice of the other(s).  
 
The result of such an exercise is that NGOs and private companies end up mimicking one 
another, tapping into each other’s linguistic and organisational registers. Yet, such a trend 
also comes with contingencies, frictions, risks and disconnections that continue to exist 
between the non-governmental world and the corporate sector. Placed back in the context 
of a broader re-organisation of state-society relations, those observations bring us to the 
following conclusion: through partnerships, NGOs and private companies imitate the state. 
By taking the lead in development or environmental schemes and defining the problems 
and solutions needed for the “sustainability transition”, NGOs and private companies are 
tapping into the register of the state. Interestingly, and as demonstrated above, both entities 
insist that they have not replaced the statutory body by demarcating their own line of 
   70 
 
responsibility: the private company declares it is “not involved in humanitarian action” 
while the NGO stresses it is only trying to “improve the system” within which it operates. 
Yet, even though the work of international NGOs and transnational corporations very often 
transcend national boundaries, the practices, tasks and commitments accomplished by both 
organisations remind us of the contrary. 
 
Now that we have analysed why and how the partnership for the PHCF was created – 
looking at the structural changes, connections, disconnections, negotiations and strategies 
that have enabled its creation – the next chapter of this thesis will consist in studying how 
actors involved in the PHCF have justified and successfully received access to Madagascar 
and, most particularly, its forest resources. The question that this next chapter will seek to 
answer therefore is: before the project was concretely implemented in the different 
intervention sites in Madagascar, what were the strategies put in place by the different 
actors of the PHCF to legitimise the project locally?   
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Part 2. 
 
 
ACCESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCESSING THE ISLAND: BRANDING MADAGASCAR 
The second part of this thesis is devoted to the question of access. Partnerships, after all, are 
created to access something in particular, let it be a product, an object, a location, or an 
audience. In fact, partnerships are very often created to render access even more legitimate: 
actors from different sectors all gather efforts, strength and skills to facilitate access to the 
desired element. When talking about access in relation to the PHCF, one question comes to 
mind: why was the PHCF implemented in Madagascar, and not somewhere else? And how is 
this choice justified? 
 
Before going any further into this chapter, it is crucial to define what is here meant by 
“access”. The most suitable definition of the term, in the context of this thesis, is the one 
suggested by Ribot and Peluso (2003). Access is, according to the authors, “the ability to 
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derive benefits from things” and not just the right to benefit from things (2003: 153).  Access 
is about a bundle of powers rather than a bundle of rights. The reason why Ribot and Peluso 
favour the concept of “access” over the term “property” when looking at acquisition for 
benefits is because the former allows us to “look at a wider range of social relationships, 
means and processes that constrain or enable benefits from resource use” (ibid). Here, one 
point needs to be stressed: access is tied to benefits. If a plurality of actors decided to team up 
for the PHCF, it is because they all expect to get some sort of benefits from it. The main 
benefit one can think of is usually monetary but it can also take the form of knowledge, 
authority, power or image. “Benefits,” the authors continue, “are important because people, 
institutions and societies live on and for them and clash and cooperate over them” (2003: 
155). This chapter intends to map the mechanisms by which access is justified, gained and 
maintained.  
 
A man to my research assistant: “There is something we don’t understand. You have wanted to 
know for a long time. Maybe if you ask the vazaha [foreigner], she will know. Every time we, 
gasy [Malagasy], see a lemur in the forest, the lemur sees us and then immediately starts 
running away. But when all the vazaha come near Berenty, the lemurs they run towards the 
vazaha. It’s like the lemurs are not afraid of the vazaha. But why do the lemurs start running 
when Malagasy are around? Can you ask her why the lemurs like the vazaha but they don’t like 
us?” 
 
A biologist: “If I am here, it is for the animals, not for the people. I know it is not really nice to 
say this but, really, this is how I feel: I’m only here for the animals.” 
 
A Malagasy ecology student: “You know, it’s very strange the way the vazaha behave here 
sometimes. We are here in Madagascar, so it is my country. So, logically, I know it better, I 
know the plants because I am from here but, yet, it feels like we have to listen to the vazaha. 
They tell us what to do, and when we do it ourselves, they don’t trust us. And what is this 
fascination with lemurs? Why do they like them so much? You know, I heard a joke one day; 
apparently it is quite famous around Madagascar and I think it’s funny. The joke says that if the 
vazaha like the lemurs so much, I mean if the vazaha like the lemurs more than the Malagasy, 
then the lemurs should all go and work at the airport to welcome the vazaha who arrive in 
Madagascar. Maybe the vazaha would like this better, no?” 
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As I quickly discovered during my fieldwork in Madagascar, there seemed to be different 
ways of speaking about the island’s forests. On the one hand, the people I talked to in the 
protected area of Antanmamo said the forest was like “a parent” because “it gives you water 
and food to feed your family. The forest takes care of you just like your mother or you father’’ 
[interview with the rondria of case-study village A, June 28, 2011]. The forest is also the 
place to look for medicinal plants and fuel woods, to consult the kokolampo (spirit), and a 
place to take care of since it is the home of the ancestors. But I have also met with a number 
of Malagasy who told me the forests should be protected for the sake of “future generations“, 
a message which strongly echoed local NGO representatives’ discourses. But when I listened 
to natural scientists and NGO workers, let them be Malagasy or foreigners, I realised that 
more than any other person I encountered in Madagascar, they clearly had two distinctive 
ways of speaking about the island’s forests: a green Eden with a unique biodiversity and a 
global heritage increasingly threatened by human activities. The reason why I think it is 
important to discuss those representations here, in reference to access, is because both images 
serve to justify intervention to Madagascar’s forests. As explained earlier, the objective of this 
section is to understand why the PHCF was implemented in Madagascar specifically, instead 
of Brazil, Congo or Indonesia for example?  
 
The second part of this thesis also serves as a justification for my decision to choose 
Madagascar as a case study for my research on environmental politics. More than any other 
country in Africa, there has been a special way of talking about Madagascar and its forests. 
This specific language has attracted a number of actors to the island, from French colonial 
missionaries to foreign naturalists, ecologists and, most recently, global environmental NGOs. 
Inside Madagascar, this powerful language has attracted local interests too, in a country which 
still strongly relies on foreign aid for social and environmental schemes.  
 
When looking at the messages communicated through the PHCF and based on the interviews 
I conducted with various actors of the project, I realised that Madagascar was highly 
“branded”. It is branded as a verdant place where endemic species live. Yet, it is also branded 
as a “global heritage” belonging to the world’s biodiversity which, nevertheless, is 
increasingly degraded by human activities – hence the choice for an “anti-deforestation” 
project for the PHCF. Such dual brandings, I shall argue, highlight a simultaneous yet 
paradoxical process of “localisation” and “delocalisation”. To the question, how do Air 
France, GoodPlanet and WWF justify and legitimise access to Madagascar, there seems to be 
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three answers. The first one, in relation to Air France, is that the French company has 
privileged ties with the island because Air France has been flying to Madagascar since the 
1960s, the island being one of their first destinations in Africa.  
“Why should we support this project? Why Madagascar? The two questions are intertwined of 
course. Madagascar has historical links with France, well, to be clear, colonial links with 
France and Air France also has historical links with the island, we fly there since 50 or 60 
years. In the context of our politics to support environmental or development programs, we 
have a special affinity with Madagascar because it is a country where we fly to and it is a very 
appealing place that faces incontestable development obstacles, it is a beautiful country with 
considerable assets but also great difficulties”, Air France Director for Sustainable 
Development Pierre Caussade explains [interview, January 19, 2012].  
The following two reasons will be the focus of my analysis here. One the one hand, 
Madagascar is unique so the project is exclusive and exemplary, but at the same time, the 
island is a world’s biodiversity hotspot and, thus, deserves global attention and protection. 
Making something global – hence belonging to everyone – renders it accessible to all.  
 
Accessing Madagascar as a foreign company or an international NGO is about playing with 
space. One may wonder what Air France, GoodPlanet and WWF are trying to access through 
the PHCF: a unique place or a global, hence delocalised, space? The answer, as disappointing 
as it may sound, is both. But this observation is, in itself, a major finding: the legitimacy of 
the project entirely relies on this paradox of representations: making Madagascar spatially 
unique while simultaneously representing the island as part of wider environmental “holism” 
– hence the name “Programme Holistique de Conservation des Forêts” (PHCF). It is because 
the PHCF presents Madagascar as both a localised place and a globalised space that 
intervention can be justified and access granted.  
 
2.1. ACCESSING NATURE: “LOCALISING” THE ISLAND 
The objective of this section is to understand how a specific element has been accessed by a 
multiplicity of actors. Here, this element is Nature and, more precisely, forest areas in 
Madagascar. When talking about access, from acquisition to legitimisation, it is important to 
realise that a fundamental part of that process relies on representation. In other terms, before 
accessing something, one needs to identify it, name it, and represent it through various means.  
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When looking at the brochures and messages published about the PHCF, the forests of 
Madagascar appear as “unique”. “Unique biodiversity”, “unique fauna and flora of the 
world’s fourth island” … Nature seems to be highly localised. “Localisation” here refers to 
the process of attributing specific features to a definite place and, by doing so, making the 
place exceptional. This process of localisation effectuated through the PHCF, however, is not 
done in a vacuum. Whether inside or outside Madagascar, the stories I heard about the island 
from foreigners – and sometimes from Malagasy themselves – very often emphasised the 
word “unique”. The same observation applied when I looked at tourist brochures, mostly 
displaying lemurs and baobabs, travellers’ books inviting their readers on a journey to an 
isolated “living Eden”, and conservation NGOs’ websites that emphasised the ecological 
diversity of “the hottest [biodiversity] hotspots”16. Being from an island myself, I understood 
how much of a role geographical isolation could play in arising the curiosity and admiration 
of land-locked foreigners. What I did not understand, however, was the reason why 
Madagascar’s ecosystem generated so much admiration. Surely, Madagascar was not the only 
place on Earth to have endemic species, tropical forests, stunning flowers, entertaining 
animals, and national parks. Then why did a number of ecologists told me they were “only 
here for the animals”? Why did many Malagasy repeatedly ask me: “why do the vazaha think 
there are only lemurs living here?” Why were foreign tourists travelling all the way to the 
Indian Ocean to, I quote, “be alone with Nature”? Why not Mauritius, the Comoros, the 
Seychelles or Reunion Island for instance? Why would they want to be “alone with Nature” in 
Madagascar in particular? Thinking he was probably the most suitable person to answer that 
question, I asked WWF Regional Director for Madagascar and the Western Indian Ocean for 
his opinion on the matter.  
“Each country [Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles and Madagascar] does have a degree of unique 
endemism and they all have values … the reality though is that the size of Madagascar and the 
amount of terrain and the number of species are much greater than any of the other islands. It 
depends on the area, but just because of its unique nature and size combined, Madagascar is 
really the core of our terrestrial work here but we also have marine work. Madagascar is a 
unique place, it really has to do with the diversity of the endemic biodiversity and a lot of that 
has to do with values over biodiversity conservation and potential future value of that level of 
biodiversity. What Madagascar has that the Congo or other countries don’t is this unique 
ecosystem of plants, animals, birds and fish. Everything here is so unique. […] In terms of size, 
                                                 
16
 Quote from Russell Mittermeier, a renowned primatologist and president of the U.S NGO Conservation 
International on http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1844474,00.html 
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economic importance and other things like that it’s a different equation. I mean Madagascar is 
still 20 million people, it’s not small … but the amount of forests when it comes to carbon 
sequestration is not comparable to the big forest basins elsewhere. The Congo Basin well … it 
has its unique features but it’s not entirely unique. Some of that biodiversity is also protected in 
other places. Whereas Madagascar … it’s unique. And if you lose it here, it’s not anywhere 
else,” he said [interview with WWF Regional Director for the Indian Ocean, March 5, 2012].   
The answer from WWF’s Madagascar-based Regional Director echoes many articles and 
publications I came across before. He and other promoters of the island’s uniqueness are 
right: Madagascar does possess a high rate of endemic species.  
 
The reason for such uniqueness is mainly geological and historical. For this reason, it is 
important to situate the project in a historical trend and context. 160 million years ago, when 
the Gondwana supercontinent started to dismantle, Madagascar was separated from Africa 
and India and ultimately became an island of its own. As a result of geological separation, 
many plants and animals originally considered to be Gondwana relicts started to evolve and 
grow in complete isolation on the island and, eventually, became endemic to Madagascar. For 
anyone passionate about biology, ecology or natural sciences in general, Madagascar’s 
endemism rate truly is a blessing.   
“Madagascar’s privileged position in terms of biodiversity is based on its geological history and 
geographic placement […] Madagascar is situated largely in the tropics and also has very high 
species richness, especially given its relatively small size (587,041 km²). For example, although 
Madagascar occupies only about 1.9% of the land area of the African region, it has more 
orchids than all of mainland Africa, and indeed is home to perhaps as much as a third of all 
African plant species. Overall, about 83% of Madagascar’s plant species are endemic, and for 
animals the proportion is usually even higher, the best example being the primates, which are 
100% endemic. While Madagascar’s species richness and endemism is impressive, it excels in 
endemism at higher taxonomic levels. As a country, Madagascar’s numbers of endemic plant 
and animal families and genera are rivalled only by Australia, which is 13 times larger. As a 
hotspot, Madagascar is simply unmatched in these categories,” Russell et al. argue (2005).   
But can geological history entirely explain why Madagascar is considered by many as unique? 
While reading colonial accounts of the island, I realised that there was a strong similarity 
between what people said about Nature on the island three centuries ago, and the way several 
actors describe it today. Past representations echo present ones. But did past representations 
influence present ones? As we will see in this section, the representation of Madagascar as a 
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unique place – and the process of “localisation” of the island associated with it – is a construct 
from a foreign gaze. The creation of and emphasis on an imagery of Madagascar as isolated 
and unique dates back to colonial times. As such, the historical foreign gaze cannot be entirely 
separated from contemporary representations of the island. To understand the latter, one needs 
to be aware of the former. Looking back at history in this specific section is therefore crucial 
because one cannot comprehend the factors that brought the PHCF to Madagascar without 
understanding how a multiplicity of foreign actors have talked about, written about and 
represented the island in the last 300 years.  
 
THE MYTH OF THE ISOLATED EDEN: A COLONIAL ARTEFACT? 
European contact in Madagascar dates back to 1500. The French had established trading posts 
along the east coast of the island around the 17
th
 century. Expansion of the French regime in 
the Indian Ocean was primarily based on economic and mercantile interests but, as 
McClanahan and Young argue (1996: 27), colonial rule also led to several non-economic 
changes. The process of colonialisation did not simply consist in trade and exploitation of 
natural resources: to control Madagascar, the French colonial power first needed to discover 
the island in order to understand its population, fauna and flora. In the beginning of the 1660s, 
French naturalists were sent from Paris to the Indian Ocean to start listing the plant and 
animal wonders of the new colony (Feeley-Harnik, 2001: 37). Ecologists and botanists 
followed. As naturalists submitted reports on their findings, increasing correspondence started 
to develop between Paris and Madagascar. Letters from botanists and notebooks of 
missionaries became the first source of representation and knowledge about Madagascar’s 
ecology. Etienne de Flacourt, who was part of the first French expedition to Madagascar in 
1661 and in charge of creating the first colony on the island, played an important role in 
providing francophone readers with a thorough account of animal and plant uses for 
alimentary, medicinal and spiritual purposes in south-eastern Madagascar (Feeley-Harnik, 
2001: 38). In personal notebooks, academic literature and official letters, most foreigners who 
had been to or lived in Madagascar depicted the island as an isolated paradise where an idyllic 
natural Eden long gone at home could be found and recreated. In a letter written after his visit 
to Fort-Dauphin in 1771 and addressed to French historian of science Joseph Jérôme 
Lefrançois de Lalande, Commerson wrote:  
“What an admirable country is Madagascar! It is the authentic Promised Land for naturalists. It 
is there that Nature seems to have retired as into a special sanctuary, to work there on other 
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models than those to which she enslaved herself in other countries. The Dioscoride of the North 
[Linnaeus] would find there the stuff of ten revised and enlarged editions of his Systema 
Naturae and would doubtless finish by avowing that merely a corner of the veil that covers the 
scattered productions of nature have been lifted” (quoted in Feeley-Harnik, 2001: 38).  
According to Goedefroit and Revéret (2007: 14), the island’s high levels of biodiversity and 
species endemism were seen by French settlers as a sort of “fantasy” that might explain much 
of the geopolitical philosophies and practices associated with French environmentalist visions 
during and after colonial times. Along the same line of thinking, Feeley-Harnik (2001: 37) 
explains that European interests in Malagasy endemic species such as the ravenala, also 
known as the traveller’s tree, can be traced back to the origins of environmentalism and 
French explorations in the western Indian Ocean in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. So when 
French naturalists started listing the plant and animal wonders of eastern Madagascar, “they 
began to see the singular ravenala as the sign of a promised land for naturalists and utopians, 
including missionaries, and they were soon joined by others” (ibid). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antique engraving of the Ravenala Madagascariensis, the traveller’s tree, 1897 
 
While analysing documents written by French settlers, naturalists, missionaries and botanists, 
Feeley-Harnik (2001: 38) noticed that the colonial vision of Madagascar was a “convergence 
between physiocracy and climatic insular Romanticism. His study of the origins of 
environmentalism in the Indian Ocean has brought him to the conclusion that “early western 
environmentalism was, to a great extent, born out of marriage between physiocracy and the 
mid-eighteenth-century French obsession with the island as the speculative and Utopian 
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location for the atavistic ‘discovery’ of idyllic societies or the construction of new European 
societies” (ibid). Pierre de la Bâthie, one of the fathers of environmental conservation in 
Madagascar, was a botanist who also leaned towards romanticism. In a 1912 essay, he wrote 
that before humans began migrating to Madagascar,  
“the island lived, thus, isolated by immense seas of all human contact. Everything – climate, 
land, plants, and animals , adapted to each other after centuries of isolation – formed there a 
biological entity of an admirable perfection, whose tenacious wonderfully balanced elements 
served as a common purpose: life, this strange and mysterious phenomenon (…) Malagasy 
species are not organised to withstand living beside man. Their ways of life, acquired during 
centuries of isolation, oppose them” (Bâthie, 1912a: 206 quoted in Kaufmann, 2001: 99, 209). 
15 years after the publication of de la Bâthie’s essay, Madagascar became one of the first 
African countries to protect its ecosystem through the creation of a protected area covering 
500,000 hectares of land (Moreau, 2007: 58).  
 
But before elaborating on the island’s Nature and its foreign representation, it shall be stressed 
that what is considered here as constructed by foreigners is not the idea of environmental 
protection itself but the representation of Madagascar’s ecosystem as unique and isolated – 
that is, the process of “localising” Madagascar. A key historical element that is very often 
omitted in publications about Madagascar’s environmental history is that the desire to protect 
Malagasy forests is neither recent nor entirely rooted in colonial ideology. As early as the 
18th century, the kings and queens of Madagascar highly condemned the practice of burning 
for agricultural purposes. In 1794, King Andrianampoinimerina implemented the first national 
decree against "slash and burn" forestry, as Wright explains (1997: 384). In 1881, Queen 
Ranavalona II imposed the “code of the 305 articles” to prohibit tree burning or cutting and, 
by doing so, prioritised forest conservation. According to Goedefroit and Revéret (2007: 17), 
such policies were implemented to develop an economy based on rice production rather than 
agriculture and livestock production, two activities deemed as harmful to the environment. 
 
As stated in the paragraph above, the narrative about Madagascar and its environment is not 
new, it has a local legacy. Knowing this, the idea of studying colonialism as the starting phase 
of the process of “localisation” of Madagascar might seem problematic and misleading. But 
what is understood here as a colonial product is not the idea of forest conservation itself but 
the promotion and representation of Madagascar as “the Promised Land for naturalists”. Put 
differently, the creation of an imagery of Madagascar as a pristine, unique and isolated Eden 
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is a vestige of French colonial rule. What outsiders have created over time is a vision of 
Nature as a primary value, so primary that is it understood as holistic. This representation 
resurfaces in the post-colonial context through a narrative presenting Madagascar as a 
biodiversity hotspot with endemic species.  
 
 
IDENTIFYING FLAGSHIP SPECIES 
 
[Flagship species: a species chosen to represent an environmental cause, such as an ecosystem 
in need of conservation. These species are chosen for their vulnerability, attractiveness or 
distinctiveness in order to engender support and acknowledgment from the public at large] 
 
I was once asked: “why is it that so many people have not been to Madagascar yet they all 
know about it, they all know there is something unique about its fauna and flora?” Part of the 
answer probably has to do with Madagascar, DreamWorks Animation movie. But, 
Hollywood fame put aside, it seems that the primary reason why people know about 
Madagascar’s biodiversity without having necessarily put their foot on Malagasy soil is 
because the island has been highly branded. It was branded centuries ago by colonial settlers 
and it continues to be branded today through the messages of environmental NGOs. A 
powerful branding of the island involves Madagascar’s fauna. Images of endemic animals that 
live on the island are the preferred communication tools of many conservation NGOs, 
including WWF, when launching advertising campaigns to generate awareness about the 
urgency to protect the island’s biodiversity. In other terms, certain animal species have been 
“branded” to reinforce the local and unique characteristic of Madagascar. The idea that the 
majority of the island’s fauna and flora cannot be found anywhere else on Earth has become a 
convincing and effective argument when it comes to advocating for the protection of 
Madagascar’s endemic species. This focus on the exclusive character of Madagascar as a 
unique and isolated “place” is mainly achieved through the identification of flagship species. 
Flagship species are flora or fauna species chosen by natural scientists and conservation 
NGOs to become conservation symbols, that is, the most important images that will be 
attributed to a specific biodiversity hotspot. In Madagascar, two main flagship species have 
served this task and reinforced the unique characteristic of the island. The point here is not to 
contest the fact that Madagascar has a very high rate of endemism. Instead, the purpose of this 
section is to understand how a geological fact has been used over the years and for which 
reason. 
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The Lemur Factor  
The Filipino crocodile for the Philippines, the panda for China, the orang-utans for 
Malaysia, the kangaroo for Australia, the Amur leopard in Russia … each country is known 
for being the home of one specific animal species. For Madagascar, the charismatic animal 
that seems to be commonly associated with the island is the lemur. In Wildnerness 
Conservation in a Biodiversty Hotspot, Russell et al. (2005) explain that Madagascar’s 
endemism rate for animals is higher than for plants, “the best example being the primates, 
which are 100% endemic”. The evolutionary history of Madagascar, the authors continues, 
“is demonstrated by lemurs that are the nonhuman primate radiation in Madagascar, 
arguably the single highest primate conservation priority on Earth” (ibid). More than any 
other Malagasy endemic species, lemurs have attracted the attention of foreigners for a 
very long time. This fascination for the primate, and the consequences related to it, is what 
I shall call “the lemur factor”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       A lemur in Antanmamo Protected Area conservation zone 
A number of private and state reserves were created in different parts of the island for tourists 
and researchers to contemplate the intriguing animals. Berenty Reserve, a small private 
reserve of gallery forest located in the far south of the island and owned by the De Heaulme 
family
17
, illustrates well the fascination cultivated by foreigners for the endemic primate. 
Since the 1960s, researchers from Japan, the U.S. and England have visited and stayed in the 
reserve to report on the daily life of the primates – not to mention the 8,000 tourists who visit 
                                                 
17 The De Heaulme family, aside from having created the Berenty Reserve, is known in the South of Madagascar for owning 
large plots of land for sisal plantation. They are probably the most renowned colonial family in the region. One friend 
even told me that people say the De Heaulme family owns Fort-Dauphin. For a closer look at Berenty’s history, see Jolly, 
A. 2004. Lords and lemurs: mad scientists, kings with spears, and the survival of diversity in Madagascar. Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt. 
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Berenty each year. In 1864 already, zoologist and bio-geographer Philip Sclater expressed his 
interest for the mammals in an article for the Quaterly Journal of Science. Based on the 
discovery of lemur fossils in Madagascar and India only, Sclater concluded that both 
countries must have been part of a unified continent that, he suggested, should be called 
“Lemuria”18. Today, many conservation NGOs continue to use the lemur as a symbolic image 
to “localise” the island and raise awareness about Madagascar’s rich yet fragile biodiversity. 
 
FROM PIERRE DE LA BÂTHIE TO PRINCE PHILIP: FACILITATING ACCESS TO NATURE   
 
We have just seen how literature, personal letters, and settlers’ accounts of Madagascar have 
created an imagery of the island as a place with a unique yet isolated biodiversity. But how 
has this construct evolved in the last 50 years? How did such ideas about Nature travel? And 
how is the idea of “uniqueness” being reinforced today?  
 
Creating “local” legitimacy 
Before the 1940s, “Madagascar was to British and even to East African ears, an island off the 
coast of Africa, and very little else. A few geographically minded persons knew that the 
French possessed it, a few zoologically minded persons knew that there was something 
strange about its fauna, but its products, its potentialities, and its strategic value meant nothing 
whatever to ordinary men,” British explorer Kenneth Gandar-Dower wrote in Into 
Madagascar when he arrived in the city of Mahajunga aboard the King’s African Rifles in 
1943 (quoted in Feeley-Harnik, 2001: 59). 30 years later, in a context of nature-for-debt swap 
and structural adjustment programs, the “island off the coast of Africa” rapidly became a 
“biodiversity hotspot” attracting exponential numbers of development workers and NGOs 
(Adger et al. 2001: 689). But for NGOs and development programs to access and intervene on 
the island, legitimacy needed to be built locally. In a country like Madagascar, where colonial 
rule lasted for more than 65 years, foreign intervention has very often been welcomed with 
scepticism and suspicion. During my stay in Antanmamo for example, I was told that a 
number of villagers refuted the creation of a protected area because the vision of vazaha 
coming to Antanmamo reminded them of colonial times when the French took away their 
land [interview with KIOMBA representative, July 20, 2011]. Similarly, a friend of mine who 
                                                 
18For more explanation on the “Lemuria” myth, see Moore, J.H. 1933. Savage Survivals.Watts & Co., London and Sclater, 
P.L. 1864. “The mammals of Madagascar”.The Quarterly Journal of Science, vol. 1, pp. 213–219. 
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was also an ecology student in Fort-Dauphin told me that, according to her, “the English and 
Americans vazaha are like the new colons in Madagascar today”. So how could a project like 
the PHCF be legitimised and accepted in a place where such sentiments existed?  
Despite the favourable economic and political environment set up by international institutions 
and their adjustment programs, how could foreign NGOs access Madagascar’s forests? 
Surely, creating an imagery of Madagascar as a unique island with extraordinary features was 
not sufficient to legitimise access to it. Malagasy themselves also needed to be convinced. If 
people within Madagascar could agree that, indeed, Madagascar is a unique place in the 
world, then access would be facilitated. If foreign actors and local ones could share the same 
perception of the island, legitimacy for access would no longer be an obstacle. The 
description provided by renowned American primatologist Wright about a conference she 
attended in the United States seems to confirm the latter hypothesis.  
“In 1985, an international conservation conference suggested that the government of 
Madagascar and international organisations needed to cooperate to create new policies linking 
conservation and development. The participation in the meeting by international 
conservationists, including Prince Philip, made the Malagasy aware of world interest in their 
national treasure of wildlife and biodiversity. To a country isolated from the western world for 
over a decade, this was an impressive surprise […] In May 1987, a meeting on St. Catherine’s 
Island, South Carolina, was attended by representatives of the key international groups 
interested in field research and captive breeding programs, including the World Wildlife Fund, 
the New York Zoological Society (Wildlife Conservation Society), the Duke University Primate 
Center, the San Diego ZOO, the Jersey Wildlife Preservation Trust, the Missouri Botanical 
Garden, and Yale University. These agencies met with the three Malagasy ministries – the 
Ministry of Water and Forests, the Ministry of Higher Education, and the Ministry of Applied 
Research – to create a collaborative plan. This was the first trip to the United States for the 
Malagasy decision makers, and in their two-week visit to San Diego, Durham, New Haven, 
New York, and St. Louis, they began to understand how special the Malagasy flora and fauna 
were to the international community. They saw the degree of Western enthusiasm, motivation, 
and expertise. By 1988 the international community was willing to fund conservation projects, 
and infrastructure was needed to expedite major projects,” Wright explains (1997: 384-5).   
In this context, it seems relevant to go back to Ribot and Peluso’s emphasis on “access” which 
they define as “the ability and capacity of some actors to affect the practices and ideas of 
others” (2003: 158). If there is one thing to remember from Wright’s description of those 
events is that, as she clearly states, it is only through foreign eyes that the delegation of 
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Malagasy – who all held important positions in local environmental politics – realised how 
unique and special their island was. This also proves that the process of “localising” 
Madagascar is a foreign process. According to the author, the encounter of Malagasy with 
international conservationists in South Carolina led, a few years later, to the elaboration of 
Madagascar’s National Environmental Action Plan, the first and most ambitious 
environmental program of its kind in Africa (Wright, 1997: 384-5). A year later, The 
Environmental Charter was created to “reiterates the government’s concern over 
environmental issues” including management of “the national heritage of biodiversity in 
protected areas, in conjunction with sustainable development of surrounding area,” 
Razafindralambo and Gaylord explain (2005: 76). And when the new Constitution was 
written in 2007, its preamble indicated that the Republic of Madagascar
19
 was  
“conscious, for the sake of humanism, of the necessity to reconcile man with his Creator and his 
fellows as much as with Nature and its environment (…) and of the importance to preserve the 
exceptional natural wealth and vegetal, animal and mining resources that Nature has endowed 
Madagascar with for future generations”.  
The implementation of an environmental policy framework at the local level, in a context 
marked by nature-for-debt-swap programs funded by international organisations, ultimately 
facilitated access for environmental NGOs that sought to develop conservation projects on the 
island, including the PHCF. A picture of WWF’s zones of intervention illustrates well the 
“rapid spread” of conservation programs in Madagascar.   
 
Zone of intervention and offices of WWF in Madagascar. Source: WWF Madagascar, 2009 
 
                                                 
19 See http://www.la-constitution-en-afrique.org/article-12939901.html 
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Foreign access through local policies 
As explained in the section above, the establishment of environmental policies and laws at the 
local level set up the adequate conditions for foreign NGOs and conservation organisations to 
further develop their activities on the island. Such a finding tells us a lot about travelling ideas 
and messages: conservation projects do not simply rely on discourses. When an idea that is 
derived from a so-called “global environmental knowledge” travels from a conference room 
in South Carolina to a Ministry office in Madagascar, it is no longer a “discourse”. Instead, it 
becomes a reality turned into practices. Practices can here refer to a public decree about 
environmental management or a national law allowing foreign NGOs to guide communities 
into natural resources management for instance. What is particularly interesting in the case of 
Madagascar, and the PHCF more specifically, is that studying the project takes us beyond the 
conventional discourse analysis. In Madagascar, probably more than in any other country in 
African, a whole set of structures and policies related to the environment have been put in 
place in the last thirty years. The exchange of ideas between foreign and local actors 
ultimately led to the “localisation” of the global – a phenomenon that some refer to as 
“glocalisation”. “Global” ideas and discourses travelled and, after several changes and 
rearrangements, became formal national policies shaping a certain reality. The 
implementation of a project like the PHCF in Madagascar is thus facilitated by the fact that 
most of the structures and legal frameworks required to implement such a project already 
exist. If ideas have become practices, it is necessary to conduct a practice – rather than 
discourse – analysis to analyse the practices actors from the PHCF have used to obtain and 
legitimise access to Madagascar.   
 
On brochures and communication documents published for the promotion of the PHCF, it is 
stated that the project is implemented thanks to existing local policies. “It is about 
contributing, on the one hand, to the creation of new Protected Areas with communities to 
help the Malagasy government face the challenge of increasing the surface of Protected Areas 
to 6 million hectares in 2012 and, on the other hand, contributing to the sustainable 
management of natural forests through a transfer of natural resources management,” a 
document co-written by WWF and GoodPlanet explains (2009: 4). Interestingly, local policies 
are presented as “opportunities” for the project. The document quoted above, for instance, has 
a specific section titled “opportunities linked to the implementation of the project” to describe 
the local policies that will be used to develop the PHCF. Most importantly, the document also 
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clearly states that the PHCF is a “contribution” to the Malagasy state’s effort. With such a 
statement, Air France, GoodPlanet and WWF position themselves as embedded in the local 
setting: the project helps the government achieve its goal and, therefore, is integrally part of a 
national effort. As such, the PHCF is no longer presented as a project conducted by foreign 
actors in Madagascar and progressively loses its foreign facet: partners of the project are no 
longer the “other”. In parallel, the ideas on which the project is based are presented as 
reflective of local and official standpoints. One illustration of the latter statement can be found 
in the document co-written by WWF and GoodPlanet which refers to the “relevant policies” 
the Malagasy government has equipped itself with including the 7
th
 engagement of 
“Madagascar Action Plan” which stipulates that  
“the loss of one hectare of forest in Madagascar has a much serious effect on the world’s 
biodiversity than one hectare of forest elsewhere because, on the one hand, it means the 
extinction of several thousand species that exist nowhere else on earth, and on the other hand, it 
represents the disappearance of a source of carbon stock (WWF & GoodPlanet, 2009: 7)”.  
Seeing how Nature is placed back and advertised as embedded in the Malagasy context, one 
may argue that Nature is “instrumentalised” for local politics. This also shows that the 
strategy of “de-foreignising” the PHCF contributes to the process of “localisation” of the 
island.  
 
In the following section, specific cases of national “environmental” policies implemented by 
the Malagasy government and used by the actors of the PHCF to “localise” the project will be 
highlighted. As Ribot and Peluso argue (2003: 158), “locating access in a political-economic 
framework provides a theoretical model of change. Social relations and differentiation emerge 
from cooperation and conflict over benefits within particular political-economic moments. 
Laws may be formed from these relations or precede them”. In order to locate access in a 
specific political-economic framework through empirical analysis, as suggested by the Ribot 
and Peluso, three specific examples will be studied.  
 
Durban Vision 
One of the six objectives of the PHCF is to “contribute to achieving the Durban Vision by 
creating new Protected Areas in WWF’s zones of intervention” (WWF & GoodPlanet, 2009: 
7). The Durban Vision is a plan that former President Ravalomanana presented at the World 
Parks Congress conference in Durban in 2003. Speaking to world leaders, President 
Ravalomanana declared:  
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"we can no longer afford to let our forests go up in smoke, to see the lakes, marshes and ponds 
of our country dry and drain our marine resources unwisely. Today I want to express our 
resolution to increase the surface of our protected areas from 1.7 million hectares to 6 million 
hectares in five years, in line with the IUCN classification of protected areas. This extension 
will include the reinforcement of the existing national network as well as the implementation of 
a new mechanism to create conservation sites” (quoted in Goedefroit and Revéret, 2007: 183). 
Following his speech, a national initiative was launched to triple the amount of protected 
areas on the island. One way of doing so, considering the number of conservation projects 
running in Madagascar, was to rely on local and foreign NGOs’ participation in the plan. 
Existing zones of intervention with high levels of biodiversity would become protected areas 
while new priority zones would be identified to become “new protected areas”. Antanmamo, 
the site where I conducted the majority of my fieldwork, is one of the many “new protected 
areas” created by the Malagasy state with the help of WWF in the southern region of the 
island. For government forest services with limited financial resources, the presence of 
foreign NGOs – financially supported by international donors – in the country is very 
practical: in most cases, new protected areas are created where NGOs are already operating. 
For NGOs, the Durban Vision represents a much-awaited opportunity: their willingness to 
expand their scope of activities on the island now fits into a government-supported plan. 
According to Duffy (2007: 742), Ravalomanana’s decision to triple the number of protected 
areas on the island was influenced by the lobbying force of two influential NGOs, 
Conservation International and the World Conservation Society. Their power, she continues, 
is rooted in “their ability to influence two other donors, USAID and the World Bank” (ibid). 
For the author, the Durban Vision exemplifies well how Nature and local politics can be used 
by foreign actors for specific purposes. Knowing how dependent on foreign aid Madagascar 
has become since the 1970s, one can imagine the influence of certain NGOs on local 
environmental politics.  
“Concerns were raised that the two wildlife-orientated conservation NGOs had pressured the 
new Malagasy president into agreeing to the Durban Vision Initiative when they met with him 
at the World Parks Congress in 2003. Because Ravalomanana was a new president who was 
looking towards the United States to replace France as the major external donor, critics 
suggested that he had felt obliged to agree because of threats from the NGOs that they could 
lobby effectively in Washington to reduce support to the new president; it was clear to their 
opponents that the environmental NGOs had a great deal of power in Malagasy politics,” Duffy 
explains (2007: 742).  
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In this sense, I shall argue that the Durban Vision has further helped NGOs such as WWF, CI 
or WCS to embed themselves in and bound their activities to a “local” context.  
 
Transfer of Management 
The fourth objective of the PHCF is to transfer the management of natural resources to the 
communities who live on the land where the new protected areas will be created. In 
Antanmamo, this transfer of management was signed in 2005. The transfer of natural 
resources management to communities, which is part of a national policy of decentralisation, 
was implemented through a law issued in 1996 as part of the National Charter of the 
Environment. The law indicates that once the transfer is signed between the community – 
represented by a newly-elected forest association named CoBa or Communauté de Base – and 
the Forest Service, a third body can intervene to provide the community with technical 
support. In most cases, NGOs provide this support. What this policy also implies, since the 
community is now responsible for forest management, is that NGOs can reallocate their tasks 
to community members, the newly-appointed “conservationists”, while remaining “technical 
advisers”. In the case of Antanmamo, villagers were assigned new roles either by WWF itself 
or through a vote at the commune level. The vacant positions ranged from reforestation agents 
to polisyn’ala (police forest) agent, tree nursery supervisor and president of the forest 
association. However, my observations during fieldwork brought me to the conclusion that 
despite the creation of a forest association responsible for natural resources management, in 
most cases, logistical decisions about forest management were taken by local WWF agents 
living either in Antanmamo or in Fort-Dauphin and financial ones by employees at WWF-
Madagascar headquarters in Antananarivo. Nevertheless, the process of embedding the PHCF 
in a local framework which reinforces decentralisation and “community empowerment” 
remains powerful when it comes to “localising” and legitimising the project.  
 
WWF presence in Madagascar 
During the interviews I conducted with representatives from Air France, GoodPlanet or 
WWF-International, many respondents repeatedly stressed how “exemplary and successful” 
the PHCF was. The reason for such a success, they argued, was the fact that the project was 
conducted by WWF, a NGO that has been present in Madagascar for almost 50 years. Former 
WWF-International Communication officer, for instance, explained that Air France agreed to 
partner up with WWF for the PHCF because “WWF has been there for more than 45 years, it 
has a long experience in Madagascar and has maintained good relationships with all the 
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successive governments in place. Also, their staff is principally composed of Malagasy 
nationals” [interview, January 16, 2012]. Indeed, all the people I encountered during my 
research in Madagascar who were working for WWF were Malagasy. During interviews, the 
“local” characteristic of the staff was presented as the main asset of the PHCF. For instance, 
Pierre Caussade, Air France Director for Sustainable Development, said his company 
accepted to finance the project because it is “locally conducted by a NGO with excellent 
references that has the capacity to intervene while respecting Malagasy politics, Malagasy 
culture and Malagasy people everywhere where the project is being implemented” [interview, 
January 19, 2012]. Nanie, Flavien, Apollinaire, Maminiaina … Pierre Caussade can name all 
the WWF employees he has met in Madagascar. “Their expertise in the subject really is 
admirable. For this project to work, in my opinion it was a prerequisite to have only Malagasy 
involved,” he added. There are social differences between many of the Malagasy working for 
WWF. Some, who have studied in Europe or in the United States, may be considered to be 
part of the national “elite” while others come from smaller cities with a less prestigious 
academic background. In most cases, all of them have worked for local NGOs or government 
offices related to the environment before being employed at WWF. The fact that 100 percent 
of WWF’s staff for the PHCF is Malagasy gives a significant “comparative advantage” to the 
project. The PHCF, despite being a foreign project in Madagascar, travels all the way to the 
island and is being implemented by Malagasy themselves. This process of “local 
appropriation”, I shall argue, also corresponds to a process of “foreignisation” of space: 
WWF, which after all is a foreign NGO, becomes the “self” and no longer the “other”. As the 
idea of the project travels to Madagascar, the PHCF changes from an imported idea to a 
locally accepted and legitimated project supported by Malagasy. The fact that WWF is a 
foreign NGO does no longer seem to be problematic considering WWF has a long history of 
working on the island and 100 percent of its staff for the PHCF is Malagasy. In other terms, 
the intervention of WWF is no longer problematic because the NGO is presented as “local”.  
 
Looking at the environmental practices developed in Madagascar tells us something important 
about access. The policies and structures put in place in Madagascar, including the Durban 
Vision and the transfer of natural resources management, were implemented in a specific 
context. The environment has become a top priority on the agenda of many world institutions. 
And so have deforestation and climate change. The political environment developed in the 
last thirty years makes initiatives such as the Durban Vision legitimate policies to be 
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implemented today. But would they have been granted the same level of legitimacy at a 
different epoch? It seems very unlikely that the government of Madagascar would have 
passed such laws forty years ago just like it is uncertain whether such practices could be 
established in twenty years’ time: the context tomorrow might not be as favourable as it is 
today. The same observation applies to the PHCF: Air France, GoodPlanet and WWF would 
probably not have benefited from such a “facilitated” environment to implement the project 
thirty years ago: the structures, ideas, practices and policies did not exist yet. At that time, 
access to Madagascar would have been far more limited. For this reason, I shall argue that 
access relations are highly contextual. 
“Generally, people have more power in some relationships than in others, or at some historical 
moments, and not others. Different political-economic circumstances change the terms of access 
and may therefore change the specific individuals or groups most able to benefit from a set of 
resources […] We see access relations as always changing, depending on an individual’s or 
group’s position and power within various social relationships. Benefits can be redistributed and 
captured in the course of changing social relations and legal frameworks as new conflicts and 
cooperative arrangements emerge ,” Ribot and Peluso argue (2003: 158).  
It is therefore useful to conceptualise access patterns as constantly changing and, hence, 
highly unpredictable processes. The process of “localisation” of Madagascar reinforced by the 
partners of the PHCF strongly relies on both national and international specific socio-political 
relations and a favourable legal and political framework. In this sense, access can be rather 
insecure because actors constantly need to develop new types of relations depending on the 
context they are working in. As Ribot and Peluso (2003: 164) explain, “a shift in the broader 
political economy can make some kinds of access obsolete by creating new types of social 
relations that need to be developed to gain and maintain access to resources”. A good 
illustration of the latter statement can be found in GoodPlanet and WWF’s official document 
(2009) quoted earlier which indicates that the success of the PHCF is based on the assumption 
that “state policy as regards to the possibility for private entities or organisms to co-manage 
new protected areas will not change”.   
 
2.2. GLOBALISING NATURE 
“When we try to pick out anything by itself, 
we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe” 
John Muir, American conservationist 
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We have just seen how a number of practices have been put in place to embed the PHCF in 
the local context and, thus, facilitate access to a distant location for decision-makers. For the 
purpose of this section, we will look at a completely different strategy aimed at gaining 
access. This strategy is the process of delocalising, and hence, globalising “Madagascar” and 
its environment. Interestingly, it seems that the processes of localisation, on the one hand, and 
delocalisation, on the other hand, are simultaneous - even though this might sound 
paradoxical. The project is embedded in a local context while, at the same time, Madagascar 
is delocalised from its geographical limits to become part of a wider global biodiversity 
hotspot. There is no doubt that what makes Madagascar a global hotspot is its ecological 
uniqueness and high rate of species endemism. But what we seek to point out here is that it is 
this same ecological uniqueness that is used to embed Madagascar into a “global” setting. The 
result of such a dichotomous representation is the following narrative: even though 
Madagascar has unique features, it remains a world’s heritage that ought to be protected by 
all, including a foreign company and two foreign NGOs. An element which is presented as 
global becomes legitimately accessible to all – but not necessarily accessible by all. This 
process of delocalisation, that is, the practice of “globalising” Madagascar, will be the focus 
of the following section.  
 
HOLISM AND SEMANTICS 
 
Holism. ολoς (holos) : totality, whole.  
A system of thought for which the characteristics of a body or a whole can only be known 
when considered and apprehended as a whole [a whole designates a multitude that can be 
comprised as an ensemble] in its totality, and not when one studying each part separately. 
Therefore, a being is entirely or strongly determined by the whole to which it belongs
20
.  
 
As explained in the first section of this chapter, there seems to be different ways of speaking 
about Nature in Madagascar. One discourse that is gaining significant importance in the 
present context of globalisation is a universal interpretation of Nature. Nature is increasingly 
portrayed as an element we should all feel concerned about. The phenomenon of climate 
change, emerging in a context where national boundaries are increasingly obsolete and in 
which environmental problems are framed as affecting all of us, has significantly reinforced 
the universality of Nature. Along a similar line of argumentation, Tsing suggests to look back 
                                                 
20 See http://www.techno-science.net/?onglet=glossaire&definition=277 for a definition of holism. 
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at the advent of the environmentalist movement which was “based on the idea that recognised 
problems such as climate change could not be contained to a single country” and therefore 
advocated for the implementation of “common standards” (2005: 7). In other terms, if the 
problem is global it requires global solutions; if Nature is threatened by global climate 
change, Nature needs to be protected in its globality. This specific language which depicts 
Nature as a global artefact has led to the delocalisation of Nature from its geographical milieu. 
In other terms, defining environmental problems as global reinforces the holism into which 
Nature is now placed: environments bound to countries are increasingly taken out of their 
spatial context for the sake of universal environmentalism. Delocalisation here refers to the 
process of encompassing the local in the global, to render the object of access global and, 
thus, more accessible. Seeing how Nature is branded as global, one can understand the 
influence of the world “holistique” in “Programme Holistique de Conservation des Forêts” 
(PHCF) or Holistic Program for Forest Conservation. I asked GoodPlanet program officer 
why the term “holistic” had been chosen to name the project. His response was the following: 
“holistic means something which ‘encompasses different dimensions or all dimensions’ … 
because we do not want to do forest protection just for the sake of forest protection. We want 
the PHCF to be a project that takes problems at their roots. In the case of Madagascar it is slash 
and burn agriculture and the conversion of forests into agricultural terrains, so we want to offer 
alternatives, educate communities, structure them, make them think, sensibilise them, raise their 
awareness about biodiversity … so it really is multidimensional, which is why we called it 
holistic” [interview, January 17, 2012].  
For Pierre Caussade, Air France General Director was “seduced by the scientific approach 
because the project is called ‘holistic’ but … very often, the term is not very well understood. 
It is the Holistic Program for Forest Conservation, the infamous PHCF, and here the word 
holistic refers to a variety of approaches, techniques and methods. We approach this project 
with different angles” [interview, January 19, 2012]. Interestingly, Air France Director for 
Sustainable Development points out himself that “very often, the term is not very well 
understood”. His statement strongly echoes the argument developed by Mosse and further 
explained in the first chapter of this thesis about the power of using “vague” words. Mosse 
(2004: 663) argues that popularly used concepts such as sustainable development or, in this 
case, holistic, are “mobilising metaphors” produced by policy-makers or project planners who 
use such terms because their “vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is 
required to conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and the enrolment of 
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different interests, to build coalitions, to distribute agency and to multiply criteria of success 
within project systems”. As it will be explained in the following paragraph, the term holistic 
has a different meaning than “multidisciplinary”. But the fact that my respondents defined it 
as such enables them to show that while there is a sectorial activity called environmental 
conservation, the project is holistic and can therefore be linked to other sectors such as 
development, science, research, and humanitarian action. By integrating the word holistic in 
its name, the PHCF appears to encompass all top-priority issues on the global agenda.  
 
Holistic, as explained earlier, also refers to “a system of thought for which the characteristics 
of a body or a whole can only be known when considered and apprehended as a whole”. In 
certain cosmologies, the term might also endorse other implications. But what shall be 
stressed here is that even though the term “holistic” was chosen by partners of the PHCF for 
reasons that go beyond its primary definition, the term still conveys a powerful – yet 
potentially misleading – message in the context of this project. Using the word “holistic” 
allows GoodPlanet, WWF and Air France to do something very specific: linking particular 
hotspots to the world at large. When tied to the environment, the word holistic also suggests 
that Madagascar, with its forests, its fauna and its flora, should not be understood as a separate 
unit of the world but, instead, as one of the numerous particles that, altogether, form a whole. 
Because global interconnections have taken the environment beyond conventional boundaries, 
the focus is no longer on preserving specific landscapes but, rather, about protecting all life-
support systems on the planet. This rhetoric has been particularly strong when talking about 
countries with a high level of biodiversity and a high rate of endemism, including 
Madagascar. Why? First, because the holistic view of Nature portrays endemic species as 
global commons belonging to a universal whole. As WWF Director for Madagascar reminds 
us, 80 percent of the island’s fauna and flora is unique so “if you lose it here, it’s not 
anywhere else” [interview, March 5, 2012]. The second reason why the universal narrative 
about Nature has been so strong in countries like Madagascar is because such places are 
increasingly presented as potential “global sinks” in a context of “rapid climate change”. The 
urgency to protect such environments thus appears to be legitimate: they house species that 
could go extinct if climate change continues while, at the same time, the forests of such 
countries have the capacity to retain enormous quantities of carbon and, by doing so, 
significantly reduce the impact of climate change. Considering the PHCF is a REDD-pilot 
project that is considering the idea of creating a carbon compensation mechanism by stocking 
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a maximum of carbon in Malagasy’s forests, it might actually be in the partners’ best interest 
to present the island as such, that is, as a unique carbon sink.  
 
DELOCALISING THE RED ISLAND 
In The Global Situation, Tsing (2000) provides an interesting explanation of the origin of 
global environmental science and how the discipline shaped what is today known as 
“universal environmental knowledge”:  
“the imperial placement of scientists in botanical gardens and research stations across the 
European colonies inspired continent-crossing correspondence in the late 18th century. Through 
this correspondence, informed by widespread fears of climate change caused by colonial 
deforestation, colonial scientists formulated notions of a "global" climate. This commitment to 
planet-wide environmental process allowed further developments in imagining both science and 
policy on a global scale,” she argues (2000: 348).  
 
The formulation of “widespread fears” about climate change informed by messages of 
“urgency” still persists in contemporary NGOs’ messages. The articles, images, graphs and 
statistics accessible to the general public about environmental degradation in Madagascar do 
indeed look alarming. According to Harper et al. (2007: 325), 90 percent of Madagascar’s 
forest cover is gone and 200,000 hectares of the island’s primary forests are disappearing each 
year. For Hannah et al. (2008) the majority of Madagascar’s endemic species, which represent 
80 percent of all mammals, reptiles, plants and amphibians on the island, are living on 
‘borrowed time’. But how have those messages been communicated through the PHCF? As 
previously explained, access to Madagascar and most particularly to its ecosystem was 
legitimised through a simultaneous – yet paradoxical – process of localising and globalising 
the island. In the following section, a second paradox will be highlighted: the Green versus 
Red contradiction. Photographs portraying a verdant island have often been juxtaposed to 
images of Madagascar “bleeding into the sea”. Pictures can tell us a lot about access strategies 
developed by certain actors. Looking at communication materials published by WWF, it will 
be argued that images of a threatened island serve to reinforce the idea that Madagascar’s 
ecosystem is “living under borrowed time” because of human-induced environmentally 
damaging activities. This process, in turn, serves to justify the intervention of a transnational 
anti-deforestation project.  
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With its tropical forests, endemic species and lush landscapes, Madagascar is often referred to 
as the “Green Island”. Yet, the island also has a second nickname: the “Red Island”. According 
to scientists, the red colour stands for the heavy erosion which has exposed the laterite and 
iron-rich soil of the island
21
. In fact, one of the first things catching travellers’ attention when 
flying over or driving through Madagascar is the orange dust and red clay emanating from the 
soil. This colour-based contradiction illustrates well the dichotomous representation of the 
island: on the one hand Madagascar is one of the world’s most verdant Edens but, on the other 
hand, it is also extremely fragile and “threatened by the traditions of its inhabitants”. In 1987, 
French photographer Jacques Hannebique published a book called Madagascar: mon île au 
bout du monde (1987). In his introduction, one can read: 
“At 10,000 meters of altitude, in the plane which, from Europe, takes you toward Madagascar, 
well before seeing its shores, you are suddenly intrigued by an immense reddish spot, which 
stands out sharply against the blue water of the Mozambique, without mingling in it. … That 
red water, spurting out from everywhere like a fatal haemorrhage whose power forces the sea 
waves beyond the horizon, is the blood of the Earth”.  
The first images of erosion and forest degradation in Madagascar dates back to airline flights 
operated in the mid-1930s. Even though deforestation had already caught the attention of 
French naturalists such as Grandidier, Bougainville or Commerson in the 19th century, the 
phenomenon only became problematic much later, Goedefroit and Revéret argue (2007: 16). 
According to Jaffe (2009: 322), “the notion of discovering the Garden of Eden and the fear of 
losing it again is a recurrent theme in fuelling conservation, and it extends from colonial times 
to the present”. What is today perceived as “environmental degradation” includes slash and 
burn agriculture and the commercial and intensive exploitation of forest areas. Looking at the 
dual representation of the island, one may wonder: isn’t it contradictory that Madagascar is 
both named the Green and the Red island? The response is: not necessarily. In fact, it seems 
that both images are complementary. By depicting Madagascar as green while simultaneously 
finger pointing at Malagasy farmers or forest users for degrading the island’s environment, a 
clear message is being communicated: Madagascar used to be green but now it is turning red, 
so it is extremely urgent to gather global efforts to make it green again. In other terms, the 
green is presented as relying on the red. WWF, for instance, describes Madagascar as “a Great 
Red Island with a touch of Green” on its website. The Betsiboka River, the largest river on the 
island located in Northern Madagascar, seems to have been a reference point for “red vs. 
                                                 
21
 See http://eol.jsc.nasa.gov/EarthObservatory/BetsibokaEstuaryMadagascar.htm 
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green” imagery. In 1972, French zoologist and botanist Jacques Millot described his findings 
on the biogeography and ecology of Madagascar collected since the 1920s with these words:  
“destructive human activities can sometimes create spectacles of diabolical beauty. The 
Betsiboka in flood can be seen to tear from its denuded banks so much red earth that its waters 
become as though stained with blood. Again at the end of the dry season, the hills on the 
horizon of Tananarive are ornamented with an incandescent necklace of prairie fires which, for 
the sake of a slight seasonal advantage, prevent future regeneration. Educating the Malagasy 
peasant in the need for forest protection ought to be the permanent concern of government 
policy” (quoted in Feeley-Harnik, 2001: 32).   
An image of the Betsiboka River taken by the NASA from the International Space Station in 
2004 circulated widely on NGOs and conservation associations’ websites.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Green [on top] versus Red [bottom: Betsiboka Estuary] Source: WWF Madagascar. 
 
On WWF’s website, a section about pioneer projects against deforestation displays a picture 
of the Betsiboka Estuary with the following text: “Nearly a century of extensive logging of 
Madagascar’s rainforests and coastal mangroves has resulted in nearly complete clearing of 
the land and fantastic rates of erosion. After every heavy rain, the bright red soils are washed 
from the hillsides into the streams and rivers to the coast. Astronauts [who took the picture] 
describe their view of Madagascar as ‘bleeding into the ocean’”22. Interestingly, what neither 
the text nor the website precises is that the picture was taken in the wake of tropical Cyclone 
Gafilo which strongly hit Northern Madagascar in March 2004. A comparative image, taken 
                                                 
22 See wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/project/projects_in_depth/conservation_program2/ 
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in September 2003 (see picture below), shows “normal water levels,” according to the NASA, 
and a far less tragic colour than the picture displayed on WWF’s website.  
 
Betsiboka Estuary, September 2003. Source: NASA 
The use of images is neither trivial nor innocent, especially when it comes to gaining access 
and asserting legitimacy. So why did WWF use the picture of the Betsiboka Estuary following 
the 2004 cyclone and not the one taken 6 months before? Is it because tragic images related to 
climate change and environmental-related issues are more effective at convincing the public 
about the urgency to act than less-heartrending ones? It is important to question the messages 
that such images mediate. According to Fairhead and Leach (1998:175), the answer to the 
previous question is positive. “Asking forestry administrators to abandon narratives of decline 
and crisis would require them to undermine their resource access-control claims,” they argue. 
In fact, I would add that doing so also undermines their strategies to legitimate access.  
 
MADAGASCAR: THE HOTTEST BIODIVERSITY HOTSPOT 
A concept that was developed by conservationists over the years to mobilise the public around 
the need to “save certain species before it would be too late” is the label of “biodiversity 
hotspot”. The term “biodiversity hotspot” was first coined by Conservation International 
ecologist Norman Myers. Myers’ objective was to “map” biodiversity so as to identify high 
priority conservation zones and targets. The term hotspot stands for places rich in biodiversity 
but increasingly threatened by environmental degradation and, ultimately, species extinction. 
In Biodiversity Hotspot for Conservation Priorities, Myers et al. (2000: 853) explain the 
rationale behind the term:  
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“Conservationists are far from able to assist all species under threat, if only for lack of funding. 
This places a premium on priorities: how can we support the most species at the least cost? One 
way is to identify `biodiversity hotspots' where exceptional concentrations of endemic species 
are undergoing exceptional loss of habitat. As many as 44% of all species of vascular plants and 
35% of all species in four vertebrate groups are confined to 25 hotspots comprising only 1.4% 
of the land surface of the Earth. This opens the way for a `silver bullet' strategy on the part of 
conservation planners, focusing on these hotspots in proportion to their share of the world's 
species at risk,” the authors explain (ibid). 
Originally, 10 regions with tropical forests were identified as biodiversity hotspots. But, since 
2009, the term now encompasses 34 regions worldwide. In total, biodiversity hotspots 
represent 16 percent of the planet’s surface area and 50 percent of the world’s species 
endemism, Neimark and Schroeder note (2009).  
 
 
The 25 Hotspots. Source: Myers et al. 2000 
 
So where does Madagascar fit into this? The Eastern part of the island became a “hotspot” in 
1988 but it is only ten years later that the totality of Madagascar’s territory became known as 
the “hottest of all biodiversity hotspots,” as Myers et al. (2000) suggest. The reason why I 
decided to analyse the concept of “biodiversity hotspot” in this chapter about “globalising” 
Madagascar is because the term itself represents one of the clearest illustrations of the process 
of “delocalisation”. The rationale behind labelling places as “biodiversity hotspots” is that 
global diversity needs to be mapped so as to facilitate global conservation and reduce the risk 
of species extinction. Therefore, biodiversity hotspots are identified and then categorised into 
groups based on their “biological commonalities” among the world’s ecosystem (Myers et al. 
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2000: 853). “Each of the areas features a separate biota or community of species that fits 
together as a biogeographic unit,” Myers et al. explain (ibid). Through this procedure, places 
like Madagascar are no longer countries or islands with national boundaries but, instead, 
become divided into priority conservation “regions” based on their biological commonalities. 
For example, WWF created a system called the “Global 200 Ecoregions” whereby a set of 
ecoregions are identified to be protected so that their “conservation would achieve the goal of 
saving a broad diversity of the Earth's ecosystems”23. In Madagascar, WWF considers that 
there are 3 eco-regions: Ala Maiky, or Spiny Forest in the South, Ala Atsinana, or Rainforest 
in the East and the North, and the Marine ecoregion in the Southwest. “The Global 200 aims 
to represent all of the world's biodiversity by identifying outstanding ecoregions in all of the 
world's biomes and biogeographic realms,” WWF website indicates. Analysing the 
connotation of the term “biodiversity hotspot”, Jaffe (2009: 317) explains that environmental 
NGOs’ ways of seeing places like Jamaica or Curacao is restricted to the country’s 
biodiversity. This implies that “maintaining global biodiversity hinges on the protection of the 
exceptionally diverse ecosystems, and dozens of endangered and often endemic species the 
region harbours,” she continues (ibid). The effect of such a strategy, I shall argue, is the 
effective removal of national boundaries. While biodiversity hotspots are being identified and 
mapped, we see that geographical spaces are being reframed, adapted and reconstructed in the 
name of global environmentalism. All the “spots” transcend and de-politicise national 
boundaries by further delocalising the environment from its spatial grid. According to 
Neimark and Schroeder (2009), the de-politicisation of national boundaries through the 
practice of encompassing biodiversity hotspots into the global helps international 
organisations legitimise their claims over natural resources and, as a result, transform such 
organisations into key decision-makers in the management of biodiversity at the international 
level. In fact, promoting an object as global and universal through the language of 
biodiversity hotspot renders it accessible to everyone and, most particularly, to those who 
have the resources to access it.  
 
2.3. TRIVIALISATION OF SPACE: HAVE NGOS BECOME SERVICE PROVIDERS?  
 
Dis-locare.[latin]  
Locare from locus, lieu.  
To be expelled from a lieu, place.  
Synonym: Disarticulate, dislocate, dismantle, disunify, disturb.  
                                                 
23 See http://www.worldwildlife.org/science/ecoregions/global200.html 
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As argued in the previous section of this chapter, the space factor represents an important 
element in access strategies. To justify access, Madagascar is both presented as a unique place 
with a high rate of species endemism and as a global common part of a broader biodiversity 
hotspot network. We have also seen how the processes and practices which serve to 
“globalise” the island take Madagascar away from its spatial grid and encompass the 
country’s ecology into the “global”. But what does this tell us about the role of NGOs in the 
context of constantly shifting international environmental governance? And, in turn, what 
does this tell us about NGOs’ organisational practices? When I asked GoodPlanet’s Program 
Officer about the foundation’s strategy for choosing the country where the PHCF would be 
implemented, he replied that GoodPlanet  
“asked Air France, with whom Yann Arthus Bertrand has very close ties, to team up for a tree 
plantation program that, very symbolically, would enable the plantation of one tree per plane 
ticket sold. But I quickly realised it wasn’t really feasible since Air France sells around 5 
million tickets per year. So, instead of planting trees, I thought it might be wiser to protect trees 
that already existed. Air France, who was interested on the idea of ‘doing something’, asked us 
to think about a project. So, a bit naturally, I turned to WWF because there are our neighbours 
here in Paris [GoodPlanet office is located inside WWF-France headquarters]. They transferred 
me to WWF-International to whom I asked what their needs were in terms of forest protection 
projects … and they came back to me with 3 propositions. The first one was about a big project 
in Brazil, another at the border between China and Nepal I think, and the last one in 
Madagascar. So … why Madagascar? Well most importantly because it was a project that was 
going to be potentially exclusively funded by Air France and it’s also a historic destination for 
Air France. So we oriented ourselves in that direction: because it was an exclusive project in a 
very particular destination” [interview, January 17, 2012].  
As GoodPlanet officer explains, the idea to implement the PHCF in Madagascar was 
suggested while talks between all partners of the PHCF had already started. GoodPlanet 
officer’s testimony also shows that even though the idea behind the project was developed by 
GoodPlanet itself, the task of looking for the “best spot” to conduct the PHCF was “sub-
contracted” to a tertiary agent, namely, WWF-International. The interesting aspect that I 
would like to point out here is not the fact that GoodPlanet chose Madagascar over Nepal or 
Brazil but, instead, the fact that GoodPlanet commissioned the task to WWF-International and 
based its final decision on “WWF’s needs when it comes to forest protection projects”.  
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Taking this aspect into account, “localising” the island no longer seems to be a relevant 
strategy when trying to gain legitimate access to Madagascar. In fact, such a process appears 
to be contradictory: members of the partnership justify their intervention in Madagascar by 
highlighting the uniqueness of the island but, yet, they also show a strong willingness through 
communication materials to detach the country from its geographical characteristics. Given 
the fact that GoodPlanet did not initially plan to implement the project in Madagascar, we are 
under the impression that neither GoodPlanet nor Air France had a particular interest in the 
island beforehand. It also creates an impression that GoodPlanet went “project shopping” at 
WWF’s office when setting up the project and deciding the place where the PHCF should be 
conducted. For this reason, I shall ask the following question: have NGOs become service 
providers? To put it metaphorically, have NGOs become real estate agencies where people are 
given recommendations on where to invest and given the liberty to choose from a variety of 
different houses, based on their needs and financial resources? Can companies and civil 
society groups which seek to invest in sustainable development projects just commission 
NGOs such as WWF to provide them with “the right fit”?  
 
The argument developed here strongly echoes Rajak’s line of thinking in her latest publication 
In Good Company (2011: 11). According to the author, who analyses mining companies’ CSR 
strategies in South Africa, “the emphasis of the global dimension of corporate citizenship […] 
claims a capacity for de-contextualisation, abstraction and re-contextualisation in diverse local 
contexts, enabling TNCs [transnational corporations] to claim the ‘art of being local 
worldwide’” (Rajak, 2011: 11). It is this particular “art of being local worldwide”, mastered 
by both companies and NGOs and which consists in accessing a global heritage through the 
language of partnership, that is analysed here. This art, I shall argue, also raises a broader 
interrogation as to the notion of space in access to land deals, and most particularly the 
conventional link between economic and geographical realities.  
 
If transnational companies are increasingly able to invest in sustainable programs in places 
where they have no activities or have never been, how can economic realities really be 
tackled? In other terms, is it enough for a private company to invest in sustainability in a place 
where it has no activity for its practices to be considered sustainable? And if economic 
activities progressively become distanced from their geographical realities because NGOs 
increasingly enable companies to do so, what does this tell us about the role of NGOs and 
their organisational practices? Are such observations an indication that NGOs’ role in society 
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is changing, from a civil society group fighting against corporate greed to an international 
network of experts helping companies follow their CSR agenda? According to Chouquer 
(2011), who wrote about foreign large scale acquisition and land deals in Africa, the direct 
consequence of “globalising” Madagascar is that “the place is no longer the link”. His 
analysis of access mechanisms brought him to the conclusion that further disconnections 
between places and “the link” were likely to generalise in the future and, as a result, growing 
distanciation of economic realities from geographical realities should be expected.  
“The delocalisation or dislocation is the new measure of the world, in its total break up with the 
ontological and geographical relationship that used to reconcile men with their milieu. Today, 
one of the new criteria for measurement is a virtualisation of the relationship with the lieu which 
enables flexible forms of redeployment […] What can we say when commercial and financial 
institutions appropriate locations where their stakeholders and customers will never live while 
people who live there see themselves being dispossessed from a great part of what constitutes 
their relationship with the lieu, that is, the power to decide of their own future, a guarantee of 
land ownership” Chouquer explains (2011).  
Delocalisation, mobility and detachment. These are the three words that increasingly 
characterise the work of NGOs that are confronted with, one the one hand, a planet whose 
conditions are, according to a number of scientists, deteriorating at a fast pace and, on the 
other hand, a growing number of private companies trying to “clean up their act” – with a 
significant financial gain linked to it but at a much slower pace. By trying to reach those two 
objectives at the same time, NGOs virtualise economic realities from geographical ones.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, access strategies are, above all, strategies to gain 
legitimacy. A translocal project is adapted to its local context in order to guarantee 
appropriate translation from the actors who created the PHCF to those who will take part in 
the project in Madagascar. We have also seen how the process of ensuring legitimacy consists 
in framing ideas and practices as being part of a “global” environmental network informed by 
the urgency to act. Such a narrative, in turn, becomes a justification for intervention: the 
PHCF is necessary because global climate change is threatening the survival of endemic 
species at the international level. Yet, we have also seen how playing with space in such a 
way that Madagascar is both “localised” and “globalised” can lead to a situation whereby the 
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environment becomes detached from the cultural and the spatial, that is, from people and land. 
When linked to the idea of a broader shift in state-society relations, such observations outline 
the contradictions of neoliberalism: one the one hand, the talk is about decentralising power 
and giving “local communities living in distant places” the authority to safeguard their natural 
resources. Yet, on the other hand, it is also about globalising those same natural resources by 
presenting certain institutions or actors, in most cases transnational organisations, as the most 
suitable actors to take care of that very process of decentralisation.  
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Part 3. 
 
 
TRANSLATION 
 
 
 
Board in front of the forest association (CoBa) office in Antanmamo 
“tsy azo atao ny mandoro ala”: it is forbidden to burn forest; “arovy ny tontolo iainantsika”: protect 
our environment. 
 
 
FROM PARIS TO ANTANMAMO: CONVEYING THE PROJECT TO A SMALL-SCALE 
LOCALITY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to follow the journey of the PHCF, a large-scale land 
acquisition project, and analyse its implementation in a “small-scale” locality. The question 
that I seek to answer here is the following: what happens when a translocal project is 
implemented in a “small-scale” locality? The PHCF covers 500,000 hectares of land spread 
over 5 sites of intervention across the island. It is funded by Air France, a foreign private 
company, and implemented in Madagascar by WWF, an international conservation NGO and 
GoodPlanet, a French foundation. As such, the PHCF is a good example of a transnational 
organisation investing in Madagascar and forging alliances to access land for a specific 
purpose: encouraging villagers to replant trees and end slash and burn agriculture to, 
ultimately, reduce national and global deforestation rates. The PHCF is also an illustrative 
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example of a broader shift occurring at the international level: transnational companies 
partnering up with international NGOs and governments in the name of environmental 
sustainability
24
.  
 
In the last 30 years, climate change and global warming have become top priorities on world 
leaders’ agenda. As a result of such concerns, projects promoting environmental conservation 
and the safeguard of the world’s unique biodiversity have exponentially increased. Forest 
users, identified as one of the primary causes of environmental degradation for practicing 
slash and burn agriculture, have become the first targets of many conservation-related 
schemes. In Madagascar, an island renowned for its endemic biodiversity and high level of 
poverty, international discourses about the environment have had a direct impact on national 
policies and strategies. The most notable one is the Durban Vision, a national policy analysed 
in the previous chapter and implemented by former President Ravalomanana for three 
objectives: tripling the number of protected areas in Madagascar to preserve the island’s 
remaining biodiversity, reducing poverty and promoting rural development (Duffy, 2006: 
742). As part of this vision, the government transfers the management of natural resources to 
communities living around protected areas and, with the support of environmental or 
development NGOs, the Malagasy state provides those communities with financial incentives 
to switch from slash and burn agriculture to more “sustainable” income-generating activities. 
The PHCF falls under the Durban Vision initiative. It aims at encouraging forest users to 
protect the natural resources located inside protected areas in order to reduce national and 
global deforestation rates. Following those objectives, new laws are set up to regulate access 
to natural resources and community members elected at the forest association are given the 
responsibility to monitor forest protection.  
 
This chapter seeks to provide an insight into the shifts occurring at the village-level once the 
PHCF was implemented. In other terms, it is about following the voyage of the PHCF until 
                                                 
24 This specific chapter of my thesis was highly influenced by the work of Sandra Evers and her research team as part of the 
NWO/Wotro programme entitled Development as a Trojan Horse? Foreign Large-scale Land Acquisitions in Ethiopia, 
Madagascar and Uganda (2011). The concept of “zone of intermediality” developed by the research team, which they 
define as “the ontological grids of (inter)national-local stakeholder encounters where diverse ideologies, discourses and 
practices of land use and valuation are mediated”, greatly helped me during and after my fieldwork in making sense of the 
various situations I was confronted with. The theoretical model of “zones of intermediality” is, in many ways, very similar 
to the idea of “zones of translation” I am developing in this chapter. I was offered the opportunity to present my findings 
at several occasions to Sandra and her research team during discussions, conferences, and workshops and many of the 
feedbacks I received have been incorporated in this thesis. In addition to Sabine Luning’s inputs in my research, I would 
therefore like to acknowledge the academic support received from Sandra Evers, Jan Abbink, Mijasoa Miandravola 
Andriamarovololona, Theodros Woldegiorgis Atreso, Josh Maiyo, Froukje Krijtenburg and Caroline Seagle. 
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the very last stage of the project’s journey, that is, its implementation in Madagascar. The 
question that shall therefore be asked is: how is “sustainability” translated when the project is 
implemented in Antanmamo? If two NGOs and a private company teamed up together to 
create a project in tropical forests areas in the name of “environmental sustainability”, how 
did the idea and practice of sustainability travelled to Madagascar? The painting on the board 
of the forest association (see picture on page 104) shows that the idea of “sustainability” 
translates into signs, boards and images that emphasise lemurs, forests, animals, and trees 
with messages such as “tsy azo atao ny mandoro ala” (it is forbidden to burn forest) and 
“arovy ny tontolo iainantsika” (protect our environment). During my fieldwork, different 
valuations of the environment were presented to me: “a parent feeding his or her children”, “a 
reservoir of food during difficult times”, “a sacred place to cherish the memory of the 
ancestors” … there clearly seemed to be different ways of speaking about the forest and, more 
generally, about the environment. But why did some people think about the environment as a 
relevant referential category for action while others did not? And if the PHCF was a project 
combining international, national and local ideas, which practices and discourses did forest 
users choose to prioritise?  
 
The purpose of analysing such shifts is not to evaluate the project but, instead, to answer 
questions about who frames his or her action in an environmental framework and who doesn’t 
and, if so, when, how, and why. In this sense, this chapter intends to shed light on the power 
dynamics operating at the village-level and the influence of newly-created figures of power, 
namely, environmental mediators. It also outlines the extent to which strategies rooted in 
community-based management transform local power configurations. Forest users, with 
varying levels of involvement in the conservation project, position themselves in varied ways 
and actively contribute to this process of re-negotiation of power among villagers (Evers, 
2011). It will be argued that the implementation of the project in a “small-scale” locality 
generates three main changes, namely, the restructuration of space, the creation of a hybrid 
regulatory framework – and the process of rulemaking and rule-breaking linked to it – and the 
re-negotiation of power among forest users.   
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3.1. THE CREATION OF LOCALITY 
 
The first image I ever saw of Antanmamo was a map (see picture below). Before I left for 
Madagascar, I was in contact with a foreign ecologist who provided me with materials that 
could help me prepare my fieldwork. One of the first documents I received was a satellite 
map that featured yet another map displaying distinctive limits or borders and various 
coloured zones. I could not see any house but only a nameless river and extensive green and 
less green spaces. The only thing I was told about Antanmamo before my departure was that 
it was a protected area that included one main village, with a few hamlets here and there. 
Thinking back about the place which 6 years ago became known as Antanmamo Protected 
Area, I started to wonder: if nothing is and everything comes to be, how did Antanmamo 
come into being? 
 
 
CREATING THE LOCALITY 
As a project initially created in Paris but implemented thousands of kilometres away in 
Madagascar, the PHCF needs to be “legible”. Legible in the sense that it visually makes sense 
for the donors, decision-makers, NGO workers, conservationists, and scientists who work on 
or supervise the project from a distance. As Scott (1998: 78) reminds us, “an illegible society 
is a hindrance to any effective intervention”. According to the author of Seeing like a State 
(1998: 4), the process of rendering spaces legible and visible in contemporary improvement 
schemes can be referred to as “miniaturisation”. Miniaturisation, he argues, is “the creation of 
a more easily controlled micro-order in model cities, model villages, and model farms” (ibid). 
The process of miniaturisation goes hand in hand with identifying the space where the project 
will be implemented and transforming it into a “locality”. In this sense, a translocal project 
like the PHCF very often implies spatial transformations and, hence, a restructuration of 
space. The “locality” I looked at during my research is the “site” of Antanmamo, located in 
Southern Madagascar. This section seeks to elaborate on the spatial metaphor of “the locality” 
to understand how space is restructured along the process of site creation and representation, 
and finally, identify the implications of such spatial transformations.  
 
The reason why space restructuration is an integral part of many translocal projects is because 
even though “to the eye, the [spatial] pattern seems convoluted and irrational […] to those 
familiar with it, it is simple enough and works admirably for their purposes” (Scott, 1998: 40). 
In other terms, spatial restructuration plays an important role because it allows conservation 
and development planners to fill space only with what they perceive to be “necessary”. 
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Because any kind of organisation maps its world according to the goal it seeks to achieve, 
mapping space and organising it based on one’s objectives render the process of access simple 
and legible. When looking at the PHCF, we see that the element around which space is 
restructured is biodiversity because the objective of the PHCF is environmental: protecting 
the biodiversity of Madagascar, and most specifically its forests, to tackle deforestation and 
global warming. When looking at the creation and delimitation of the protected area in 
Antanmamo, we see that land was not spatially defined in terms of everyday use or identity 
value but in terms of forest cover. In other terms, the implementation of an environmental 
project leads to space being structured around biodiversity. Specific delimitations are made 
around areas with abundant biodiversity and high rates of fauna and flora while other 
delimitations are made around places marked by a lack of biodiversity, high rates of 
deforestation and “land degradation”. When I asked one of the agents responsible for 
delimitation about how exactly the protected area of Antanmamo was created, he replied that 
the strategy of the consultants and technicians from the Forest Service was, first of all, to 
prioritise and “identify where intact forests were located” [interview of July 25, 2011]. This 
testimony shows that biodiversity becomes the most central element in the mapping process. 
In parallel, it also shows that the protected area becomes spatially structured around two kinds 
of places: the areas that need to be protected because of the high level of biodiversity and 
forest cover as opposed to the areas which require conservation action because of the high rate 
of deforestation. A direct result of creating a locality around biodiversity is that land valuation 
changes: land is not valued as an ancestral heritage or a means of subsistence but, instead, as 
an ecological asset. Biodiversity progressively takes a central role in the configuration of the 
protected area. The exercise of mapping therefore appears to be complex because it re-shapes 
the landscape in order to valorise certain aspects of the environment over others. For this 
reason, one can argue that space is always in the process of becoming something else. When 
looking at the restructuration of space as a result of global values flowing to “small-scale 
localities”, it is important to remember that space is the product of interactions between 
people, histories, ideologies, discourses and imaginations (Evers, 2011). The way people talk 
about the environment, how it ought to be protected and what is represents, translates into 
something completely new through a map. 
 
Restructuration of space also implies defining the limits and frontiers of the structure. To be 
legible and controllable, the protected area needs to be spatially delimited. In Antanmamo, 
space delimitation was a multi-stakeholder process in which a variety of actors with different 
   109 
 
levels of power, valuations, and interests negotiated over land. Actors who participated in the 
demarcation included the international NGO WWF, KIOMBA – a local association based in 
Ambovombe working under a six-month contract with WWF to support the creation of the 
protected area – several Forest Service consultants, three fokontany chiefs and villagers. 
According to a KIOMBA representative, the delimitation of the protected area was mainly 
based on WWF and the Forest Service’s ecological assessment, that is, their scientific analysis 
of biodiversity levels in the area. “The villagers had to accept the decision of the Forest 
Service. For instance, the consultants from the Forest Service determined where exactly the 
untouched forests were located and where to delimitate the different zones … but at least the 
villagers got to choose the names of each area!” he explained [interview, July 20, 2011]. But 
if the determining factor in structuring the protected area was biodiversity, the unit on which 
Antanmamo frontiers were demarcated was the fokontany. A fokontany is the equivalent of a 
district managed by an elected chief and, sometimes, incorporating several communes. In 
Antanmamo, I was told that a fokontany is based on ancestral borders and malaso frontiers. 
WWF-Madagascar Regional Director for the Anosy region explained that, in the delimitation 
process, WWF held a meeting to discuss “ancestral limits”. “Those limits are mainly based on 
zebu thievery because, when there is a zebu thief, the fokontany chief has to look for traces of 
the zebu until he reaches the ancestral border, that is until the reaches the fokontany border, 
and then he has to call neighbouring fokontany chiefs to show them the absence or presence of 
zebu traces in his own fokontany. So, when we delimited the protected area, we respected 
those traditional limits,” he explained [interview of July 25, 2011]. As a result, the borders of 
Antanmamo were based on the frontiers of three fokontany.  
 
Now that the limits were demarcated, the division of the protected area into different zones 
with distinctive rules could be established. After negotiations with CoBa and neighbouring 
fokontany, it was decided that the protected area would be divided into 4 different zones to 
regulate access to and use of natural resources (see map below): a restoration zone to conduct 
reforestation programs; a subsistence use zone, or ala’fampiasana, to collect fuel wood and 
extract wood for house construction and zebu fences as long as they have bought a permit 
from the forest association; a conservation zone through which humans can walk but are 
prohibited from extracting any forest resource – wood, plants, animals, honey ; and a “sacred” 
zone, or ala’fady, where human activities are entirely forbidden… except for tourists and 
local guides.  
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Use zones in Antanmamo protected area 
 
The creation of the “locality” of Antanmamo is a clear illustration of the interactions, 
negotiations and mediations occurring between translocal stakeholders. This process of 
creating the locality is, according to Tsing (2005: 57), a scale-making project that is necessary 
for the realisation of any type of development project. “A project that makes us imagine 
globality in order to see how it might succeed is one kind of ‘scale-making project’; similarly, 
projects that make us imagine locality, or the space of regions or nations, in order to see their 
success are also scale-making project,” Tsing argues (ibid). According to West (2006: 32), 
and based on her analysis of a conservation project in Papua New Guinea, the process of 
space restructuration, shows how culture, ideology, imagination and discourses progressively 
get tied to places. Ideas about the importance of biodiversity as an ecological and global asset 
confront valuations of land as an “ancestral” identity marker. In parallel, conservation NGOs 
with a politically and culturally specific set of commitments and practices need to take into 
account ancestral borders and zebu thieves’ modus operandi. For this reason, West (2006: 28) 
concludes that places like Antanmamo protected area did not only come into being with 
ecology and evolution but were also produced by social and material relations between people 
(2006: 28).  The “people” West is referring to include local forest users, foreign and Malagasy 
ecologists and biologists, WWF agents, members of the forest association and representatives 
from the regional Forest Service. In this sense, Antanmamo represents an in-between milieu 
where local, national and global forces collude and engage with each other differently, a zone 
of transnational contact where a locality is created and new kinds of communities are built. 
 
MAPPING THE INVISIBLE 
But the act of restructuring space and rendering borders visual – especially when it refers to 
ancestral ones – never comes without friction. On the one hand, we see that the locality 
becomes visual. As borders are set up and usage zones delimited, maps, pictures and satellite 
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captions represent the end product of distinctive ideas interacting together. Through this 
visual support, the project becomes operational at the global level: it is now possible for 
donors, decision-makers and NGOs planners seating in Paris or Antananarivo to look at a 
miniaturisation of the PHCF. As Scott (1998: 87; 57) reminds us, the transformative power of 
maps does not reside in maps themselves but, instead, “in the power possessed by those who 
deploy the perspective of that particular map […] this spatial fact is perhaps inherent in the 
process of urban or architectural planning itself […] that involves miniaturisation and scale 
models upon which patron and planner gaze down, exactly as if they were in a helicopter”. 
Yet, and on the other hand, we see that as the locality becomes mapped so do ancestors 
(Evers, 2011). As ancestral borders become visually demarcated, a frontier line seems to be 
drawn between land inside the protected area and land outside the protected area. Paint, for 
instance, is used to mark the different usage zones.  
 
The process of “mapping the ancestors” is strengthened by WWF and the Forest Service 
which both insist on “respecting traditional and ancestral borders” when setting up the 
delimitations [interview with WWF Regional Director for Anosy region, July 25, 2011]. By 
stressing the need to respect ancestral borders, WWF and the Forest Service also reinforce the 
idea that borders do exist and that the spatial location of ancestors can be mapped and 
negotiated. However, while trying to use “community mapping” methodology during my 
research, I quickly realised that ancestors – and ancestral borders – were seen by forest users 
as agents with capacity. When I asked my respondents where their ancestral lands were 
located, the majority of them had difficulties answering my question because, in most cases, 
they did not perceive ancestrality as a delimited and “delimitable” space. What this shows is 
that mapping is an abstract exercise and, by conducting such an exercise, the agency 
embedded in ancestors as acting agents is taken away (Evers, 2011). I asked a man who lived 
in the most remote village from Antanmamo what his first impression was when he saw paint 
on the trees for the first time [the paint that was used to delimitate the different use zones]. “If 
I find paint somewhere, it means that the land around it belongs to the vazaha. The vazaha 
goes there sometimes because they own this land with the paint on the tree. When I saw the 
paint I thought this must be for the vazaha and when I see you coming here for example, I 
think the land with the paint there belongs to you or to John
25,” he answered. Considering that 
                                                 
25 John is an Irish ecologist who has been working in Antanmamo for 14 years. He started as a researcher in Antanmamo 
focusing on lemur ecology and later on started to become involved in projects with WWF and other associations in the 
commune. In the main village of Antanmamo as well as in surrounding villages, John is often seen as the “English vazaha” 
who brings foreign tourists and students to the area. He is very well respected and probably the most renown vazaha in town. 
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Antanmamo is a locality where local and transnational imaginations interact, it is interesting 
to notice how the divergent valuations of space create an environment within which 
misunderstanding seems to prevail: the more WWF and the Forest Service try to render 
ancestors visible, the less ancestral the land appears in the eyes of forest users. But the 
reaction of the forest user quoted above tells us something more important about how visual 
delimitations of land very often are interpreted as synonymous with “foreign”. Because 
ancestors are understood as agents who act, attempting to visually map their spatial 
localisation progressively “foreignises” space while emptying ancestors’ capacity as agents 
(Evers, 2011). 
 
If there are flows in the journey of an idea influenced by international values to a small-scale 
“locality”, there are also strong blockages along the way – especially when the idea gets tied 
to a place. When members of the forest association were asked by WWF and KIOMBA to 
explain the new delimitation to villagers living inside and outside the protected area, they 
encountered difficulties accomplishing their tasks. Because the message did not seem to make 
sense to the villagers, CoBa members decided that the only way to mediate this situation was 
through kabary
26. “It was mainly the communities who asked us to make kabary in order to 
take decisions over the limits of the protected area,” a KIOMBA representative said. “They 
told us: ‘we are waiting for our ancestors to discuss the matter with neighbouring villagers’. 
This made the process extremely long for us because we were working under a six-month 
contract to do this transfer but we couldn’t move any further until the kabary had taken 
place!,” he added. In other villages, many forest users refused the delimitations proposed by 
WWF, KIOMBA and the Forest Service on the basis that the land where the protected area 
would be established was “ancestral”.  
The biggest obstacle was the perception of villagers. It was very difficult to convince them to 
agree on ‘ancestral’ limits. There were conflicts between the different fokontany as to where 
the limit should be drawn. Even for just five meters, people were unhappy and couldn’t come 
to an agreement. So … the biggest problem was definitely to put a frontier between the 
villages. One person would say ‘the limit is here’ and the other would reply ‘not it is there’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
Because he has been so involved in the various conservation or development projects implemented in the last 10 years in 
Antanmamo, I was very often told by villagers that, according to them, the forest of the protected area belongs to John. 
Similarly, I was asked many times by villagers to go and ask John if he could send them a radio or build a road next to their 
village.  
26 Kabary is Malagasy word to describe a means of communication that was used when Madagascar was still a royal 
kingdom to inform the people about the ordinances of the king. Kabary used to be very rich in metaphors to captivate the 
attention of the population. Today, kabary refers to a speech pronounced during important celebrations. It is also commonly 
used as a conflict resolution tool enabling people to debate matters through speeches and, eventually, reach an agreement.  
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[pointing another direction]. So we decided to work with a GPS and put paint on trees every 
100 meters. But I am telling you, just for two meters, you see, just two meters [he points a 
very small distance with his hands], the villagers refused to agree because they said they had 
ancestral rights in the forest and they kept repeating to us ‘in the past, if our ancestors had 
problems with the malaso they would bring the zebus there to keep them safe, so you cannot 
put a boundary here,” KIOMBA representative explained [interview of July 20, 2011]. 
If ancestors cannot be spatially located, they certainly are powerful mediators to enforce land 
claims and slow down the process of space restructuration. Responses to this process of 
“mapping the invisible” were various but all pointed to the same conclusion. As a response to 
space restructuration, there seemed to be a growing feeling of land dispossession and, as a 
result, increasing motivation to mediate land claims through unconventional brokers … 
including the ancestors. Even though ancestors cannot be situated on a map, villagers use the 
ancestors as the basis of their claims to maintain access to land. These observations call into 
question the notion of authority: through those different forms of translation, where and who 
is the authority? Who can decide what is legal and what is not legal? Is it the state or is it the 
ancestors? Observations during fieldwork have led me to the conclusion that ancestors are 
seen as powerful agents who act and enable forests users to mediate their claims once space 
starts to be visually restructured and the sense of land ownership is at stake. The capacity of 
ancestors for agency was illustrated to me by a rondria who explained that it was important to 
maintain ancestral traditions and take care of the ancestors otherwise “we would receive no 
rain because the ancestors would want to punish us for not taking care of them […] and if we 
don’t have rain, we cannot have any harvest. So we need to listen to them and take care of 
them”. His testimony proves that ancestors have an agency power and act as the authorising 
agents when it comes to legitimacy [interview, February 18, 2012].  
 
3.2. RE-REGULATION: FOREST ACCESS REGULATED BY NEW AND OLD RULES 
 
Antanmamo is legally recognised as a community-managed protected area. This characteristic 
defers with the Malagasy state’s national policy of decentralisation which became operative in 
1996 as part of the second phase of the National Action Plan for the Environment. Under this 
legal framework, the management of natural resources of Antanmamo was transferred from 
the Malagasy state to the communities living inside the protected area in 2003. Once the 
contract was signed between the various parties, a number of local forest users were elected 
or, in some cases appointed, to represent the community into a forest association called CoBa. 
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According to Bérard (2012: 124), the decision to transfer the management of natural resources 
to communities was a significant shift: the Malagasy government could now link itself to the 
aspirations of the international community calling for sustainable development while claiming 
back a history respectful of the environment
27. The government’s politics of decentralisation 
follows a broader shift in global environmental politics: based on past experiences, 
researchers and policy-makers came to the conclusion that biodiversity protection would not 
be successful as long as the communities living around protected areas were not directly 
involved in the management of the latter. This observation ultimately led to the advent of 
innovative concepts, ideologies and practices such as “integrated development and 
conservation,” “community-based forest management”, and “participative conservation”. 
Participation became the norm and a sine qua non requirement for any form of translocal 
conservation and development project, like the PHCF. Along those lines, efforts to enhance 
local capacity-building via the “participative” method provided project planners and donors 
with a great deal of legitimacy, at the national and international levels. The participation 
ideology is rooted in the belief that if communities are responsible for managing the natural 
resources surrounding them, they should also be decision-makers when it comes to the legal 
system regulating access to natural resources. 
 
So when the idea of transferring the management of natural resources was discussed at the 
state-level, a consensus was reached that the Dina should become the national framework 
regulating all newly-established protected areas (Ratsirahonana, 1996). The Dina is one of the 
most legitimate “customary” structures regulating social life in Madagascar. Often referred to 
as a “social contract”, the Dina is according to Razanabahiny (1995: 67) a “convention or 
agreement between the members of a community in which each member shows his or her 
adhesion through vows or imprecations and in which sanctions or maledictions are reserved 
for those who do not respect the agreed terms”. In 1996, the Dina was officially incorporated 
into state legislation28 through law 96-025 and later on through a simplified decree referred to 
as 2001-122
29
 (Aubert, 2002: 113). In accordance with the newly-established legislation, all 
                                                 
27 The annex on the genesis of the National Chart of the Environment states that « les souverains se sont préoccupés de la 
sauvegarde des forêts et de la terre ancestrale […] depuis les kabary d’Andrianampoinimerina jusqu’au code de 305 
articles de 1881, en passant par les traditions orales ayant valeur de loi, tous les souverains ont édicté des règles de 
protection des ressources naturelles et de limitation » (Bérard, 2010 : 124).  
28 Article 49 of law 96-025, 30 September 1996, stipulates that “the relationships between all members of the communauté de 
base are regulated by the Dina”. 
29 The legislation encouraging the transfer of management of certain renewable resources from the Malagasy state to 
communities was first elaborated in 1996 through the GELOSE law. However, actors from different sectors suggested 
improving the GELOSE legislation. In 2000, a simplified version of the legislation focusing on the transfer of forest 
resources was passed by the Malagasy government, and is now referred to as GCF (Gestion Contractualisée des Forêts). 
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parties involved in the transfer of forest resources management in Antanmamo – from the 
commune to CoBa, the Forest Service and WWF – agreed on a set of regulations formally 
codified as the Dina. But if Antanmamo is a place where international values and customary 
norms co-exist, are the laws legitimate and according to whose standards? 
 
A HYBRID REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
Implementing a national policy which places the Dina as the basis of a contract between 
villagers, the state and the commune – and unofficially NGOs that provide technical support 
to villagers – falls under a certain logic: combining the legal with the legitimate. It is 
interesting to look at how the notion of “contract” travels. On the one hand, we see that 
customary arrangements become recognised and formalised by the state: the national 
encompasses the local. In Antanmamo, for instance, a custom that prohibits the extraction of 
wood in a circumference of 70 meters near burials site was kept when the Dina was codified 
(see picture below).  
 
 
A burial site surrounded by lush forests 
 
On the other hand, rules that the community would not necessarily perceive as customary or 
traditional become codified as Dina in the regulatory framework of the protected area: the 
local encompasses the national – and, to take the argument further, the international. The 
prohibition of slash and burn is one of the clearest illustrations of the latter statement. The 
agricultural practice, known as hatsake in the Southern region of Madagascar, was not 
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considered to be part of the customary Dina before the creation of the protected area. At 
different times and under different regimes, state laws did prohibit the practice but no 
customary rule in Antanmamo sanctioned the agricultural method. But considering that the 
main objective of the PHCF is to reduce deforestation in Madagascar based on the 
internationally-supported idea that deforestation fastens global climate change and that the 
objective of the Malagasy government as part of the Durban Vision is to protect the nation’s 
biodiversity, WWF and the Forest Service negotiated with CoBa that the new Dina should 
prohibit the practice of slash and burn in order to discourage people from cutting and burning 
trees. The practice, considered by most of my respondents and many academics
30
 as a 
century-old “ancestral” method for subsistence and land acquisition, is now banned and 
referred to as fady by the majority of Antanmamo residents and WWF’s local agents. Fady 
refers to local taboos and customary interdictions. The term has a highly sacred connotation 
and breaching fady comes with significant implications for the individual or community who 
doesn’t respect it. A “customary” fady in Antanmamo ranged from eating goats to peeing near 
a burial site, cutting trees near ancestral tombs or eating lemurs and tortoises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Field after hatsake 
 
 
                                                 
30 See Keller, E. 2008. “The banana plant and the moon: Conservation and the Malagasy ethos of life in Masoala, 
Madagascar”. In American Ethnologist, vol. 35 (November, 4).  
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Picture of the same field, six months later, with maize cultivation 
 
The product of such a convergence of international norms with national objectives and local 
values is, unarguably, re-regulation and changes (Evers, 2011). New rules are implemented 
and selected old rules are reinforced. As the new Dina requires Antanmamo residents to buy a 
permit from CoBa to extract wood or plants in the protected area, forest access becomes 
increasingly regulated – and limited. The authority in charge of making sure the Dina is 
respected is no longer the fokonolona (village council traditionally led by elders) but a 
villager with experience in development and conservation projects appointed by the Comité 
de Suivi des Dina (a committee comprised of the mayor, a representative from the commune, 
the gendarmerie, WWF and the Forest Service) and trained by WWF’s office in Fort-Dauphin 
to best fulfil his role.   
 
INSTRUMENTALISING TRADITIONS?  
One can quickly see the criticisms arising from such a procedure. Bérard (2009:123-4), who 
conducted a two-year analysis of multiple transfer of management contracts across 
Madagascar, concluded that, from a customary structure regulating all aspects of life – rituals, 
health, solidarity, cattle thievery, conflict management – the Dina has become a regulatory 
system strictly concerned with the forest and its protection, setting up quotas and creating 
permits to regulate access (ibid: 284). The perception that the newly-established convention 
only has the name of Dina but not its customary value was also expressed at the village-level 
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in Antanmamo. According to a forest user living five kilometres away from Antanmamo, the 
Dina only reflects the interests of the state and environmental NGOs.   
“When Zafy Albert31 was in power, there was a lot of rain for three years and the harvests 
were very good so it was possible to do hatsake and cultivate. Then, it was the era of 
Ratsiraka. During that time, there was less rain and less production. The harvests from 
hatsake were limited and very meagre. And after that, with Ravolomanana, hatsake became 
fady. We could no longer do hatsake because Ravalomanana declared it was necessary to 
increase the number of protected areas in Madagascar. It is at this precise moment that WWF 
arrived in the region to prohibit hatsake for peasants. The politics of Ravolomanana goes 
hand in hand with WWF, they took the decisions together. Since the ban on hatsake, the 
harvest is insufficient and living conditions have deteriorated,” he explained [interview, July 
12, 2011]. 
Nevertheless, Bérard (2009: 138) reminds us that the process of encompassing the national 
into the local – and vice versa – is neither new nor foreign. Looking at the history of the Dina 
in Madagascar, one realises that from its first implementation among the Merina community 
in the High Plateaus to the French colonial regime and, later on, the Malagasy state, there has 
always been an attempt to influence and instrumentalise the Dina
32
. Razanabahiny (1995: 71) 
even considers the process of establishing the Dina as a rite of passage: “the ritual of the Dina 
consists in making a community or population transition towards a new situation,” he argues. 
Emphasising the fluid characteristic of the Dina, Bérard (2009: 130) argues that “the Dina is a 
traditional judicial institution that travelled across Malagasy history by constantly adapting 
and redefining itself based on the needs of the population and expectations of the state […] 
[the Dina] has been encouraged, subjected, framed, idealised and instrumentalised by the 
different powers in place”. From the 17th century up to today, the Dina has very often been 
perceived as an effective and legitimate tool for customary regulation that could effectively be 
used and adapted to comply with the centralised government’s objectives33. 
 
                                                 
31 Zafy Albert was the President of the Republic of Madagascar from 1993 to 1996; Ratsikara held this position twice, once 
from 1975 to 1993, the second time from 1997 to 2002; followed by Ravalomanana from 2002 to 2009.  
32 For a detailed history of the Dina, see Randrianarison, 2010.  
33 The Dina first started to be implemented among the Merina community within lineages and clans to give sanctions related 
to land tenure issues. Then, in the 17th century, the Dina was used to regulate life in villages and hamlets and later on to 
impose community work within such units and sanction those who did not participate in it. For more about the history of 
the Dina, see Randrianarison (2010: 55).   
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DEFINING LEGITIMACY IN A HYBRID REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Looking at a translocal project like the PHCF, one cannot help but wonder how legitimacy is 
defined in such a hybrid environment? Is legitimacy purely linked to the traditional and the 
customary? In other terms, is it sufficient for a regulatory framework to recognise the 
traditional structures and values of a community to be considered legitimate? Negotiating and 
agreeing on regulation, as we have seen throughout this section, comes with a double 
challenge: taking into account the divergent interests of the numerous actors involved in the 
project while, at the same time, making space for the different values and logics supported by 
the various institutions involved. But framing the process of re-regulation as a mere 
traditional versus foreign dichotomy closes a debate that, yet, deserves much more attention 
and discussion. It also blinds us to the dynamics and practices operating at the local level once 
the project is implemented and once regulations are redefined. The limitation in “community-
based projects” like the PHCF is that they often define legitimacy as a natural result of 
“participation” and assume that the inclusion of community members in decision-making 
processes related to regulation guarantees the legitimacy of laws. However, it will be argued 
that additional factors need to be taken into account when assessing legitimacy. 
 
One of them is power disparity at the village-level. During my fieldwork in Antanmamo, I 
noticed that the lack of legitimacy of the new Dina was not necessarily rooted in its 
“exogenous” characteristic but, instead, in power inequalities between the residents of 
Antanmamo. In the most remote village of the protected area, a forest user who had recently 
been penalised by CoBa for doing hatsake contested the fine on the basis that no one had 
informed him that the land he burnt for cultivation was ala’fady (sacred forest). The man, who 
had been taken to the gendarmerie for not paying the fine established by the Dina
34
, explained 
that 
                                                 
34 Members from the Comité de Suivi des Dina – including the gendarmerie, WWF field agent, and the member of 
polisyn’ala who had denounced the man to CoBa – came to his village two weeks before I met him to inform his and six 
other families that they had to pay a fine based on a report transferred to them by CoBa, who reported those seven families 
had done hatsake in protected areas. The man I met contested the sanction because he claimed that, nine years ago when 
the delimitation was done, WWF agent – a different one at that time – informed this village that only the forest in the 
mountain should not be burnt whereas today, WWF agent affirmed all forest areas were ala’fady and should therefore not 
be burnt at all, even for hatsake. Since those families refused to pay the Dina because they claimed to have been “ill-
informed”, the Comité de Suivi des Dina brought them to the gendarmerie until an agreement could be reached. When I 
went back to Antanmamo six months later, the situation was still unresolved. It is important here to note that the fine 
established in the Dina for doing hatsake represents a lot of money and value for villagers: someone who is caught doing 
hatsake should pay 60,000 Ariary, approximately 20 Euros, and sacrifice a zebu – whose meat will be divided among the 
members of the Comité de Suivi des Dina. The sacrifice of a zebu as a fine formalised in the Dina is particularly strong, 
considering the sacred value attributed to the animal.   
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“It is the people from Antanmamo who elect CoBa members, but we are definitely not 
implicated in this decision, they don’t ask us for our opinion. The meetings are only held in 
Antanmamo and the people who organise those meetings never ask us to join, they only ask 
the people from Antanmamo who should take the decisions about the Dina and other things. 
And then, it is those exact same people who were elected by people from Antanmamo who 
come here to threaten us! It is like we have to listen to something we did not choose” 
[interview, July 15, 2011].  
Along a similar line of observation, an ambiasa (traditional healer) from the neighbouring 
village explained that  
“one day there was a meeting with all the villages to inform us that, very soon, people would 
come to make the delimitations of the protected area and choose the ala’fady area with 
everyone. At the end of this meeting, the representatives from the Forest Service and WWF 
left to go somewhere else, but they didn’t give us a date for the next meeting. So people were 
waiting. Finally, the representatives came back to Antanmamo, but no one informed us about 
this. So, only people from Antanmamo attended the meeting. And it is on that day that they 
decided which village would be part of the protected area, which one would be excluded, and 
what would be the new rules … and that was it” [interview, July 18, 2011]. 
The lack of legitimacy of the new Dina can be explained by local power disparities but also 
embeds in what some authors refer to as the “illusion of participation” (Blanc-Pamard & 
Fauroux, 2004). Even though the word “community-based project” carries a high level of 
legitimacy at the global level, I realised that many NGO workers were acutely aware of the 
difficulties arising when trying to incorporate diverging interests and different levels of power 
into the concept of “a community”. Their scope for manoeuvre, however, was limited. In this 
sense, the predicament of the “participative” ideology is not only to assert the unity of a yet 
highly unequal society but also to frame the regulatory system of the protected area based on 
the assumption that all forest users are deeply anchored into customary structures and 
traditional beliefs when, in reality, those structures and beliefs are contested by an increasing 
part of the community.  
 
Based on the suggestion of the ambiasa, who was warned by a foreign ecologist that if 
hatsake continued in Antanmamo he would no longer be able to find plants to heal people, it 
was decided that all areas inhabited by the kokolampo (natural spirit) would be considered 
ala’fady, or sacred areas, under the framework of the new Dina – the place where the 
kokolampo lived was also the place where the ambiasa performed healing rituals and 
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collected most of his medicinal plants. But despite the existence of a Dina prohibiting the 
extraction of resources in areas inhabited by the kokolampo, the ambiasa noticed that a 
growing number of people continued to practice hatsake in ala’fady areas. The reason for 
such behaviours, he explained, was that the people who had breached the Dina were 
“Christians so they do slash and burn or cut trees even when the land they clear is very close 
to the kokolampo. They do this just to show their religious adversity, it is like a 
demonstration of strength and power, a provocation to us. Because for us, we are just too 
scared to clear the forests near the kokolampo, so we never cut trees there! [interview, July 
18, 2011]. 
The “religious” factor shows yet another example of the local dynamics influencing 
legitimacy of legality. It also clearly illustrates the complexity of working in accordance with 
“tradition” when the definition of the latter is more and more challenged.  
 
In a context in constant “reshuffling”, we see that laws become fluid and boundaries between 
the different legal systems become increasingly permeable. “We live in a time of porous 
legality or of legal porosity, of multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to constant 
transitions and trespassing,” Sousa Santos comments (1987: 297). Interestingly, alternative 
notions and conceptions of “legitimacy” start to fill in the void left by the hybridity and 
porosity of the new regulatory framework. A clear illustration of the latter statement can be 
found when looking at the use of the Malagasy term “rariny”, which the English language 
would translate as “fair” or “just” [conversation with Mija Andriamarovololona, PhD 
candidate in Anthropology at VU University Amsterdam, December 6, 2011]. Rariny entails a 
notion of justice not purely rooted in customary norms but also based on a “contextual” 
definition of fairness. When CoBa members accompanied me in the protected area and 
discovered a hundred carved wooden boards hiding in the forest, it is their interpretation of 
rariny that guided their decision and action as “environmental mediators”. When CoBa 
members came back from the neighbouring village to identify the “illegal logger”, we were 
informed by the vice-President of CoBa that the loggers would not be penalised even though 
they cut trees without a permit because the loggers intended to build a school with the carved 
wooden boards. “If trees are cut for the construction of a school, a church or a hospital, then it 
is not necessary to buy a permit from us,” CoBa vice-President explained [interview, June 20, 
2011]. As far as I was aware, the Dina did not include such a “clause”. But according to 
CoBa, the logging was “rariny” because it was meant for the construction of a school that 
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would provide education to the children of the village [interview with CoBa vice-President, 
June 20, 2011]. This example clearly shows the complexity of setting up rules in a hybrid 
environment where “legality” starts to take on different meanings and, ultimately, “becomes 
fragmented to the extent that no legal system can benefit from absolute supremacy,” Bérard 
comments (2009: 20-21). In Antanmamo, the legal experience becomes a contextual practice 
and decision that is constantly being redefined through a never-ending search for legitimacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CoBa members standing in front of the piles of “illegal” wooden carved boards 
 
 
CoBa members taking the carved boards to the neighbouring village to identify the “illegal logger” 
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3.3. The restructuration of the “local”: assigning new roles and creating 
new figures of power  
 
New roles were created when CoBa was established. 11 people were elected by fokontany 
residents, or in some cases appointed by WWF, to become members of CoBa and fill in one 
of the following positions: president, vice-president, secretariat, treasurer and commissioner 
of accounts. A level down in the forest association hierarchy, a team of polisyn’ala (forest 
police) agents was set up to monitor surveillance in the forest, control forest permits and 
report to CoBa people who had cut or burned trees. In addition to the polisyn’ala president 
and his three agents in Antanmamo, 10 villagers were elected as polisyn’ala representatives in 
one to two hamlets each. Before becoming members of CoBa or polisyn’ala, those newly-
elected villagers were cultivators, carpenters, sisal plantation workers, sapphire diggers, or 
members of the municipal council. Seeing the diverse backgrounds from which CoBa 
members were coming from and given their initial low enthusiasm towards their new 
profession, I couldn’t help but wonder how the members of the forest association were 
dealing with their new status and power? Considering that one of the main tasks of a 
polisyn’ala agent is to denounce people who practice hatsake in a protected area that has a 
relatively small number of hamlets – usually inhabited by 30 to 70 people –, how did 
polisyn’ala agents manage to combine their role as “forest police” agents with their family 
and community status? Did their new profession as guardians of the environment impact on 
their relationship with the community? 
 
The answer to those questions came when I asked my respondents about CoBa’s effectiveness 
in protecting the forest. Beside the lack of financial resources to monitor forest management, 
all CoBa members agreed that their limited success in enforcing the Dina was rooted in the 
difficulty to enforce laws when their families were implicated in the infringement.  
“The criterion to be elected at CoBa is to be capable of telling the truth about who is doing 
hatsake even if this person is the rondria (village elder) or a member of your family. The 
former President, for example, he had to leave his position because he was not applying the 
Dina properly when his family was practicing hatsake, he never made them pay a single 
fine!” [interview with CoBa vice-president, July 5, 2011] 35. 
                                                 
35 A number of respondents informed me that the other reason why the previous President had to leave his position was 
because of financial mismanagement of CoBa funds under its direction.  
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The former President of CoBa himself affirmed that “they were conflicts between the 
members of CoBa because they couldn’t agree on how to apply the Dina” [interview with 
OPCI President and former CoBa President, July 7, 2011].  
 
THE FIHAVANANA: BOOSTING OR SLOWING CONSERVATION? 
Conscious of the dilemma faced by polisyn’ala agents, WWF decided to appoint “people with 
less community ties” to a committee responsible for enforcing the Dina when CoBa would be 
unable to do so, the Comité de Suivi des Dina. What WWF did not realise, however, was that 
affiliation very often went beyond kinship. Certain families were protected by their fokontany 
chief – who also has considerable influence in conservation-related matters36 – because those 
families had voted for him when he ran for the fokontany election. As a payback for their vote, 
the fokontany chief demanded that their penalty should be cancelled [interview with CoBa 
vice-President and President of polisyn’ala, February 23, 2012]. The complexity of enforcing 
the Dina without compromising one’s legitimacy in the community lies in one word: 
“fihavanana”. In each conversation I had with villagers or CoBa members about the new role 
attributed to some residents, “fihavanana” was the term most referred to.  
 
According to my respondents, fihavanana refers to the ties of mutual solidarity existing 
between all Malagasy. For Gannon and Sandron (2003: 4-5), who propose an in-depth 
analysis of the term while acknowledging the difficulty to define it, fihavanana is the 
“concretisation of the relations of solidarity relative to heritage, be it land, recognised 
ancestors, shared resources, etc […] Peasants refer to it when a whole village gets together to 
celebrate family ceremonies such as wedding, circumcision, funeral or when mechanisms of 
mutual aid need to be activated for loans or agricultural help”. Considering the influence of 
the fihavanana in creating and maintaining a sense of solidarity within the community, 
Gannon and Sandron (ibid: 7) add that respecting the fiahavanana also implies “not to 
undertake innovative action that may harm or threaten the community”. The latter definition 
illustrates well the dilemma faced by those newly-appointed guardians of the forest. Between 
their assignments as “conservation agents”, which require them to denounce members of the 
community, and their reluctances to disrespect the fihavanana, CoBa members become 
brokers caught in between. According to a polisyn’ala agent living in one of the hamlets 
                                                 
36 The fokontany chief plays an important role in the management of the protected area because he is the intermediary 
between CoBa and WWF. CoBa needs to submit its monthly report detailing the names of the people who did hatsake to 
the fokontany chief, who will, later on, hand it in to WWF.  
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inside the protected area, the biggest challenge when working as a polisyn’ala agent is to 
denounce other villagers   
“because I am married to the daughter of the rondria. So, for me, it is very difficult to 
denounce the rondria if he does hatsake [interview with polisyn’ala agent in case-study 
village A, July 6, 2011].  
For CoBa vice-president, his new role as a protector of the forest is a catch-22.  
“My biggest problem is to give fines to my family when they practice hatsake. For me, it is 
not good to be part of CoBa because it is putting me in a very difficult situation towards my 
family. The work at CoBa creates rakiny (discord). Many people are scared of me now and I 
can no longer go in the forest by myself for security reasons, because of the risk of reprisals 
from people who were denounced in the past. In the villages, this situation has created a lot 
of tensions because villagers start accusing each other or accusing the polisyn’ala agent from 
the village of denouncing people to CoBa” [interview with vice-president of CoBa, July 5, 
2011].   
When I met him six months later, he and the polisyn’ala president expressed their desire to 
receive uniforms from WWF. “If we were wearing special clothes when going on forest 
surveillance missions, it would be rariny because then villagers could make the visual 
distinction between the moment when we do our job as members of the forest association and 
the moment when we are just normal villagers again, once we remove our uniform,” they said 
[interview, February 23, 2012]. What this clearly shows is that environmental mediators are 
strongly inclined to separate their duties from social relations so that they no longer have to 
choose between valuing and protecting the community and performing sanctioning tasks.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATORS 
Alike CoBa vice-president, other members of the forest association were reluctant to 
compromise their legitimacy in the community even though such a decision meant less 
credibility for CoBa and less authority to enforce the rules. But what happened to those CoBa 
members who embraced their new roles as guardians of the forest through discourses and 
practices? While staying in one of the villages inside the protected area, an informant told me 
that two men who had worked for CoBa and polisyn’ala in the past had recently been 
marginalised from the forest association. Their testimonies clearly illustrate the fact that being 
an environmental mediator can sometimes come at a high price.  
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“I used to write a lot of reports to CoBa to denounce the families who were doing hatsake 
but after a few years, villagers did not like me anymore because they thought I was 
denouncing people too much, that I was too honest. So the villagers asked CoBa to fire me. 
In 2009, CoBa did fire me because CoBa has the power to decide who can be part of the 
polisyn’ala team, this is how the hierarchy works. Today, I would like to become a 
polisyn’ala agent again but the population is refusing it, they voted ‘no’ against me” 
[interview with the first President of polisyn’ala, July 7, 2011].  
“In 2009, 7 people did hatsake in one village. I reported this to the President of CoBa at that 
time but he did not react and refused to enforce the Dina. After a while, the penalty was 
finally given but it was reduced: instead of giving one zebu each, the families only had to do 
the vonon’dina (ceremony to proceed with the ruling) with one zebu for all of them. Because 
of this exception, people thought the penalty was not so bad so they continued doing 
hatsake. In 2010, there was a big rise in the number of hatsake so I decided to write a report 
about it again, but this time I gave it directly and personally to the WWF agent here. The 
reaction of CoBa was simple: they fired me and I had to leave polisyn’ala. You know if a 
family member of someone from CoBa or polisyn’ala does hatsake, he or she will not be 
punished because he or she has exclusive rights. And this is why CoBa members complained 
about my work, because I was doing my job without even receiving orders to do it. One day, 
for example, the brother of the president of CoBa asked him ‘why he is controlling me? Why 
is he asking for my permit?’ Even the agents of polisyn’ala themselves do hatsake! That’s 
why they do not denounce anyone in their report […] But today, WWF is trying to place me 
back inside CoBa because I take my job very seriously and I always tell the truth. WWF also 
gave me a special authorisation for me and a former colleague, so we can continue our 
control and monitoring activities in the forest. It was like a way to reward us for our good 
work […] I know the villagers don’t like me but WWF does, because I am not scared to 
denounce people” [interview with a former polisyn’ala agent, July 7, 2011]. 
After they left CoBa, the two men were rewarded by WWF for their honesty and given a 
special authorisation to continue reforestation and surveillance work in the protected area. 
Both of them were offered a paid-job
37
 as reforestation agents and the ex-polisyn’ala agent 
now takes care of the tree nursery funded by WWF and located in Antanmamo. The story of 
                                                 
37
 The salary received by the reforestation agent and manager of the tree nursery is 700 000 Ariary per month, paid by WWF. 
This highly contrasts with the situation of CoBa or polisyn’ala agents who usually don’t get any income for their work. 
WWF does not pay for their salary because the strategy of the NGO is that CoBa, on the long-run, CoBa becomes a 
financial self-sufficient unit by accumulating finances through the money it receives from people who pay permits to 
extract wood. However, only 2 permits maximum are purchased each month, each worth 3000 Ariary. Also, CoBa usually 
sends 2 to 3 agents for forest monitoring mission (for security reasons) and each agent should normally be paid 6000 Ariary 
as an income for forest surveillance and reporting. But with only 6000 Ariary maximum arriving in CoBa funds, this is not 
enough to pay all agents who go on mission [interview with former polisyn’ala agent, February 23, 2012].    
   127 
 
those two men illustrates well the problematic arising when power dynamics are reconfigured, 
when people are assigned tasks that have a good resonance in the ears of international donors 
but often spark distrust in the eyes of villagers. On the one hand, the two men who are acutely 
aware of WWF’s aspirations embrace the idea and practice of conservation – and get 
rewarded for doing so. But on the other hand, they are marginalised by CoBa and villagers for 
doing their job too well and disregarding the fihavanana. The more they demonstrate their 
“environmentality”, the less trust they receive from the majority of villagers. In the following 
section of this chapter, it will be argued that, despite being torn between local conventions and 
global aspirations, the new figures of power created by the PHCF have become environmental 
mediators who reconcile different scales of legitimacy – local, national, and international.   
 
 
Former polisyn’ala agent now reconverted into a reforestation agent/tree nursery caretaker 
 
3.4. The convergence of the local, national and international in individuals 
Looking at the actions and choices made by certain members of the forest association, one 
would be tempted to argue that a number of villagers, when embracing their new roles as 
environmental mediators, have become the eyes and ears of conservation NGOs in remote 
locations. But such a statement would blind us to the zones of translation that CoBa members 
constantly activate as environmental mediators. Agrawal (2005: 162), who made similar 
observations in his study of “environmental subjects” in India, suggests that      
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“these different justifications of personal transformation into someone who cares about 
protecting trees and situates his actions within a general framework of conservation are too 
resonant with prevailing environmentalist rhetorics to be original. But to dismiss them 
because they are being repeated by others would completely miss the enormously interesting, 
complex, and crucial but understudied relationship between changes […] and related shifts in 
environmental practices and beliefs. When and for what reason do socially situated actors 
come to care about, act in relation to, and think about their actions in terms of something 
they identify as “the environment”?”  
 
The reforestation agent who is “ready to kill his son for the forest”, on a reforestation site in the protected area 
 
SWITCHING CODES AND COSTUMES 
The actions of environmental mediators are not “either/or” choices. They are not limited to 
either bypassing the rules in order to respect the fihavanana or bypassing the fihavanana in 
order to respect the rules. As we have seen in the previous section, trying to categorise actors 
based on their “specific and distinctive” valuations of the environment is no longer relevant, 
especially in contexts of rapid change and transition. In practice, people switch codes and 
“attires” depending on the situation they are confronted with. For instance, when the former 
polisyn’ala agent guided me and my assistant to one of the most remote villages in the 
protected area he insisted on informing the villagers that he was not here for any 
conservation-related work. The conversation between him and two villagers illustrates well 
the perception of villagers towards environmental mediators and the capacity of the former 
polisyn’ala agent to act as a broker and change costumes when needed.  
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[villagers] – “Why are you here once again? Why did you come back to our village? And 
why did you bring the vazaha with you?”   
[former polisyn’ala agent] – “No, I am a guide now. I did not come to make any control 
today. My role today with the vazaha is only to guide her and bring her here but I do not 
work for polisyn’ala anymore. The last time I came here, it was with WWF and the 
gendarmerie. But they forced me to come here with the Comite de suivi des dina, it wasn’t 
voluntary, it was just my work. I was just doing what I was told to do. But now I don’t do 
this anymore, now I am just a guide
38” [conversation between two villagers and a former 
polisyn’ala agent, February 22, 2012].   
Interestingly, the day after our excursion, the former polisyn’ala agent was accomplishing his 
task as a WWF reforestation agent, preaching the virtue of conservation and reminding the 50 
villagers planting trees under his supervision about the importance of trees for future 
generations. Along the same line of observation, James (2011: 331-2) argues that the 
flexibility of brokers embed in their capacity to withdraw from too precise an identification 
with the authority of the project when interacting with villagers, while winning the trust of the 
former by mastering the language and practice of environmental conservation. Conscious that 
a number of people and organisations have certain expectations of them, the majority of 
environmental mediators have learned how to juggle between their new role and their local 
legitimacy, Evers comments (2011). Environmental mediators know what to tell a WWF 
agent, how to behave when a vazaha is around, and how to gain the trust of sceptic villagers. 
While acknowledging the structural patterns that can limit brokers’ scope for action and 
decision, James (2011: 335) claims it is necessary to go beyond a vision of brokers as “figures 
who stand between powerless people and externally imposed power” and, instead, look at 
environment mediators as actors “who activate the continuing interplay between apparently 
irreconcilable discourses and practices”. As a result of the implementation of the PHCF, the 
“local” is restructured: carpenters, sisal plantation workers and cultivators become figures of 
power who reconcile global, national and local aspirations to mediate action. Their very 
persona, as James suggests, is a “zone of translation” (ibid: 333).  
 
                                                 
38 The day after, we met him again. He confessed that “the work as a reforestation agent and manager of the tree nursery is 
much better than polisyn’ala agent because working for polisyn’ala created a lot of tensions between me and people, it was 
too difficult in relation to the community, the relationship I had with them because of my role back then was very tense 
whereas now, when I work in the tree nursery, I don’t even need to talk to people, I don’t have to interact with them anymore. 
WWF was very unhappy when they heard I was fired from CoBa. And you know yesterday during our excursion in the 
forest, the other guide who also works for CoBa told me to come back and work with them again. I haven’t made my mind 
yet but … I think I will refuse his offer. Being a polisyn’ala agent is a very difficult role to adopt, and I don’t want to take 
this responsibility anymore” [interview, 23 February, 2012]. 
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MEDIATING LEGALITY  
Those same zones of translation were also explicitly exposed when looking at forest users’ 
mechanisms of adaptation and mediation when confronted with “legality”. During my 
fieldwork, I found that many villagers were acutely aware of global expectations and norms, 
especially when related to the environment, and constantly adapted their meaning of tradition 
or ancestrality depending on the situation they were confronted with. The same observation 
applied when I looked at local NGO workers’ modus operandi39 in Antanmamo: many “local 
traditions” likely to contribute to the efforts of conservation became codified as part of the 
Dina. The NGO’s argument to justify its support for pro-conservation customary laws in the 
Dina is that “old conservation practices and beliefs already existed in the law of the 
fokonolona before the project was implemented; the project only endorsed and reinforced 
those realities” [interview with WWF agent, February 13, 2012]. As a foreigner coming into 
this hybrid environment, where different interests interacted and distinctive values came into 
friction, predicting the verdict of CoBa when an “illegal” situation would occur was a gamble. 
Forest users adapted their discourses and practices to the situation they were confronted with 
while CoBa members adapted the rules depending on the people they had to deal with.  
 
Walking past the ala’fady forest on a daily basis to go the village where I was conducting my 
first case study, I started to wonder why this specific area had such a strong sacred 
connotation in the Dina and why the law considered it to be a totally protected zone. 
Interestingly, I received different answers. A foreign ecologist, who had been working in the 
area for some time, told me that the forest was a sacred area because it was the location of 
burial sites belonging to families from Antanmamo. What seemed intriguing to me was that 
during my walks inside the protected area, I had come across many burial sites and tombs. 
Yet, the majority of them were not codified as ala’fady in the Dina despite their sacred value 
in the eyes of the community. So why did this specific forest, more than any other forest in 
the protected area with burial sites, deserve a sacred recognition and total protection? The 
former President of CoBa, who had taken part in the use zones delimitation process, admitted 
that even though there were a few burial sites and sacred trees inside this forest, the area was 
not “sacred” in its traditional sense [interview, July 7, 2011].  
                                                 
39 The reason why I am solely referring to the NGOs operating in Antanmamo here, and not the Malagasy state or Forest 
Service, is because the Forest Service was not very present in Antanmamo as opposed to the conservation NGO, who had 
one agent living in the village of Antanmamo and one project supervisor also based in Antanmamo. This absence is 
mainly due to limited financial resources to employ more staff and operate more controls. For people living in the 
protected area, WWF was an authority much more visible to them than the state.   
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“This area is a zone of total protection but it’s not because it is sacred. It is because when we 
were doing the tracking for the delimitation of the use zones, we noticed that this zone had 
remained intact and that there were very few trees cut and no trace of slash and burn in this 
area. So it was decided that the area should become sacred, like a zone with total protection, 
to make sure it would remain intact, just as it is now. In the past, the ancestors were 
protecting this area because this is where they would find all the resources and especially 
food … so this is why the forest has remained intact” [interview, July 7, 2011]. 
If the forest itself has remained intact, access to ala’fady, however, has changed: the new 
Dina stipulates that humans are not allowed to enter the sacred forest and neither are they 
allowed to extract resources from it – tourists, however, can enter with local guides. Puzzled 
by the different answers I was getting, I decided to ask the same question to another villager. 
According to him, everybody knew that “many animals lived there and many plants could be 
found in this forest, so over the years people kept it well-preserved to ensure that, when the 
kéré (food shortage) would come, they would know where to go to find food or medicinal 
plants […] it is like a back-up reserve when the kéré comes. In this forest, you always find 
something” [interview, July 9, 2011].  
 
 
The frontier zone between the ala’fady (on the left) and the usage zone (on the right) in the 
protected area. 
 
It is interesting to note how “traditional beliefs” and “local culture” are used to advance two 
completely different objectives. On the one hand, local actors along with conservation 
planners give sacred names to places with a high conservation potential but no specific sacred 
connotation in the eye of the community. On the other hand, CoBa Vice-President tells me 
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that “if someone needs wood to build a tomb, that person doesn’t need to buy a permit to take 
the wood because this ritual is part of the Tandroy
40
 culture. The person only needs to inform 
CoBa about this, but we don’t require them to have a permit because building tombs for 
ancestors is necessary in the Tandroy culture … this ritual is for the safeguard of the Tandroy 
culture” [interview, July 18, 2011]. While in some cases it is the lack of belief in tradition that 
is used as a pretext to bypass rules, in other instances, it is tradition itself that is used to 
disregard legality. Respect of the ancestors and protection of the kokolampo are presented as 
central reasons to keep the forest preserved and intact. Yet, it this same respect of the 
ancestors and local culture that is advanced to make exemptions to the laws in order to 
maintain access to the forest and preserve one’s right to extract resources from it.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The convergence of the local, the national and the international in individuals could be 
interpreted as a rational strategy driven by opportunism. But isn’t such an interpretation 
misleading and simplistic? Along a similar line of thinking, Goedefroit (2002: 141) questions 
whether 
“the procedures that we precisely conceived to best correspond to the ‘traditional structure’ 
really meet local realities? Is the generalised application of stale concepts […] truly 
appropriate to vehicle new notions to people who, despite being traditional, have 
demonstrated a capacity to face the conjectural transformations of their environment by 
adopting adaptive and sometimes opportunistic behaviours which conservation planners all 
know so well?”  
As explained throughout this chapter, the answer to Goedefroit’s interrogation is negative. 
The application of “stale concepts” and the categorisation of actors based on their valuations 
of the environment are no longer relevant methods because individuals transcend 
conventional scales of legality and legitimacy. In this sense, Goedefroit’s observations 
strongly echo the argument developed by Mosse (2004) and outlined earlier: the use of 
powerful yet extremely vague concepts. As Mosse reminds us (2004: 663), the use of stale 
words serves to “conceal ideological differences, allow compromise and the enrolment of 
different interests, build coalitions, distribute agency and multiply criteria of success within 
                                                 
40 Tandroy is one of the ethnic groups living in the far South East of Madagascar, the semi-arid region of the island. Their 
land is known as “the Androy”, more commonly referred to as the “land of the thorny bush”. “Antandroy” is the name of 
the ethnic group, which translates as "those of the thorny bush."  
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project systems”. Looking at the notion of legitimacy in the context of Antanmamo, there 
seemed to be a gap between project planners, donors, NGO workers, and researchers’ efforts 
to respect traditional structures and values in the name of “community-based management” 
and “empowerment” and what happened at the community-level in practice. In practice, a 
growing number of individuals in Antanmamo speak the language of the local, the national 
and the international. In settings where the local, the national and the international converge, 
the environmental broker becomes “the person who, in his daily life, is confronted in his 
behaviour with various, possibly conflicting, regulatory orders emanating from the various 
social networks of which he is, voluntarily or not, a member,” Vanderlinden suggests (1989: 
153-154). Varying levels of involvement in the different regimes of environmental regulation 
not only generated new ways of understanding the environment but also enabled forest users 
to switch between those different ways of understanding the environment. While trying to 
find their ways through “old” rules and international expectations, many residents in 
Antanmamo made use of the complexity and hybridity of the new regulatory system to reach 
their objectives. For Sousa Santos (2002: 19), community members “do so now within/now 
without the limits of the modern official law, mobilising various scales of legality (local, 
national and global) and building translocal and even transnational alliances”. “Struggling 
against oppression, exclusion, discrimination and the destruction of the environment, these 
groups resort to law, or rather to different forms of law, as one more instrument of resistance,” 
he adds (ibid). Based on the observations outlined in this chapter, I shall conclude that the 
most pragmatic account of societies encountering rapid transition under translocal projects is 
one that portrays highly differentiated communities all engaged at different stages in a process 
of reshuffling.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
During my stay in Antanmamo, my assistant and I decided to visit a village, the most remote 
of all in the protected area, situated at the frontier of the protected zone. In the first days, 
people were not very responsive to us and I noticed that, very often, the village was empty. 
We asked the rondria of the village for his authorisation to let us come back to the village on 
a daily basis for two weeks, thinking people might get accustomed to us and open up 
progressively. A few days after, an informant that eventually became a very good friend of us 
explained that most villagers thought that, because I was a vazaha, I was working for WWF. 
He also explained that if the village looked empty, it was because the parents had told their 
children to run away in the forest as soon as they would see me arriving [interview, July 15, 
2011]. The reason for being so suspicious about the vazaha – that is, myself – was because 
two weeks before our arrival, a group of people including a WWF representative, two 
polisyn’ala agents, and a person from the gendarmerie had come to this specific village with a 
list of families who were denounced by a polisyn’ala agent for doing hatsake. The issue, and 
reason for their impromptu visit to the village, was that those families had not paid the fine for 
infringing the Dina. The committee from Antanmamo therefore wanted explanation.  
 
However, the families did not understand. 9 years ago, when WWF first and last came to the 
village, the NGO’s agent informed the families living here that the mountain in front of their 
village would become ala’fady. But according to my respondents, the agent did not mention 
anything about the rest of the forests [interview, July 15, 2011]. In response to the families’ 
declarations, WWF’s agent explained that, in practice, all forest lands were under protection 
and therefore, no one was allowed to cut a tree or do hatsake anywhere [interview, July 15, 
2011]. Conscious that the situation would not be resolved easily and rapidly, the gendarmerie 
decided that the families whose names were on the list should be brought to the gendarmerie 
in Antanmamo. Members of the seven families, including my respondent, were kept for 8 
hours at the gendarmerie. Later on that day, the chief of the village was informed of the 
situation and walked to the gendarmerie to ask for their release.   
 
As far as I knew, such a procedure was not part of the Dina and none of my informants from 
CoBa or polisyn’ala ever informed me that people could be brought to jail if they had done 
slash and burn agriculture and did not pay the fine. So was this just another illustration of 
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translation? Could this act possibly reflect WWF and polisyn’ala agents’ interpretation and 
translation of what they thought “sustainability” meant, not necessarily in their own eyes but 
in those of the rest of the world?   
 
Since the day those seven families were taken to the gendarmerie, anyone foreign or involved 
in conservation activities is seen as suspicious and a potential threat. I was even told that 
when people saw me in the village in the first days, they thought it was “WWF coming back 
here to take them back to jail” [interview, July 18, 2011].  Another man told me he did not 
feel comfortable talking to me because he feared I would use his information to “take away 
his land and his children” [interview, July 17, 2011]. The experience my assistant and I 
encountered in this village was one of the most challenging we had to deal with throughout 
the whole fieldwork. Not only because the data collection process was considerably slowed 
down by the circumstances, but also because Aldin and I started to realise the tensions and 
violence implicated in the travelling notion and practice of “sustainability”. In the first days, it 
often happened that we would get shouted at by men holding guns who complained about 
people from Antanmamo who, they said, “think they have the authority to disturb the life of 
families who are simply trying to cultivate small plots of land to grow maize and feed their 
families” [interview, July 18, 2011]. The river bed that normally surrounded the village and 
provided families and cultivated land with water had been completely dried for months. The 
only source of water available was located a seventeen-kilometre walk away from the village 
– the village is not accessible by car as there is no road within the protected area – and the 
only source of food available for subsistence was a land known for being extremely rocky and 
definitely not fertile.  
 
During my stay in the village, and even when I left, I was perceived as someone working for 
WWF – despite my numerous attempts to demonstrate the contrary. After time passed, I 
realised that, unbeknown to myself, I was seen by a number of my respondents as one of the 
partners of the PHCF. Even though the experience was, for my assistant, the villagers and 
myself very painful, it did give me an incredible insight into the world of environmental 
politics and clearly showed me what the journey of the idea and practice of “sustainability” 
can entail in some places of the globe.  
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The reason why I chose to outline this event as a concluding remark for this thesis is not to 
give my readers a general impression that, in every part of the world where “sustainable” 
projects are implemented through NGO-private companies’ partnerships, people suffer. 
Making such an assumption would be misleading and, most probably, inaccurate. 
Environmental projects or movements have had considerable effects and consequences 
throughout the world and particularly in what some refer to as “Southern” countries.  But it is 
not part of this assignment to judge whether the results of such schemes were positive or 
negative.  
 
If I decided to close this thesis with the story of seven families who were taken to the 
gendarmerie for having done hatsake, it is to remind us of the importance of research and the 
need for in-depth analysis of contemporary large-scale development and conservation 
projects. Through the lens of anthropology, my goal was to look behind the curtain and 
understand processes of translation at different scales.  
 
When reading communication materials about the PHCF such as Air France’s CSR report 
which indicates that  
“four years on from the start of the programme, Air France and its partners GoodPlanet and 
WWF can point out their ﬁrst successes: nearly 350,000 hectares have been protected and 
secured, 29 natural resource management transfer contracts have been signed, reforestation 
targets have been reached in certain areas, 5,000 households have given up slash and burn 
cultivation in favour of alternative farming methods and 25,600 households have been informed 
about the effects of climate change
41”, 
                                                 
41 See Air France CSR Report for 2011 on  
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/16963/original/Air_France_KLM_CSR_report_2011.p
df?1344434866 
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I cannot help myself from concluding that, from the creation of a translocal to its 
implementation, there is a significant gap in mutual awareness. People in Paris are 
probably not aware that seven families in one of the PHCF’s intervention zones have to 
pay an enormous fine – one zebu cow and 20 Euros – for doing hatsake, an activity vital 
for subsistence. At the same time, it is also very likely that those seven families do not 
know that Air France refers to them as one of the “5,000 households who have given up 
slash and burn cultivation in favour of alternative farming methods”.  
 
But was this not predictable considering the number of people involved voluntarily or 
involuntarily in the PHCF, given the size of the project and the distance that separates project 
creators from project receivers? The question of “sustainability” and its translation in different 
settings is inextricably linked to Chouquer’s (2011) concerns regarding the link between 
economic realities and geographical ones. In this re-organisation of commitments, roles and 
responsibilities between the state, civil society and private companies, it is important to 
scrutinise the voyage of “sustainability”. From an idea that was initially put forward by civil 
society groups in international conferences, “sustainability” then became a practice formalised 
in the agenda of transnational companies under the name of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
and eventually concluded its travel as an experience creating opportunities for some and 
social tensions for others.  
 
The stories collected in the villages that I visited and the discussions I had with different 
actors of the PHCF in Paris show that the two main terms referred to in this thesis, namely 
“partnership” and “sustainability”, have dual meanings. The concept of “partnership”, for 
instance, takes different connotations depending on the setting in which it is embedded and 
the actors it is used by. There are two sides to the word. In Paris, partnership is perceived as a 
difficult and lengthy process of learning the language of the other and, progressively, tapping 
into the register of the other. There is also a sense that compromises and choices have to be 
made, just like in Antanmamo where people have to switch hats and costumes. The other side 
of the term, which applies less when situated in the settings of Air France or GoodPlanet’s 
offices for instance, is that in Antanmamo local “partners” who are involved in forest 
management have to apologise to their community for doing the tasks they have been 
assigned to because, in the wrong moral sense, they are “collaborating”. This was illustrated 
by the reaction of the polisyn’ala agent who insisted on justifying the purpose of his visit to 
the village where he had denounced families for doing hatsake. To protect himself and in 
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order to be accepted, the now former polisyn’ala agent switched hats and explained he was 
only here as a guide for the vazaha and apologised for his past acts as a forest police agent. 
The reason why he did so was because he knew that, in a way or another, he had been a 
partner of the institutions and actors who caused trouble to those families. So if there is one 
conclusion that should be made regarding this research, it is that any translation hinges on a 
rocky surface, a friction.  
 
The question of who is local and who is global therefore becomes central: how does each 
actor involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the PHCF presents him or herself? How do 
they want to be perceived and by whom? When looking at the latter question, we see 
significant ruptures between people. The price to pay when presenting oneself as “global” can 
be high and painful, as the example of the polisyn’ala agent illustrates. But so is the price of 
being “local” and remaining as such: those who do not take part in the “sustainability” 
transition can considerably suffer from not being partners in the project, as demonstrated by 
the stories of the seven families who live in in the most remote village of the protected area.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Ala’fady   Sacred forest 
Ambiasa   Traditional healer 
Dina    Customary rules 
Fady    Taboo, interdiction 
Fihavanana   Mutual solidarity 
Fokonolona   Traditional village council 
Fokontany   District 
Hatsake   Slash and burn agriculture 
Kéré    Famine, usually caused by drought 
Kokolampo   Natural spirit(s) 
Polisyn’ala   Forest police 
Rakemba   Elder woman 
Rakiny   Discord 
Rariny    Fair, just 
Vazaha   Foreigner 
Vonon’dina   Ceremony to proceed with the ruling when a dina is not respected 
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ANNEX 
 
CHRONOLOGY OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Researchers in Land tenure and/or Carbon Trade 
 
 
Antanmamo protected area 
 
 
Members of the forest association (CoBa) 
Date Location Identification 
14.06.11 Université Antananarivo B. Ramamonjisoa, ESA Eau et Foret 
14.06.11 Université Antananarivo P. Ranjatson, ESA Eau et Foret 
14.06.11 Observatoire National 
Foncier 
P. Bernaud, socio-economist CIRAD 
15.06.11 Antananarivo J. Ellis, consultant in carbon trade 
13.02.12 Antananarivo Pierre Montagne, CIRAD 
15.02.12 Antananarivo Cécile Bidaud, PhD candidate 
Date Identification 
19.06.11 Forest user 
19.06.11 Forest user who applied to CoBa for a permit to do slash and burn 
agriculture  
20.06.11 Forest user and his family 
20.06.11 Polisyn’ala agent of the village - East 
20.06.11 Forest user 
21.06.11 Polisyn’ala agent of the village - North 
21.06.11 Two cultivators, village at the border/outside the protected area 
21.06.11 Forest user with his family, village at the border/outside the protected area 
18.07.11 Ambiasa,  village at the border/outside the protected area 
Date Identification 
19.06.11 CoBa vice-President 
20.06.11 CoBa vice-President in his native village 
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Case-study A in village East of the protected area  
22.06.11 Deputy mayor 
23.06.11 CoBa vice- President with his family and the village chief 
02.07.11 Chief of fokontany A 
02.07.11 Chief of fokontany B  
03.07.11 Chief of the gendarmerie of Antanmamo 
04.07.11 CoBa vice-President at the eco-tourism bungalows 
05.07.11 CoBa vice-President (follow-up) 
06.07.11 Polisyn’ala agent 
07.07.11 Former posilyn’ala agent fired by CoBa who now works for WWF as the 
manager for reforestation in Antanmamo 
07.07.11 OPCI President, former CoBa President for 2 months 
07.07.11 First polisyn’ala President from 2004-09 fired by CoBa 
08.07.11 First CoBa President from 2002-2008 
10.07.11 Polisyn’ala President since 7 months 
12.07.11 Reforestation agent 
18.07.11 CoBa vice-President  
19.07.11 President of the Comité des Dina 
19.07.11 Deputy mayor (follow-up)  
20.07.11 WWF local agent in Antanmamo 
21.02.12 CoBa President with a polisyn’ala agent 
21.02.12 Discussions between former polisyn’ala agent now reconverted into a 
WWF reforestation manager and a group of forest users 
23.02.12 CoBa vice-President with polisyn’ala President 
23.02.12 WWF reforestation manager looking after the tree nursery 
Date Identification 
24.06.11 Elder in the village  
24.06.11 Focus group with 6 women 
24.06.11 Worker at sisal plantation 
25.06.11 Focus Group  with 7 children 
25.06.11 Two rakemba 
28.06.11 Rondria, chief of the village 
   142 
 
 
 
Case-study B in village North of the protected area 
30.06.11 Inventory of land use and forest use with 10 families 
01.07.11 Inventory of land use and forest use with 5 women 
01.07.11 Man selling firewood at sisal plantation 
01.07.11 Focus Group with 6 women 
02.07.11 Inventory of land use and forest use with 2 families 
02.07.11 Rondria, chief of the village (follow-up) 
03.07.11 Elder in the village (follow-up) 
05.07.11 Inventory natural resources use with 6 families 
05.07.11 Forest user 
06.07.11 Inventory natural resources use with 6 families 
06.07.11 Rondria, chief the village (follow-up) 
06.07.11 Polisyn’ala agent for this village, husband of the rondria’s daughter 
08.07.11 Rondria and his son on land inheritance  
09.07.11 Inventory natural resources use with 5 families 
10.07.11 Two women on land inheritance 
11.07.11 Elder from the village on land inheritance at the hospital 
12.07.11 Son of the elder on the evolution of conservation in Madagascar 
18.02.11 Rondria, chief of the village and his family 
20.02.11 Rondria, chief of the village and his family 
23.02.11 Elder in the village and his family 
01.03.12 Rondria, chief of the village and his family 
Date Identification 
15.07.11 Forest user who was denounced for having done slash and  burn 
15.07.11 Two cultivators 
16.07.11 Rondria with his family 
17.07.11 Focus group with forest users 
18.07.11 Forest user  who was denounced for having done slash and burn with his 
family 
22.02.12 Forest user  who was denounced for having done slash and burn  
22.02.12 Discussions between former polisyn’ala agent guiding us to the village and 
a group of villagers he had denounced while doing his previous job 
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Government bodies & NGOs working in Antanmamo protected area   
 
 
Decision-makers involved in the PHCF  
 
 
 
 
Date Location Identification 
21.07.11 Fort-Dauphin WWF Project manager Anosy region 
21.07.11 Fort-Dauphin WWF Coordinator for Anosy region 
21.07.11 Fort-Dauphin Topographic services, Land Registry  
21.07.11 Fort-Dauphin Land entitlement service, Land Registry 
21.07.11 Fort-Dauphin Conservation Officer, Madagascar National Parks  
22.07.11 Fort-Dauphin Environmental Officer, Forest Service 
25.07.11 Fort-Dauphin WWF Regional Director for Anosy region 
25.07.11 Fort-Dauphin Forest Service agent, responsible for delimitation of 
Antanmamo protected area in 2002 
25.07.11 Fort-Dauphin Conservation Officer, Forest Service  
25.07.11 Fort-Dauphin CARE Coordinator for Anosy region 
25.07.11 Fort-Dauphin ASOS Coordinator for Anosy region 
20.07.11 Antanmamo KIOMBA representative who worked on the creation 
of the protected area in 2002.  
13.02.12 Antananarivo WWF Program Coordinator for the PHCF with 
GoodPlanet PHCF Coordinator 
23.02.12 Antanmamo WWF local agent in Antanmamo 
02.03.12 Fort-Dauphin WWF Project manager Anosy region 
04.03.12 Fort-Dauphin WWF local agent for several zones of intervention 
around Antanmamo 
Date Location Identification 
16.01.12 Geneva (skype 
conversation)  
Former Communication-Officer at WWF-International 
involved in the PHCF 
17.01.12 Paris Action Carbone Program Officer, GoodPlanet 
18.01.12 Paris Yann Arthus-Bertrand, President of GoodPlanet 
19.01.12 Paris Director for Sustainable Development, Air France 
05.03.12 Madagascar WWF Director for Indian Ocean region 
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Journalists who took part in the press visit organised by Air France in 2009 and 2011 
 
 
  
Date Identification 
10.01.12 Journalist at Europe 1 
11.01.12 Journalist at Radio France International 
13.01.12 Journalist at Le Point 
16.01.12 Journalist at Paris Match 
17.01.12 Journalist at Le Point (phone conversation) 
18.01.12 Journalist at Youphil (phone conversation) 
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